From Elections to Appointments of the Regional Governors: Major Challenges and Outcomes
Publication date
Tuesday, 05.02.2008
Authors
S. Sinelnikov-Murylev, P. Kadochnikov, I. Trunin, S. Chetverikov
Series
CEPRA
In 2005 Russian Federation moved from the elections of the regional governor to their appointment by the federal center. The study analyzes the possible changes in the regional governments fiscal policy due to the change of the preferences aggregation mechanism at the regional level. It includes an overview of the existing theoretical and empirical studies, as well as international experience of the regional governments formation. The study also contains a theoretical and empirical analysis of the possible changes in the fiscal policy in Russia at the regional level as a result of the implemented reform.
Contents
Introduction 7
1. Theoretical and Empirical Models of the Public Choice Mechanisms and Preference Aggregation at the Regional Level 8
1.1. Specific Features of Provision of Public Goods at the Regional and Local Levels 12
1.1.1. Effectiveness of Differentiation of Public Benefits by Regions; Decentralization Theorem 15
1.1.2. Limited Provision of Public Benefits Sub-Nationally; Optimum Size of the Region 17
1.1.3. Local Public Goods Provided by Sub-National Governments 25
1.1.4. The Problem of Interregional Externalities Emerging in Public Goods Provision at the Sub-National Level 31
1.2. Regional Governments Preferences: Aggregation 35
1.2.1. Restrictions in Building a Tool for Aggregation of Individual Preferences 36
1.2.2. Establishment of Preferences as those of the Benevolent Dictator 37
1.2.3. Aggregating Individual Preferences Based on Democratic Electoral Procedures 40
1.2.4. Democratic Electoral Preferences Aggregation Mechanisms and Political Business Cycles 44
1.3. Preferences of Regional Governments in Models of Bureaucracy 51
1.3.1. Bureaucrats’ Preferences and Budget Increase 52
1.3.2. Realization of Bureaucrats’ Preferences by Manipulating Alternative Options at Elections 56
1.3.3. Empirical Studies of Median Voter and Bureaucracy Models 61
1.3.4. Modeling Regions’ Support to the Central Federal Government at Elections 67
2. Elections and Appointment of Subnational Authorities: International Experience and Russian Reform 73
2.1. Assessing Contractual Relations between Federal (National) and Regional Governments: A Review of the International Experience and Possible Implications for Russian Federation 73
2.1.1. Principal Issues and Concepts 74
2.1.2. Implementing Effective Transfer Systems: Criteria & “Trade-offs” 77
2.1.3. Types of Intergovernmental Transfers & Mechanisms of Distribution/Provision 82
2.1.4. Conceptual Framework 88
2.1.5. Country Assessments 89
2.1.6. A Typology of Federal–Regional Contractual Relationships 150
2.2. Assessing the Executive Functions of Regional Governments in Multilevel Governance Systems: Review of International Experiences 160
2.2.1. Territory and Institutions: What is at Stake and Why Do the Form and Function of Regional Executives Matter? A Review of the Theoretical/Conceptual Literature on the Executive Functions of Regional Government 162
2.2.2. Territory and Institutions – How to Evaluate a Regional Executive System – Form, Size, Efficiency, and Democracy: A Review of Appointed, Elected, and Mixed Regional Executive Systems 167
2.2.3. Description, History, and Assessment of the French Systems of Regional Executive Functions (with examples from Italy and Spain) 181
2.2.4. The Political Dimension of Regional Executives of France (Italy and Spain) 194
2.2.5. Regional-Central Relations in France (Italy and Spain) 198
2.2.6. The Fiscal Position of Regional Heads in France 202
2.2.7. Conclusion: Merits and Weaknesses of Appointed Executives and Mixed Systems 208
2.3. Reform of the Regional Elections in the Russian Federation 210
2.3.1. Background. Stages in development of the regional governments leadership in post-socialist Russia 210
2.3.2. An Analysis of Constitutionality of the New Procedure of Appointment and Dismissal of the Regional Governors 217
3. Modeling Financial Behavior of the Regional Governments under Changes of the Political Structure of Russian Federation 223
3.1. Main Assumptions and Structure of the Model 223
3.2. The Regional and Federal Governments’ Preferences 231
3.3. Modeling the Financial Behavior of the Regional Governments after the Changesof the Political Structure of the Russian Federation 236
4. An Empirical Analysis of the Reform Results 244
4.1. The Main Hypotheses for the Changes in the Financial Behavior of Regional Governments 244
4.2. The Specification of Econometric Models and the Data Description 250
4.3. Results of the Econometric Estimation of Regional Budget Expenditure Models 257
4.3.1. Expenditures on Public Health Care 257
4.3.2. Expenditures on Public Education 260
4.3.3. Expenditures on General State Issues 263
4.3.4. Expenditures on Law-Enforcement Activity 266
4.3.5. Expenditures on Housing and Utilities 269
4.3.6. Expenditures on Social Policy 272
Conclusions 277
Bibliography 283
From Elections to Appointments of the Regional Governors: Major Challenges and Outcomes / S. Sinelnikov-Murylev, P. Kadochnikov, I. Trunin, S. Chetverikov ; Consortium for Economic Policy Research and Advice ; Canadian Agency for International Development [et al.]. – М. : IET, 2008. – 297 p. : il.
ISBN 978-5-93255-244-5
The research and the publication were undertaken in the frame-work of CEPRA (Consortium for Economic Policy Research and Advice), project funded by the Canadian Agency for International Development (CIDA).
Full version
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