From Elections to Appointments of the Regional Governors: Major Challenges and Outcomes Moscow IET

Дата публикации
Понедельник, 27.10.2008

Авторы
S. Sinelnikov-Murylev P. Kadochnikov I. Trunin S. Chetverikov

Серия
Монографии ИЭПП

Аннотация
In 2005 Russian Federation moved from the elections of the regional governor to their appointment by the federal center. The study analyzes the possible changes in the regional governments fiscal policy due to the change of the preferences aggregation mechanism at the regional level. It includes an overview of the existing theoretical and empirical studies, as well as international experience of the regional governments
formation. The study also contains a theoretical and empirical analysis of the possible changes in the fiscal policy in Russia at the regional level as a result of the implemented reform.

Содержание
Introduction 7
1. 1. Theoretical and Empirical Models
of the Public Choice Mechanisms and Preference
Aggregation at the Regional Level 8
1.1. Specific Features of Provision of Public
Goods at the Regional and Local Levels 12
1.1.1. Effectiveness of Differentiation of Public
Benefits by Regions; Decentralization Theorem 15
1.1.2. Limited Provision of Public Benefits
Sub-Nationally; Optimum Size of the Region 17
1.1.3. Local Public Goods Provided
by Sub-National Governments 25
1.1.4. The Problem of Interregional Externalities
Emerging in Public Goods Provision
at the Sub-National Level 31
1.2. Regional Governments Preferences: Aggregation 35
1.2.1. Restrictions in Building a Tool
for Aggregation of Individual Preferences 36
1.2.2. Establishment of Preferences as those
of the Benevolent Dictator 37
1.2.3. Aggregating Individual Preferences Based
on Democratic Electoral Procedures 40
1.2.4. Democratic Electoral Preferences
Aggregation Mechanisms and Political
Business Cycles 44
1.3. Preferences of Regional Governments
in Models of Bureaucracy 51
1.3.1. Bureaucrats' Preferences and Budget
Increase 52
1.3.2. Realization of Bureaucrats' Preferences
by Manipulating Alternative Options
at Elections 56
1.3.3. Empirical Studies of Median Voter
and Bureaucracy Models 61
1.3.4. Modeling Regions' Support
to the Central Federal Government
at Elections 67
2. Elections and Appointment of Subnational
Authorities: International Experience
and Russian Reform 73
2.1. Assessing Contractual Relations between
Federal (National) and Regional Governments:
A Review of the International Experience
and Possible Implications for Russian Federation 73
2.1.1. Principal Issues and Concepts 74
2.1.2. Implementing Effective Transfer Systems:
Criteria & "Trade-offs" 77
2.1.3. Types of Intergovernmental Transfers
& Mechanisms of Distribution/Provision 82
2.1.4. Conceptual Framework 88
2.1.5. Country Assessments 89
2.1.6. A Typology of Federal-Regional
Contractual Relationships 150
2.2. Assessing the Executive Functions of Regional
Governments in Multilevel Governance Systems:
Review of International Experiences 160
2.2.1. Territory and Institutions: What is at Stake
and Why Do the Form and Function of Regional
Executives Matter? A Review of the Theoretical/
Conceptual Literature on the Executive Functions
of Regional Government 162
2.2.2. Territory and Institutions - How to Evaluate
a Regional Executive System - Form, Size, Efficiency,
and Democracy: A Review of Appointed, Elected,
and Mixed Regional Executive Systems 167
2.2.3. Description, History, and Assessment
of the French Systems of Regional Executive
Functions (with examples from Italy and Spain) 181
2.2.4. The Political Dimension of Regional
Executives of France (Italy and Spain) 194
2.2.5. Regional-Central Relations in France
(Italy and Spain) 198
2.2.6. The Fiscal Position of Regional
Heads in France 202
2.2.7. Conclusion: Merits and Weaknesses
of Appointed Executives and Mixed Systems 208
2.3. Reform of the Regional Elections
in the Russian Federation 210
2.3.1. Background. Stages in development
of the regional governments leadership
in post-socialist Russia 210
2.3.2. An Analysis of Constitutionality
of the New Procedure of Appointment
and Dismissal of the Regional Governors 217
3. Modeling Financial Behavior
of the Regional Governments
under Changes of the Political Structure
of Russian Federation 223
3.1. Main Assumptions and Structure
of the Model 223
3.2. The Regional and Federal Governments'
Preferences 231
3.3. Modeling the Financial Behavior
of the Regional Governments after the Changes
of the Political Structure
of the Russian Federation 236
4. An Empirical Analysis
of the Reform Results 244
4.1. The Main Hypotheses
for the Changes in the Financial Behavior
of Regional Governments 244
4.2. The Specification of Econometric Models
and the Data Description 250
4.3. Results of the Econometric Estimation
of Regional Budget Expenditure Models 257
4.3.1. Expenditures on Public Health Care 257
4.3.2. Expenditures on Public Education 260
4.3.3. Expenditures on General State Issues 263
4.3.4. Expenditures on Law-Enforcement Activity 266
4.3.5. Expenditures on Housing and Utilities 269
4.3.6. Expenditures on Social Policy 272
Conclusions 277
Bibliography 283

Примечания
UDC 352.075.31.082.39(470-3)"2005"
BBC 66.3(2Рос),131+67.401.011.2(2Рос)
F94

From Elections to Appointments of the Regional Governors: Major Challenges and Outcomes / S. Sinelnikov-Murylev, P. Kadochnikov, I. Trunin, S. Chetverikov ; Consortium for Economic Policy Research and Advice ; Canadian Agency for International Development [et al.]. -
М. : IET, 2008. - 297 p. : il. - ISBN 978-5-93255-244-5

 

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