Central Bank eases its grip on the national currency
The Central Bank of Russia has widened to Rb 9 fr om Rb 7 the range of the acceptable ruble value of the dual-currency basket (floating trading band) since August 18, 2014. The range of the currency trading band has been shifted by Rb 1 for either side of the trading band so that the floor and top limits are set Rb 35,4 and Rb 44,4 respectively (now the dual-currency basket value is set Rb 41,61).
At the same time the Central Bank of Russia has reduced to $350m from $1bn the volume of accumulated interventions shifting by 5 kopeks the currency trading band. The Bank of Russia has noted in its statement that it plans to complete the transition to a floating currency exchange rate by the end of 2014.
Therefore, the regulator has reverted back to the course of further easing its grip on the currency exchange rate. In general, the Central Bank’s policy may lead to devaluation of the national currency subject to external macroeconomic changes, namely drastic fall of crude oil prices and growth in capital flight.
Prior to the crisis of 2008-2009 the Bank of Russia was committed to a policy of fixed ruble exchange rate. The dual-currency basket (including the US dollar and the Euro) has been the benchmark of the currency policy since 2005. The structure of the dual-currency basket has been established at $0,55 and 0,45 Euro since February 8, 2007. The exchange rate was allowed to float within a narrow band range, but actual value of the dual-currency basket changed very insignificantly. For instance, in the period of 2006 to H1 2008 the value of the dual-currency basket varied 4% or less. Considering that the balance of payment on the current account of the Russian Federation remained positive, the Bank of Russia had to buy considerable amounts of foreign exchange to be able to maintain a stable exchange rate.
The Stabilization Fund, which was established as early as 2004, was used as instrument of sterilizing excessive money printing. This helped lim it the money printing, which is determined by the purchase of FX revenues from exports of crude oil and natural gas amid growing global prices of energy resources.
Restrictions on capital cross-border movement were removed completely in the middle of 2006. A stable exchange rate and high rates in the internal financial market made the Russian currency attractive for speculators, thereby enabling more than $145bn of net capital inflow over two and a half years elapsed between 2006-2007 and H1 2008. At the same time the Bank of Russia found it impractical to carry out an independent monetary policy subject to a fixed currency exchange rate and free movement of capital (“Impossible trinity”). If excessive inflow of foreign currency amid high prices of crude oil was sterilized using the resources of the Stabilization Fund, the foreign capital inflow led to printing more money and interfered with the control over inflation. Furthermore, high rate of inflation strengthened the ruble exchange rate in real terms amid stable nominal exchange rate.
The crisis of 2008-2009 revealed once again the disadvantages of both horizontal and downward (in a period of “gradual” devaluation of the ruble) trading band. The Bank of Russia spent more than $200bn to support the exchange rate of the national currency within the five months elapsed between September 2008 and January 2009. Since then the regulator has decided to gradually give up the support of stable exchange rate and switch to the targeting inflation regime.
The width of the trading band of changes in the value of the dual-currency basket (currency trading band) increased to Rb 7 in the middle of 2012 from Rb 2 early in 2009. At the same time the volume of accumulated interventions shifting the range of the trading band was reduced.
Early in 2014 the range of the trading band was shifted by 5 kopeks after a total of $350m interventions were made. In March, however, the Bank of Russia lifted this value to $1,5bn due to anticipated instability in the foreign exchange market resulting from the political tensions in Ukraine, thereby slowing down markedly the devaluation of the ruble exchange rate early in March 2014.
Mikhail Khromov, leading expert of Gaidar Institute’s Center for Structural Research
Wednesday, 20.08.2014