

Modelling systemic risk in inter-bank networks: From theoretical to data-driven models

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IIASA, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

What is systemic risk?

- Risk: Effect of **uncertainty** on **objectives** (ISO 31000)
- Single/Individual risk (UNISDR 2013): emerges between two counterparties
- Single risk may lead to a disaster in part of the system, to which an object belongs







- Financial systems: Credit risk failing to make the full prespecified payments
- Management option: higher interest rates to borrowers who are more likely to default

What is systemic risk?

- Systemic risk originates from the connections between objects
 - sometimes also called "networked risks" (Helbing 2013)
 - Systemic risk is a network property => Domino effect
- Systemic risk, by definition, leads to a breakdown or at least major dysfunction of the whole system (Kovacevic and Pflug 2014)
- Different topologies have different probabilities of contagion
- Management of systemic risk is a matter of restructuring financial network








Systemic risk is a global issue

- Financial crisis of 2008 increased the interest in and funding for systemic risk (focusing mostly on the financial sector) to unprecedented levels (May and Arinaminpathy 2009)
- **"Failure of financial mechanism or institution**" one of the major risks in The Global Risks Report 2017, World Economic Forum
- Markets and financial flows are global, but there is no global governance of these (Mau, Gaidar Forum 2017)
- Measurement of systemic risk is a challenge



Science view

Economic-financial systems as networks of interconnected nodes




- Nodes: banks
- Links: liabilities (loans)
- Failures spread from one node to another causing cascading failures

System-wide collapse could be caused by cascading failures

Example: Banking network of Austria

 A measure of systemic risk:
DebtRank = fraction of the economic value that is potentially affected by a collapse of the node


• Related to the node's centrality



How to measure systemic risk?

 Poledna et al. (2015) introduced the notion of an incremental increase in systemic risk caused by an individual financial transaction: marginal systemic risk


Every loan creates systemic risk





Mitigating systemic risk: Systemic risk can be managed by restructuring the network

- How? Incentivize agents to avoid risky transactions
- Simple way: Tax risky transactions
- Agents look for loans with low systemic risk.
- Liability networks re-arrange
- Mitigates the risk of cascading failure






Testing the tax policy with the CRISIS model

Compared three schemes:

- No systemic risk management
- Systemic Risk Tax (SRT)
- Tobin-like tax (0.2% on all transactions)


The CRISIS model is an agent-based model of the economy and financial system that is based on how people and institutions actually behave








Model results: distribution of losses






Model results: cascade size





Model results: transaction volume



Are there other ways to reorganize the network of exposures?


- Different loans have different incremental effects on systemic risk
- We can transfer an exposure from one bank to another using a Credit Default Swap (CDS)





Reorganizing the network of exposures


• A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a form of insurance against default risk:



- A CDS transfers an exposure from one bank to another
- CDSs have a bad reputation, since they can be used for speculation.
- However, if used properly, they effectively rewire the network!

Regulating the CDS market


- The CDS transactions that increase systemic risk can be penalized and the CDS transactions that decrease it can be encouraged
- Such policy is simulated using the CRISIS model



Leduc et al. (submitted)



Model results: distribution of losses



Leduc et al. (submitted)



Publications

S Poledna and S Thurner (2016): Elimination of systemic risk in financial networks by means of a systemic risk transaction tax, Quantitative Finance, 16(10): 1599-1613

S Poledna et al (2015): The multi-layer network nature of systemic risk and its implications for the costs of financial crisis, Journal of Financial Stability, 20: 70-81

M Boss et al (2004): Network topology of the interbank market, Quantitative Finance, 4: 677-684



Questions? Comments?

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