

**Prospects for Migration and Russia's Ethnic Development and Their Account in the Development of Strategic Guidelines of the Country's Development in the Long Run**

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**Prospects for Migration and Russia's Ethnic Development and Their Account in the Development of Strategic Guidelines of the Country's Development in the Long Run.** – M.: IET, 2004. P. 94.

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The aggravation of the demographic situation in Russia in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the discontinuation of natural increment of her population and the start of its contraction compels to revise the migration challenges, because in the current circumstances the completion of the population of the country on the whole and its regions can be associated only with migration. Russia has found herself facing new, very hard challenges, whose gravity has not been yet sufficiently realized. The purpose of the present paper is to identify the challenges to a maximum possible completeness and justify setting a number of problems and to create a basis for their consequent in-depth research.

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# Table of Contents

<b>Introduction</b> .....	5
<b>1. Migration As a Mechanism Of the Geographical Redistribution of Russia’s Population</b> .....	6
<b>2. Internal Migration Challenges</b> .....	9
2.1. The Fleeting Capacity of Internal Migration.....	9
2.2. New Regional Migration Vector: from East to West .....	12
2.3. Main Centers of Gravitation .....	17
2.4. The Population Outflow from the North and Autonomous Units in the Southern Russia.....	22
2.5. Internal Migrations and Urbanization .....	25
2.6. Challenge Knots of Russia’s Settlement .....	32
2.7. Forecast Hypotheses and Some Consequences of Their Implementation.....	40
<b>3. Immigration challenges</b> .....	47
3.1. The visible immigration trends .....	47
3.2. Perspective Needs in Immigration .....	50
3.3. The Labor Market as a Main Engine of Immigration .....	52
3.4. Functions of Immigration and Conflicts Between Them .....	53
3.5. Potential Migration Donors.....	55
3.6. Regions as Potential Recipients of Migration .....	57
3.7. Immigration Policy: the Western Experiences .....	64
3.8. The Immigration Policy: Challenges Facing Russia .....	76
<b>4. Immigration and Russia’s Multiethnicity</b> .....	80
4.1. Immigration and Changing Ethnic Composition .....	80
4.2. The Inevitability of Doctrinal Adjustments .....	82

4.3. Assessment of Threats and Counteraction	
Strategies.....	85
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	90
<b>Annex</b> .....	92

## Introduction

The present research was conducted in parallel with the one focused on prospects of reproduction of Russia's population<sup>1</sup>. It is back-upped by the conclusions we have arrived at while developing – in the framework of the noted research – Russia's demographic forecast up to 2050. The main conclusion is that increasing Russia's and the majority of its regions' population by means of the nation's own reproduction capacity appears unlikely over the upcoming half century. This dramatically increases the significance of migration processes that played a very important role in formation of population of single countries, regions and whole continents through the mankind's history.

In Russia, the role of such processes was important, too. Such historians as S. Solovyev and V. Kluchevsky viewed colonization and consequently the respective migrations as a key phenomenon in Russia's history. However, until recently those have been migrations in a country abundant in terms of population, thus ignorant of the idea of saving it and apt to send it to the neighboring territories, sometimes even compelling it to migrate. The inertia of such 'generosity' was retained even when the reservoir of the Russian population had no longer been able to reproduce itself at the same pace. Only after the possibilities for its tankage through natural reproduction had exhausted and the accumulated 'demographic stock' not only discontinued to grow, but began to deplete steadily, has the socially unwelcome problem of the inevitable need in increasing the country's population by means of migration begun gradually coming to the forefront.

Russia essentially found itself facing new, unusual and hard challenges, whose gravity has not yet been appreciated enough even by the research community, to say nothing of the political establishment and a broader public opinion.

The purpose of the present research is, at least, to identify the challenges as fully as possible and to justify the setting of a number of problems, and to lay out some fundamentals for their further studying.

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<sup>1</sup> See: Vishnevsky A. G., Andreev E.M., Treivish A.I., *Perspektivy razvitiya Rossii: rol demographicheskogo factora*. IEPP, Nauchnye trudy № 53P. M.: 2003, p. 90.

# **1. Migration As a Mechanism Of the Geographical Redistribution of Russia's Population**

An aggravation of the demographic situation in Russia in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the discontinuation of the natural increment in its population and the ongoing contraction of its number compels us to revise migration (both internal and external) problems, for under current circumstances hopes for increasing the population of both the country as a whole and its regions can be associated solely with migration.

Development and colonization of the largest state territory worldwide inhabited by the largest in Europe, but still insufficient population always posed a huge problem both for the Russian Empire and the USSR. The contemporary Russia within its current borders has also experienced and still does see the problem, and even witnesses its intensification.

The interaction between population and its territory, as well as their general connection with the economy are mirrored both by the way a local concentration of the population and the pattern of its settlement was structured throughout the country's territory. The 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed a very dynamic local settlement and geographical distribution of the population of the USSR and Russia, with migrations forming the core mechanism generating such dynamics. As concerns the USSR on the whole, those were primarily domestic migrations, which was not Russia's case. The latter always contributed to a vigorous population exchange with other former USSR republics, and such migrations were internal for her. In the last quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and more specifically in its last decade such external migration formed a significant source of increase in the Russian population, but the internal (for Russia) migrations always played an extremely important role.

For decades, the two main mutually intersecting types of migration flows were changing – and very sufficiently – the spatial organization of the USSR's and Russia's population. Those were inter-regional migrations and rural-urban migration. In some sense, the 1990s drew the line under these two kinds of migration and showed that the transformation capacity of the migrations that can now be considered internal for Russia were about to exhaust, if not fully exhausted.

The exhaustion is qualitative and quantitative.

The qualitative dimension means, given its growing concentration in urban centers, always insufficient and currently shrinking Russia's population does not allow to increase a nationwide presence of Russian citizens, at least, by means of their 'spreading over' in a thin layer throughout the whole territory, while the 'rural-urban' flow in turn is naturally fading due to its shallowing pool, that is, the rural population.

Refusal of its former, 'mobilization' mechanisms, generates the qualitative exhaustion of possibilities for the transforming, 'guided' internal migration flows.

An intense settlement of Russia's Eastern regions and especially the unfavorable Arctic and sub-Arctic regions during nearly the whole 20<sup>th</sup> century became possible thanks to an indirect (and sometimes direct) violence, through the romanticism of the 'Young Komsomol League Draft', conscription for colossal construction sites, maintenance of '*propiska*' in Leningrad or Moscow, etc. The 'human' conversion of the North, which started in the late 1980s, became a fairly normal phenomenon, despite frustration of a huge army of bureaucrats and vendors engaged in the 'Northern Supply'.

But, like the general population outflow from the East to the West, this particular 'conversion' was not driven just by subjective reasons. The problem did not lie just with the conflict between individuals' private interests and the state's political settings and grandiose impracticable projects – the projects themselves proved to be inefficient.

The population's eagerness to move to the habitable and populated and, at the same time, most dynamic areas is not considerations of the moment or a mere reaction to an economic depression, but a long-term trend, the belated manifestation of the transition from an extensive to an intensive development of space, compression of the populated territory and its more efficient use. This contributes to making the general social possibilities more available for the whole population.

The turn from the rigid 'mobilization' mechanisms of the country's development towards liberal and pro-market ones yet to the greater extent exposed the natural polarization of conditions and prospects of growth in Russia's East and West and intensified the earlier emerged migration counter-flow towards the most developed and favorable regions.

At the same time – also thanks to the liberal reforms and the parallel political developments – there began to emerge sometimes compulsory (which is a trivial note), but sometimes, on the contrary, freer than before (this is often ignored) external migration flows, particularly an economic migration (both immigration and emigration) of the kind that has already long been noted in the world.

What was, and will be the future correlation between domestic and external migrations, and how can they contribute to solving demographic, economic, geopolitical and other challenges now facing the country? What will be the place of these crucial social processes in the Russian society's life over the coming years and decades? What kinds of challenges will they give a rise to and what responses will they require?



## 2. Internal Migration Challenges


### 2.1. The Fleeting Capacity of Internal Migration

While much has been said lately about migration to Russia from outside, repatriation of the ethnic Russians and other peoples of Russian Federation, about the compulsory migration fueled by military conflicts arising on the wreckage of the former USSR, an illegal migration, etc., analysts and publicists somewhat overlooked the intra-Russian migration, which is considerably greater than the external one. In this particular realm, however, there were important shifts that demand a very serious appreciation. The migrations of the 1990s appeared not just different from those dictated by the task of more uniform settling of Russian territory, but their essence was opposite. The Russians were abandoning the poorly populated northern and eastern regions for those that anyway enjoyed a large and even excessive population, that is, the country's south-west and center, and migrants from abroad were apt to go there, too. However, considering the overall turnover (52.4 mn. migrations between 1989 to 2000), it was dominated by domestic migrations, for  $\frac{3}{4}$  of migrations were noted within Russia (*Fig. 1*), of which 55% – within the same Subjects of the Federation (oblasts, krais and republics), while another 45% were inter-regional migrations. These are classical proportions of gravitation migrations. Even in the years of the maximal migration inflow from the CIS and the Baltic states, the proportion of domestic migration in the aggregate number of migrations did not plunge below 66%, while recently it has accounted for over 80% of all the migrations.

Notably, the number of migrations – both internal and external (at least, registered) ones was declining steadily over the 1990s (*Fig. 2*): in 2000, the aggregate number of migrations accounted for 2.8 mn. individuals vs. 6.3 mn. reported in 1989.

Fig. 1


**Components of Russia's Migration Turnover in 1989–2000**



Source: here and below – the official data of Goskomstat of RF unless indicated otherwise.

Fig. 2

**Dynamics of Volumes of Internal and External Migrations. Russia, 1989–2002**




The most drastic drop in the intensity of migration, nonetheless, was noted at the very beginning of the 1990s, consequently followed by some rise in 1994–1995. However, since 1996 the volume of migrations resumed their decline countrywide. The decline in the volume of migration was propelled by a serious crisis, and it complicates the emergence of normal market mechanisms that propel the functioning of the labor, housing and land markets.

The contraction in the gross migration (as the aggregate of in- and out-migration) took place in all the okrugs of RF, however, it meets the eye—that those ones located in the eastern part of the country showed a relatively greater migration turnover (*Fig. 3*), due to an intense migration to the western part of the country and considerable population migrations from the north southward within the okrugs.

*Fig. 3*

**Gross Migration Rate by Federal Okrugs in 1991–2000**



During the period in question, the intensity of migrations fell and its vectors changed. It has discontinued to solve a the tasks, which for had long been considered major ones, at least, as long as inter-regional migrations were concerned.

## 2.2. New Regional Migration Vector: from East to West

During the past centuries, Russia's population was moving down north- and eastward. The agrarian overpopulation in the western part of the country, the need in populating vast Siberian space, the industrialization of the eastern part of the country that intensified dramatically during World War II, due to the evacuation of thousands of plants there, the post-war development of the natural resources base there constituted the major reasons propelled the noted eastbound movement that was not always voluntary, though.

The population outflow was noted primarily in the Central-Black-soil, North-Western, Volga-Vyatka and Ural economic regions (while the first two had been losing their populations since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Ural region experienced that since the 1950s). These Russian regions have long formed a major demographic donor area both for Siberia and Far East, and Kazakhstan and the Central Asia.

The eastbound migration process was not constant: more specifically, because of migration, the Western Siberia lost as much as 800,000 in the 1960s. Likewise, the eastern Siberia also periodically experienced the same process. A negative migration balance was also noted there in the 1970s (*Table 1*).

*Table 1*

### Net Migration Rate By Russia's Economic Regions Between 1970–1998 (per 10,000)

	1970–1978	1979–1988	1989–1998
<b>Russia, total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>21</b>
Northern	5	7	-50
Northwestern	78	56	27
Central	25	34	38
Volga-Vyatka	-47	-27	22
Central-Black-soil	-49	-18	68
Volga	11	-1	48
North-Caucasian	11	4	49
Ural	-51	-28	19
West-Siberian	-9	58	18
East-Siberian	-9	5	-21
Far- Eastern	70	45	-102

*Sources:* Chislennost, sostav i dvizhenie naselenia v RSFSR. Moskva, RIITS Goskomstata RSFSR, p. 46–47; Naselenie Rossiii 1999. Sedmoy ezhegodny demographichesky doklad. Moskva, 2000. P. 145.

It was only the Far East that enjoyed a steady migration increment in its population.

The situation began to change in the late 1980s, when the local population began to leave the North. In parallel with that, most of the other regions of the European part of the country saw a discontinuation of outflow of their population.

When the USSR and its economy began to collapse, the population began to abandon hastily the North, where many enterprises had become idle and other kinds of activities (for instance, prospecting and meteorological service) had been cut down. Plus, under the galloping inflation the benefits and 'northern bonuses' no longer formed incentives and failed to maintain living standards. Many cities and settlements saw their social sphere collapse, and the unemployment became dangerously close. Many of those born in the former USSR republics (such as Ukraine and Belarus) headed back, to their 'national quarters', as they were concerned about losing their housing reserved for them there and their work record needed to get pension.

In the conditions of economic crisis, the central and southwestern regions grow attractive to potential migrants. There the advantages generated by market relations manifested themselves much faster than elsewhere, particularly thanks to their better infrastructure, proximity to the western markets for cheap goods, a greater consumer demand capacity. It was those regions where the best conditions for alternative incomes unfolded, such as the so-called shuttle trade and other kinds of self-employment that literally saved the population from going flat-broke at the first stage of the economic crisis. The central and southwestern regions also saw an inflow of compulsory migrants and repatriates from the former Soviet republics, and demobilized military staff from dismissed units. Those groups secured migration increment in all the federal okrugs, but the Far-eastern (*Table 2*). In the early 1990s, the population inflow from the former Soviet republics appeared especially significant in the Central, Southern and Volga okrugs. The further down eastward, the less moderate the inflow was, and it totally faded in the trans-Baikal area.

The picture of the territorial movement of Russia's population has changed drastically thus interrupting for a long time (and maybe forever) the population's centuries- long north- and eastward migration.

Table 2

**The Components of the Population Migration Increase  
in the Federal Okrugs of the Russian Federation between 1991–2002**

	<b>1991–1995</b>	<b>1996–2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Russia, total</b>	<b>1981,1</b>	<b>1351,4</b>	<b>72,2</b>	<b>77,9</b>
Due to the internal migration	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Due to the migration with the CIS and the Baltic states	2507,5	1737,3	124,0	124,7
Due to migration with other countries	-526,4	-386,0	-51,8	-46,7
<b>The Central okrug, total</b>	<b>929,1</b>	<b>839,9</b>	<b>111,2</b>	<b>123,5</b>
Due to the internal migration	302,2	426,0	72,7	81,8
Due to the migration with the CIS and the Baltic states	744,3	466,5	42,5	45,4
Due to migration with other countries	-117,4	-52,6	-3,9	-3,6
<b>The Northwestern okrug, total</b>	<b>-35,2</b>	<b>56,8</b>	<b>11,1</b>	<b>11,0</b>
Due to the internal migration	-119,9	-34,4	6,6	3,9
Due to the migration with the CIS and the Baltic states	154,2	133,7	8,8	10,8
Due to migration with other countries	-69,5	-42,4	-4,3	-3,8
<b>The Southern okrug, total</b>	<b>772,2</b>	<b>187,2</b>	<b>12,9</b>	<b>-0,9</b>
Due to the internal migration	214,5	-31,2	1,1	-13,7
Due to the migration with the CIS and the Baltic states	636,4	269,4	19,3	18,9
Due to migration with other countries	-78,6	-51,0	-7,4	-6,1
<b>The Volga okrug, total</b>	<b>758,2</b>	<b>407,7</b>	<b>6,8</b>	<b>2,8</b>
Due to the internal migration	196,7	82,7	-13,6	-14,2
Due to the migration with the CIS and the Baltic states	620,8	369,7	26,5	23,0
Due to migration with other countries	-59,2	-44,7	-6,1	-6,0
<b>The Ural okrug, total</b>	<b>34,7</b>	<b>160,0</b>	<b>11,6</b>	<b>3,0</b>
Due to the internal migration	-75,7	-29,2	3,5	-2,3
Due to the migration with the CIS and the Baltic states	152,8	223,8	13,0	9,8
Due to migration with other countries	-42,4	-34,6	-4,9	-4,4
<b>The Siberian okrug, total</b>	<b>90,3</b>	<b>15,0</b>	<b>-35,8</b>	<b>-33,7</b>
Due to the internal migration	-110,5	-120,2	-26,0	-27,9

Table 2

1	2	3	4	5
Due to the migration with the CIS and the Baltic states	343,6	264,8	13,9	16,0
Due to migration with other countries	343,6	264,8	13,9	16,0
<b>The Far-eastern okrug, total</b>	<b>-568,2</b>	<b>-315,3</b>	<b>-45,6</b>	<b>-27,8</b>
Due to the internal migration	-407,3	-293,6	-44,2	-27,5
Due to the migration with the CIS and the Baltic states	-144,6	9,4	0,1	0,7
Due to migration with other countries	-16,4	-31,1	-1,4	-1,0

Since the late 1980s the domestic migrations have steadily drifting westward. The poles of the drift are formed by the Central okrug that collects population from elsewhere and the Far-eastern okrug that contributes with its population to the other okrugs. The migration can be tracked down using an inter-regional migration matrix built for the federal okrugs of RF (*Table 3*).

Table 3

### Net Migration between Federal Okrugs of RF in 1991–2000, as Thos

In an exchange with the territory:	Received or lost by the territory:							
	<i>Russia, total</i>	Central	Northwestern	Southern	Volga	Ural	Siberian	Far – eastern
Russia, total		618,3	-148,6	165,1	294,6	-73,8	-185,9	-669,8
Central	-618,3		-134,3	-89,9	-38,2	-51,8	-104,3	-199,8
Northwestern	148,6	134,3		31,3	63,5	-4,4	-23,0	-53,1
Southern	-165,1	89,9	-31,3		19,4	-26,4	-66,8	-149,9
Volga	-294,6	38,2	-63,5	-19,4		-59,4	-72,4	-118,1
Ural	73,8	51,8	4,4	26,4	59,4		-28,1	-40,2
Siberian	185,9	104,3	23,0	66,8	72,4	28,1		-108,8
Far-eastern	669,8	199,8	53,1	149,9	118,1	40,2	108,8	

The *Table 3* shows that in the last decade the Central, Volga and Southern federal okrugs enjoyed a positive balance of internal migration: they increased

their populations by 1,078 Thos. migrated from other okrugs, while other okrugs were losing their populations. The drift eastward becomes yet clearer in the course of computation of a staggered Table across economic regions<sup>2</sup>.

Ranking okrugs basing on how many okrugs contribute to an increase in the population of the given okrug provides the following picture (*Table 4*).

*Table 4*

**The rating of the Federal Okrugs by Their Performance in the Migration Exchange between 1991–2000 (Net Migration, as Thos.)**

	Rank						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Central	Volga	Southern	Northeastern	Ural	Siberian	Far-eastern
Net migration, total	618,3	294,6	165,1	-148,6	-73,7	-185,9	-669,8
Including:							
With lower rank okrugs	618,3	332,8	274,5	80,5	68,3	108,8	
With higher rank okrugs		-38,2	-109,3	-229,1	-142	-294,6	-669,8

As the *Table 4* shows, against often cited opinions, it was the Volga, not Southern, okrug that was ranked the second in the '90s. This particular okrug lost its population only in exchange with the Central one, while having positive exchange balances with the others. By contrast, the Southern okrug gave away its population to the Volga one, plus it received a smaller number of migrants than the Volga okrug, etc.

*Table 5* provides the respective ranking by each year.

One can see, over past decades okrug's positions were changing. More specifically, the original leader, the Southern okrug, lost to the Volga and the Central and consequently- even to the Ural and the North-western okrugs. The Siberian okrug also lost points in the course of time, followed in the late 1990s by the Volga okrug. By contrast, the Central okrug that was ranked No. 3 in 1991, has been an absolute leader since 1995, while the Ural and Northwestern okrugs also improved their positions. It was only the Far-Eastern okrug that always held the

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<sup>2</sup> See: *Naselenie Rossii 2000. Vosmoy ezhegodny demographichesky doklad / Editor-in-chief A.G. Vyshnevsky. M., 2001.*



last line, as decade it was giving away its population to the others over the decade in question.

Table 5

**The Federal Okrug's Ranking by Their Performance in Annual Migration Exchange between 1991–2000 (net migration as Thos.)**

year	Ranking						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1991	South.	Volga	Central.	Siber.	N-W	Ural	Far-east.
	40,1	23,6	20,2	-9,2	-14,4	-22,1	-38,1
1992	Volga	Central.	South.	Ural	Siber.	N-W	Far-east.
	49,8	33,2	32,1	-17,3	-7,5	-24,1	-66,0
1993	Volga	Central.	South.	Ural	N-W	Siber.	Far-east.
	53,0	47,6	21,6	-6,3	-24,3	-18,0	-73,6
1994	Volga	Central	South.	Ural	N-W	Siber.	Far-east.
	51,3	63,1	43,2	-11,1	-20,2	-17,8	-108,6
1995	Central.	Volga	South.	N-W	Ural	Siber.	Far-east.
	70,8	37,3	28,5	-18,2	-7,5	-14,1	96,8
1996	Central.	Volga	South.	Ural	N-W	Siber.	Far-east.
	60,4	20,0	13,3	3,1	-11,5	-19,0	-66,3
1997	Central.	Ural	Volga	South.	N-W	Siber.	Far-east.
	80,8	5,0	18,2	3,2	-13,1	-30,5	-63,6
1998	Central.	Volga	South.	N-W	Ural	Siber.	Far-east.
	85,4	20,4	-3,7	-8,4	-4,7	-25,7	-63,3
1999	Central.	Volga	South.	N-W	Ural	Siber.	Far-east.
	82,9	23,3	-0,5	-12,6	-14,3	-21,6	-60,0
2000	Central.	N-W	Ural	Volga	South.	Siber.	Far-east.
	73,9	-1,6	1,6	-2,3	-12,6	-22,4	-36,6
2001	Central.	N-W	Ural	South.	Volga	Siber.	Far-east.
	72,6	6,6	3,5	-11,9	-13,5	-26,1	-31,2

It is worthwhile noting that in the years of economic prosperity (1997 and 2000–2001) the Ural and Northwestern okrugs would improve their rating; on the contrary, in the times of deterioration of the overall economic situation (1998–1999) they lost their positions to the Southern and Volga okrugs.

### 2.3. Main Centers of Gravitation

The major Russian migrant gravitation centers are the Moscow and St. Petersburg agglomerations. Their powerful absorbing role began especially visible since the 1970s, while in the 1980s their share of migrants redistributed within the USSR on the whole accounted for nearly 50%. In the early 1990s, Moscow to a certain extent lost the role of a migrant-attracting center. According to the

official statistical data, between 1991–1995 the city’s migration increment formed by the domestic migration accounted just for 11,000, which is negligibly low when compared with the earlier times. Moreover, like St. Petersburg and many other Russian cities, in 1992–1993 Moscow was losing its population. Such tendencies formed the ground for statements about the reverse nature of the urbanization process and its broken phasic nature. All that also affected the migration performance of the Central and Northwestern okrugs.

*Table 6*

**Components of the Moscow Capital Region Population Migration Increase Between 1991–2002, as Thos.**


	<b>1991–1995</b>	<b>1996–2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>
<b>The Moscow region, total</b>	<b>131,8</b>	<b>453,2</b>	<b>92,2</b>	<b>100,5</b>
Due to the internal migration	115,1	331,9	76,7	83,9
Due to the migration with the CIS and the Baltic states	108,2	152,4	17,0	18,1
Due to migration with other countries	–91,4	–31,1	–1,5	–1,5
including:				
<b>Moscow oblast, total</b>	<b>138,4</b>	<b>183,8</b>	<b>40,1</b>	<b>52,3</b>
Due to the internal migration	72,1	115,2	30,4	40,7
Due to the migration with the CIS and the Baltic states	77,8	74,1	10,2	12,0
Due to migration with other countries	–11,6	–5,5	–0,4	–0,4
<b>Moscow, total</b>	<b>–6,6</b>	<b>269,4</b>	<b>52,1</b>	<b>48,2</b>
Due to the internal migration	42,9	216,8	46,4	43,2
Due to the migration with the CIS and the Baltic states	30,3	78,3	6,8	6,1
Due to migration with other countries	–79,9	–25,6	–1,1	–1,1

However, Moscow’s migration performance in the late 1990s once again compelled one to view the city as the greatest magnet for migrants from all the country’s regions. Between 1996 to 2000 the internal migration alone to the national capital resulted in a 207,900 increase in the number of its residents. Though in annual terms the increase was not so impressive accounting for just slightly over 40,000, however, the amount was greater than in any other Russian region, and it made up 54% of the population increase of the whole Central federal okrug. As of early 2001, the Moscow city population accounted for 23.3% of the Central okrug one.

Where did Moscow attracted so many migrants from? As it can be seen from *Fig. 4*, the major migration ‘donor’ for Moscow were other Subjects of the Central okrug: their contribution to Moscow’s migration increment accounted for 40%. The neighboring Southern, Volga and Northwestern okrugs provided nearly the same proportion of the increase, while the regions located in Russia’s East secured less than 25% of the capital city’s migration increase.

*Fig. 4*

**The Distribution of Moscow’s Population Migration Increase by Federal Okrugs in 1996–2000**



Out of the 84,000 migration increase in Moscow’s population supplied by the Central okrug, 30,100 was provided by Moscow oblast, while the five neighbor oblasts – Tver, Vladimir, Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga together ‘supplied’ roughly the same amount of migrants – 28.800.

Moscow oblast in turn compensated for its Moscow-bound population outflow at the expense of other oblasts. Moscow oblast likewise enjoys migration increase secured by all other Russia’s regions except the city of Moscow itself.

For migrants, the capital region on the whole currently undoubtedly appears the most attractive region in the country.


In the Central okrug, there is only one region enjoying a positive migration balance within the okrug, that is, Belgorod oblast. It gives away its population only to the Moscow region and St. Petersburg, holding, at the same time, positive migration balances with other regions of the country.

This particular example clearly highlights the centripetal force of the migration process in the contemporary Russia. While the Central okrug attracts population from all other federal okrugs, within itself the population migrates to the capital region, while residents of Moscow oblasts vigorously migrate to Moscow.

Following Moscow, St. Petersburg: in 1991–1995 the city experienced a 17.7 Thos. migration loss in its population exchange with other Russian regions. At the time, Leningrad oblast found itself in a better situation having a 28.400 in-flow, thanks to its positive balance with St. Petersburg.

*Fig. 5*

**Distribution of Poulation Migration Increase in St. Petersburg and Lenigrad Oblast across Federal Okrugs in 1996–2000**



In the late 1990s, thanks to the domestic migration, St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast received 81,300 migrants, while the population outflow from these specific regions was noted only to Moscow and Moscow oblast and – an insignificant one, though – to the neighbor Novgorod oblast. At the same time the migration imbalance with the capital region was fully compensated by other regions of the Central okrug.

In contrast to Moscow and Moscow oblast, for St. Petersburg it is the migration with the okrugs of the Asian part of the country that plays a greater role, for it secures 44% of the city’s migration increase (*Fig. 5*). Likewise, the European North plays a significant role, for the migration from there to St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast is much more intense than to the capital region. That is why

this specific region has every right to be ranked the second biggest migration center nationwide.

In the Volga okrug, the population moves to Nizhny Novgorod oblast. It bears considerable migration losses only in its exchange with the capital region. However, Nizhny Novgorod oblast does not form a dominating center: it has a number of large rivals in the same okrug, namely, Tatarstan and Samara oblast. It is only thanks to these three regions that the Volga federal okrug maintains a positive migration balance in the nationwide domestic migration: their aggregate migration increment between 1996–2000 accounted for 91,700 (while the respective amount for the Volga okrug on the whole made up 79,500). These regions, however, have a steady and significant losses in their exchange with the two capital regions.

In the south of Russia, the following regions experience a considerable increase in the internal migration: the ‘plain sub-Caucasus’ regions – Krasnodar (78,100 over 1996–2000) and Stavropol (36,800) kraises. In the early 1990s, these were the most attractive regions for migrants. Nowadays, migration within the area is of a great importance for their migration balances: it secures nearly all the migration increase for Stavropol and almost 40% of that for Krasnodar krai, with the migration from Chechnya accounting for a large part of that.

At the same time, Krasnodar krai enjoys intensively attracts population from many regions of Siberia, the Far East, and the European North, which makes it a large inter-regional center of migration gravitation.

Novosibirsk oblast forms a fairly large, though local center of migration gravity. While having practically zero migration balance with the western part of the country, it attracts population from all the Siberian and Far-eastern regions.

Further East, none of regions can pretend to the title of even a local center of migration gravitation, for all of them experience either an intense migration loss, or more or less compensate for their migration outflows to the ‘more western regions at their neighbors’ (located to the north or east of them) expense.

Thus, in the late 1990s, suffering migration losses with all the okrugs to the east of it, Khabarovsk krai compensated for nearly 30% of that, thanks to the Far-eastern okrug. Similarly, in the same period Irkutsk oblast compensated for nearly 50% of its migration losses caused by the migration exchange with the western parts of the country by attracting population of the regions located to the east of it.

## **2.4. The Population Outflow from the North and Autonomous Units in the Southern Russia**

In the 1990s, there emerged a stable and rather compact in terms of territory zone of population outflow that embraced the whole North, eastern Siberia and Far East. It was formed by the northern regions (Murmansk, Arkhangelsk oblasts, and Komi Republic), a part of Siberian regions (Krasnoyarsk krai, Chita, Irkutsk and Tomsk oblasts with their respective territorial okrugs, Republic of Buryatia and Tyva), and the whole Far East. Between 1991 through 2000 the noted regions lost almost 1.3 mn., solely due to the nationwide domestic migration, or roughly 6% of their population, as of the early 1990s. The population outflow to other regions was most intense from Chukotka AO and Magadan oblast, Murmansk oblast and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).

Migration losses of the ‘donor’ regions are of course comparable with gains of the ‘recipient’ zone. That, however, does not imply a direct population exchange between the zones, for there is a group of regions with a balanced exchange. Those are, first of all, the Ural regions and those in the Southern Siberia. Some of them, for instance, Orenburg, Kurgan oblasts, and recently Altai krai have had a negative balance of their migration exchange with other Russian territories, but they benefited greatly from the external migration, primarily from Kazakhstan and the Middle Asian countries.

So where do residents of the Russian North and eastern regions migrate? With the account of a great length of the donor zone, it would be appropriate to divide it into three parts: the European North, the Siberian North and the Far East.

The European North (Murmansk, Arkhangelsk oblasts, Republic of Komi and Nenetsky AO) give away their population chiefly to the Center and the southern Northwestern regions (*Fig. 6*), while the migration outflow to the Asian part of the country is negligible. Notably, the European North even enjoys a slight (1,100 over 1996–2000) migration increment with the Far-eastern okrug. The most intense migration flows from the European North are noted to St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast, the capital region, Krasnodar krai, Nizhny Novgorod and Belgorod oblasts (the aggregate share of these regions accounts for 40% of the European North’s migration losses).

The Siberian North also loses its population in their exchange with all the okrugs except the Far East, however the migration ‘gain’ at the latter’s expense is fairly insignificant, and it compensates for less than 10%. The major migration vectors are the Southern Siberia, Central, Volga and Southern okrugs.


The Far East forms the zone of a complete migration exodus. Migration from there is noted both to the Siberian and Ural okrugs (22% of the aggregate loss)

and to the European part of the country. While compared with the Siberian North, a more significant outflow is noted to the Southern okrug, with which the Far-eastern regions have long established intensive migration connections.

A stable zone of migration outflow in the past decade (as well as in the prior ones) was formed by the republics of the North Caucasus (except Adygeya populated chiefly by Russians) joined by Kalmykia. In the late 1990s, the outflow from those republics to other parts of the country accounted for some 140,000<sup>3</sup>. The region’s specificity is that a major migration outflow from there is forwarded to its plain part.

Fig. 6

**Distribution of the Migration Losses of the Donor Zone across Federal Okrugs in 1996–2000**



A number of regions located in central Russia also experience migration losses. While they were receiving an intense migration inflow from the CIS countries and the Baltic states, such peculiarities of the domestic migration were not particularly visible. However, a drastic fall (at least, registered) in the migration inflow has created a situation when the overall natural population loss in central Russia was complemented by the migration one.

In 1996–2000, the domestic migration generated losses in Kursk, Smolensk, Tula, Tambov, Ryazan oblast, and the Republic of Mordovia (Table 7).

<sup>3</sup> Estimated data, as there is no registration of newcomers in the Chechen Republic.

Fig. 7

**Distribution of Migration Losses of the National Republics of the Southern Russia across Federal Okrugs in 1996–2000**




Table 7

**The Balances of Domestic Migrations Across Some Regions of Central Russia in 1996–2000**

Regions	Migration loss-total, as Thos.	Including in the exchange with other regions of the Central federal okrug
Kursk oblast	-3,1	-9,7
Ryazan oblast	-5,6	-11,2
Smolensk oblast	-3,9	-8,3
Tambov oblast	-6,9	-9,9
Tula oblast	-1,8	-11,5
Republic of Mordovia	-8,7	-4,6

The evaluation of the two-way migration exchange between Russian regions allows to identify the most typical current vectors of the inter-regional redistribution of Russia's population:

1. From East Westbound. This trend has been steadily in place over the past decade.

2. From Central Russian oblasts to the largest megapolises (primarily Moscow and St. Petersburg). This is an old trend which has become especially notable over last 3–4 years.



3. From the republics of the North Caucasus to plain sub-Caucasian areas, the largest cities of the Central and Volga okrugs, which forms a steady trend.

Other major directions of redistribution of Russia’s population:


- from the northern part of the Far East to the southern part of the Far East;
- from the European North to St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast;
- from the Far East to plain sub-Caucasian areas;
- from the regions bordering Kazakhstan to urban agglomerations of the Volga and Ural okrugs.

### 2.5. Internal Migrations and Urbanization

In addition to securing population redistribution between Russian regions, internal migrations also serve as a core vehicle of urbanization. Through the whole 20<sup>th</sup> century, urbanization in Russia was developing at a more impressive pace than the settlement of the country’s remote northern and eastern areas. Russia was rapidly developing into a country of cities and townspeople (*Fig. 8*).

*Fig. 8*

**Russia’s Urban and Rural Population. 1897–2002, as mn. (Persons)**



In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, only 15% of Russia’s population was urban and resided largely in small towns whose population accounted for less than 50,000.

The list of the biggest cities was topped by the two historical capitals – St. Petersburg (1, 265.000) and Moscow (1,039.000), followed by Saratov, Kazan, Tula and Astrakhan whose populations, however, did not exceed 150.000. In another 17 cities the number of residents was between 50,000 to 90,000.

By the late 1930s, one-third of Russians already lived in urban settlements, by the late 1950s – already half of them, and by the late 1980s – nearly three-thirds of Russians were townspeople. For the period of less than 100 years there emerged over 600 cities, and the number of urban villages had been growing continuously until 1991.

The urban population growth rates remained fairly high up to 1990, when its share reached a peak value of 73.9%, followed by a decline: between 1991 to 2001 the urban population fell by 4, 264.000 persons, or by 3.9%.

Up to the early 1990s the rise in Russia's urban population was fueled by three factors: a natural increase, net migration, and administrative-territorial transformations, because of which many rural residents turned into townspeople without making a step out of their door (*Fig. 9*). The natural loss of the urban population that had began to emerge since 1992 has become a major factor of the fall in the number of townspeople. The migration outflow from urban settlements noted in 1991–1992 furthered the contraction of Russia's urban population. The process was also greatly complemented by a reverse transformation of urban settlements into rural ones, which became a mass process in 1991–1992, and in 1999. That was associated with certain utility-related and land benefits that helped rural residents survive in the situation of the crises. The opposite processes have not discontinued, nevertheless: in 1998 a new town – Mikhailovsk, with the population of 50,000 – appeared in Stavropol krai, while in 1999 in Leningrad oblast the town of Volosovo (11,000) was created.

Between the 1989 and 2002 censuses the overall number of urban settlements dropped for the first time, which primarily concerned smaller ones (*Table 8*). By contrast, the number of bigger urban settlements (with the local population starting from 100,000) grew from 165 up to 168, though the composition of the group changed notably.

The city of Volgograd joined the group of millionaire cities.

The group of cities with the number of residents between 500,000 to 1 mn. suffered the loss of, accordingly, Volgograd, as well as Tula, Tomsk and Kemerovo, where the number of residents now is under 500,000. However, the group was joined by Tumen and Lipetsk.

The group of cities with the population over 100,000 lost Magadan, Kolpino, Vorkuta, Andjero-Sudjensk, Michurinsk, Ussolye-Sibirskoye, Kineshma and Votkinsk, but was joined by Bataysk, Derbent, Nazran, Nefteyugansk, Zheleznodorozhny, Zelenodolsk, Kyzyl, Elista.

Table 8

**The Grouping of Russian Urban Settlements by the Number of Residents, According to the Census Data**

	1926	1939	1959	1970	1979	1989	2002
Urban settlements, total	1163	1317	2372	2838	3045	3230	2938
<i>Including by the number of residents:</i>							
Up to 100,000	1143	1265	2280	2714	2893	3065	2770
100–499,900	18	48	78	107	126	131	135
500–999,990	–	2	12	11	18	22	20
Over 1 mn.	2	2	2	6	8	12	13

*Source:* Rossiysky statistichesky ezhegodnik, 2003. M.: Goskomstat Rossii. P. 80–81.

Despite some new trends in the urban and rural population dynamics, apparently the urbanization process in Russia continues. After a slight decline in the 1990s, the proportion of urban population has stabilized at the level of 73%, while according to the most recent data, the proportional weight of urban residents that reside in big and the largest cities is growing (*Table 9*). In 2002, the cities with the number of residents over 100,000 were home to 64.2% of urban population vs. 62.4% reported in 1989, of which 40% and 37%, respectively, resided in the millionaire cities. The number of residents in the latter grew by 9%, while those of cities with the population between 100,000 to 250,000 – by 7%. By contrast, the aggregate population of cities with 500,000 to 1 mn. residents fell by 12%, while that of cities with 250,000 to 500,000 fell by 3%.

Table 9

**The Distribution of Russia's Urban Population Across Urban Settlements of Different Size, According to the Censuses, as %**

	1926	1939	1959	1970	1979	1989	2002
All urban residents	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
<i>Including across urban settlements with the number of residents:</i>							
Up to 100,000	60,8	49,4	48,6	42,5	38,5	37,6	35,8
100,000 to 499,900	17,1	27,8	25,1	28,8	28,2	26,1	26,8
500,000 – 999,900	–	3,2	13,4	10,3	13,3	13,0	11,7
Over 1 mn.	22,1	19,7	12,9	18,3	19,9	23,3	25,7

The proportion of urban population is the greatest one in the Northwestern federal okrug –82.3%, followed by the Ural (80.7%) and Central (79.9%) federal okrugs. The respective index is lowest in the Southern federal okrug (57.6%). Interestingly, between the 1989 and 2002 censuses it dropped by 2.2 percent

points. Similarly, the share of urban population slightly (at 0.6 p. p.) dropped in the Siberian federal okrug.

The regions – Subjects of the Federations show yet greater differences in the urbanization level and trends (*Fig. 9*). Given that in some Far-northern areas, namely, Magadan, Murmansk oblasts, Khanty-Mansy autonomous okrug, the share of urban population accounted for 91–92%, in Koryak and Komi-Permyak<sup>4</sup> autonomous okrug and the Altay Republic – just 26%, while in Ust-Ordynasky Buryatsky autonomous okrug there is no urban population at all, because of the transformation of its administrative center into a rural settlement. Between the 1989 and 2002 censuses the share of urban population fell in 36 regions. Apart from the aforementioned Ust-Ordynasky Buryatsky (a 18.4 p. p. fall) and Koryak (11.5 p. p.) autonomous okrugs, the fall was especially notable in Orenburg oblast (by 7 points), Republic of Karelia (6.4 points) and Chukotka autonomous okrug (by 6.1 points). At the same time, the respective index showed some growth in other regions, namely, Magadan oblast (at 8.7 points), Kaluga oblast (6.2 points), Yamal-Nenetsky autonomous okrug and the Republic of Tyva (by more than 5 p. each).


The change in the number of urban and rural population of regions - Subjects of RF (*Fig. 10, 11*), according to the censuses, shows that the contraction in the former was characteristic of the 1990s (except for the noted Ust-Ordynasky Buryatsky autonomous okrug, where the number of urban residents had reduced slightly between 1970–1979, too). This is associated chiefly with a steady trend to the natural population loss which migration increment fails to compensate for. On the one hand, the migration capacity of the countryside that had been supplying its excessive population to cities (*Fig. 11*) has exhausted by now. On the other hand, not all the urban settlements and regions appear equally attractive to migrants. In addition, some of national-territorial units have retained until lately (and some still do) natural increment.

Between the censuses in question the urban population grew notably in the Republic of Dagestan (at 42%), Stavropol krai (17.5%), city of Moscow (16.7%), belogorod oblast (14%), Khanty-Mansy autonomous okrug (11.6%) and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic (10.6%).

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<sup>4</sup> According to the local referendum held on 7 December, 2003, the autonomous okrug is going to join Perm oblast as a district .

### The Change in the Proportion of Russia's Urban Population, According to the Censuses by regions, as %




*Note:* in the Fig. Above, all the regions- Subjects of the Federation are numbered in a standard fashion set by Goskomstat of RF (see *Annex*).

Accordingly, the greatest increment was characteristic of such cities as Nazran (6-fold), Makhachkala (by 48%), Zelenograd (36%), Derbent (30%), Stary Oskol, Novorossiysk and Kyzyl (at some 25% each), Kislovodsk, Armavir, Nalchik (19–22% each). At the same time, of the large cities the following suffered the greatest losses: Grozny (44%, according to the census data), Magadan (by more than one-third), Leninsk-Kuznetsky (by 32%), Murmansk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky (by some 28% each), Vorkuta and Norilsk (roughly 25% each).

Fig. 10


**Change in the Size of Russia's Urban Population,  
According to the Census Data by Regions, as %**



(See Note to Fig. 9.)

Fig. 11

**Change in the Size of Russia's Rural Population,  
According to the Census Data by Regions, as %**



(See Note to Fig. 9.)

As concerns the group of millionaire cities, it is the city of Moscow that demonstrated the highest growth rates (*Table 10*). Between the 1989 and 2002 censuses a visible rise in local population was noted in Rostov-on-Don, Kazan and Volgograd. The number of residents of Russia's other largest cities was contracting, and most notably – in Nizhny Novgorod, Samara and Perm.

*Table 10*

**The Number of Residents in the Millionaire Cities,  
According to the 2002 Census Data**

<i>City</i>	<b>Thos. resi- dents</b>	<b>As % to 1989</b>	<i>City</i>	<b>Thos. resi- dents</b>	<b>As % to 1989</b>
Moscow	10357,8	117	Kazan	1105,3	102
St. Petersburg	4669,4	94	Chelyabinsk	1078,3	94
Novossibirsk	1425,6	99	Rostov-on Don	1070,2	106
N. Novgorod	1311,2	91	Ufa	1042,4	97
Ekaterinburg	1293,0	95	Volgograd	1012,8	102
Samara	1158,1	92	Perm	1000,1	92
Omsk	1133,9	99			

As concerns the rural population network, one should note a rise of the overall number of rural settlements during the period between the censuses (*Table 11*), which clearly does not match long-term trends and requires a more detailed consideration. At the same time, as of the 2002 census, 8.4% of rural settlements did not have any population, while in another 22.4% the number of residents did not exceed 10. The share of settlements with the number of residents over 100 fell from 39.2% in 1989 to 35.6% in 2002.

The greatest share of abandoned and thinly populated (not more than 10 residents) villages were found in the Northwestern (13.4 and 36.8%, respectively) and the Central (10.1 and 28.4%) federal okrugs, while the least share of such settlements was reported in the Southern (2.3 and 3.0%) and Siberian (2.2 and 6.1%) okrugs. In the Southern federal okrug, over 80% of rural settlements have over 100 residents, while in Siberia and the Far East – over 70%.

The 2002 census data on the population distribution across rural settlements with differing number of residents have not been available as yet, and it is hard to judge in a greater detail of the today's newest trends in the rural population distribution. According to the previous censuses, the rural population tended to concentrate in bigger settlements.

Table 11

**Grouping of Russia's Rural Settlements by Number  
of Residents, According to the Census Data<sup>5</sup>**

	1959	1970	1979	1989	2002
Rural settlements, total	294059	216845	177047	152922	155290
Of which with the number of residents:					
No residents	–	–	–	–	13032
Up to 10	41493	25895	23855	30170	34803
11 to 50	83311	62480	54638	44674	37337
51–100	55258	37205	26328	18094	14804
over100	113997	91265	72226	59984	55314

The recently published preliminary and main results of the 2002 census allow so far to draw just very general conclusions on the ongoing degradation of the urban and rural settlement infrastructure in some regions and on a considerable rise in the demographic pressure on the social infrastructure of a number of regions in the center and south of Russia.

## 2.6. Challenge Knots of Russia's Settlement

The migrations of the 20<sup>th</sup> century have changed drastically the Russia's population, albeit to a much lesser degree they impacted the general picture of its geographical distribution. In any case, despite all the changes, the current specificity of the population spread over Russia's territory exposes a failure to solve many historical challenges. Plus, the current demographic situation raises serious doubts as to whether they can be resolved in the foreseeable future. Let us examine this specificity.

*Dispersion.* In terms of its population density, Russia overruns just 12 countries, that is, mountainous, desolate or Nordic, like Russia herself, and it is 2–3-fold inferior to Scandinavia and the USA, 6–10-fold – to its neighbors in the CIS, 15-fold to China, and 37-fold to Japan. While so far being equal with Angola, Saudi Arabia and Papua-New Guinea, it soon will be notably lagging behind them, too. Even if one excludes deserted areas, which would allow to double the density rate in the populated ones, the ultimate indicators would be much lower than our neighbors<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> *Rossiysky statistichesky ezhegodnik, 2002.* M.: Goskomstat, 2002; O predvaritelnykh itogakh Vserossiyskoy pereisi naselenia 2002 goda.



The European part of Russia can be compared with the US in terms of population density (29 persons per 1 sq. km), however, even Russia's historical core appears relatively thinly populated when compared with the industrial European nations. While one-fifth of the country's population is concentrated in the Central economic region that accounts for less than 3% of the country's population, the population density rate in this specific area (over 62 persons per 1 sq. km) proves to be nearly as much as twice lower compared with the EU (119 per 1 sq. km).

*The catch-up-type urbanization* close to the Latin American model (Fig. 12) and a semi-rural nature of many towns. Most likely the share of real townfolk does not exceed 55–60%, while a complete account of labor costs makes the agrarian sector, when taken together with auxiliary personal farming, a leader, with 17 million of conditionally employed instead of 8.5 million as regularly reported and vs. 15 million employed in the industrial sector<sup>6</sup>.

*Relative shortage of cities* that intensifies the dispersion effect. A century ago, the average distance between cities in the European Russia accounted for 60–85 km, in the Urals – 150 km, and in Siberia – 500 km. While by now it has shortened almost twice to the east of the Urals, it was reduced just to 45–75 km to the west of it. In the heart of Europe, for centuries, neighboring towns were located within 8–20 km, and peasants managed to make a round trip to the local market in a day. Russians had to spend several days, which constrained progress in division of labor and exchange.


A delay of sub-urbanization. The poor population density coupled by our climate, poverty and 'dacha' tradition complicates and decelerates transition to counter-urbanization, the new universal stage of settlement. It is essentially substituted by a seasonally pulsating agro-recreational form: the cities 'melt into outskirts and further down to the countryside only in summertime. Even New Russians' suburban villas function mostly in summer, thus having a little impact on the local employment and infrastructure.

Overall, due to numerous reasons, the Russian settlement network lags far behind the Western one in terms of its development and geographical parameters, while its fast urbanization puts Russia among semi-peripheral nations, and its underpopulation forms the factor that hampers overcoming of this medium-term development. The challenge knots appear related both to the types of settlements and their size, etc., and to the geographical location of such settlements, and, accordingly, the population, with its spread over the country.

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<sup>6</sup> Gorbacheva T.L. Ispolzovanie dannykh obsledovaniya naseleniya po problemam zanyatosti v Rossii dlya opredeleniya parametrov tenevoy ekonomiki // *Voprosy statistiki*, 2000, # 6, p.15–21.

### Urban Population Shares in Dynamics by Selected Country and Region Worldwide



The contrasts can be easily found along the axes West–East, North–South, the center–periphery, and the Russian ethnic core – ‘other ethnical homelands. To illustrate changing disparities of each type of regions, in their stable contemporary or partly varying limits, they are classified in 7 groups in the Fig=s. below.

**The West–East axis.** The West–East gradient is a product of the failure to overcome a historical asymmetry. Despite all the historical efforts, the problem of populating the Asiatic part of Russia has remained unresolved. The proportion of the Asiatic Russia’s population that was growing continuously (though with a notable deceleration between the 1960s through the 1980s) rose from 13.3% in 1926 up to 21.9% in 1991. The peak population – 32.5 million – was registered in early 1992, followed consequently by a drop, and by 2002 the respective share

fell to 21.4%, given though that 75% of Russia's territory lies to the east of the Urals, while the population density there accounts for 2.5 persons per sq. km.

'Go East, the main tune of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, has failed to drag the estimated central point of Russia's population over the Urals. Having passed 600 km eastward – up to the Belaya river in Bashkiria – it already begins to crawl towards South-West, thus drifting away from the center of the national territory located 2,400 km to the east (in Evenkia) and 1,200 km from the center of inhabited lands (between Omsk and Novosibirsk). Attempts to create a strong population pole close to the Pacific ocean were a complete failure, and the center of urban dwellers for 40 years has been close to Ufa, while the center of big cities (with 100,000 and more residents) lies in the Western Bashkiria, and the center of larger cities is located yet further to the West (the millionaire cities' center can be found within 620 km from the all-urban one, in the eastern margin of Nizhniy Novgorod oblast). The larger cities are, the further to west they lie, where their network becomes more dense and compact.

**The North–South axis.** Zonal differences along this axis are also huge. Russia is a northern country as a whole, with 70% of its territory (roughly as much as 12,000 sq. km) having the official status of the Far-Northern areas and regions with severe climatic conditions equaled to them<sup>7</sup>. The overall population of these regions hardly outnumbers 11.5 million. The population density rate is very low there (1 person per sq. km.), however, the Russian North is far greater populated if compared with the American. At this point, one should cite the presence of the GULAG legacy and generally cheap labor. The most desolated Russian okrugs are not as abandoned as the northern Canadian territories.

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<sup>7</sup> This special status was legitimized by the 1967 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and implied additional monthly bonuses to salaries and wages, additional vacations, additional bonuses to sick leaves, beneficial pension plans, etc.).

The list of such territories was further extended in the 1990s. Nowadays, the following regions enjoy this status: the whole territory of Republics of Karelia, Komi, Sakha (Yakutia), Tyva, Dolgano-Nenetsky, Komi-Permyatsky, Khanty-Mansy, Chukotka, Evenk and Yamal-Nenetsk AO=s, Arkhangelsk, Kamchatka, Magadan, Murmansk, and Sakhalin oblasts, as well as a part of respective territories of Republics of Altay and Buryatia, Krasnoyarsk, Primorsky and Khabarovsk kraiss, Amur, Irkutsk, Perm, Tomsk, Tyumen and Chita oblasts.

Fig. 13

**The Profile of Russia's Population along the West–East Axis in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (seven longitudinal belts, stable composition)**





Fig. 14

**The Profile of Russia's Population along the North–South Axis in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (seven latitudinal belts, stable composition)**




Obviously, the general spatial picture of Russia’s population is not determined by the North. Rather, historically, it is the ‘middle zone, the so-called ‘Major Settlement Lane that dominated the processes, as it accounts for one-third of the country’s territory and three-quarters of its population. However, in the meantime, the North-South polarization can become yet more distinct because of population loss in the North and growing importance of the South . Until recently, this significance of the South was moderated by the fact that the Russian South was conceived as a part – and, moreover, not the key one, – of the greater Soviet South. Nowadays, it has gained significance of its own, which is further intensified by its border status, the role of Russia’s sole exit to warm seas, and new economic opportunities, associated particularly with transit of Kazakh oil from the northern Caspian sea. Today’s Russian South is neither vast (occupying just 3.4% of the national territory, the Southern federal okrug is the smallest one in Russia), not reach, but abundant with population, attractive to migrants, though it retains its political conservatism and exposes the danger of unrest.

**The center–periphery axis.** The natural and geographic polarization along the West–East and North–South axes evidently affected by natural conditions, which are quite severe in the Russian North and East, is generated and intensified by a ‘man-made’ polarization along the center-periphery axis.

*Fig. 15*

**The Profile of Russia’s Population along the Center–Periphery Axis in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (seven regional clusters, partly varying composition)**



Changes in the migration trends in the past decade clearly mirror an intensification of the ‘centripetal force’ – a reversed vector towards more and earlier developed, and in this sense ‘central regions’, that had once formed sources of the centrifugal movement.

The capital metropolises remain stable, thus contrasting with the generally changed background, for they have always formed major centers of attraction to migrants. Thanks to such centers, their surroundings are also somewhat special. In the 1990s, the Central economic region increased its population by 1.3 million thanks to migration: it absorbed as much as one-third of Russia’s migration increment. At the same time, other early developed regions have become more attractive, too: in the past decade, the Volga-Vyatka, Central Chernozem (Black-soil) regions, and the Urals and most of regions of the northwestern and central Russia received a population inflow, though earlier they had long been giving away their populations.

Nowadays, the regions that attract migrants are also ‘central’, because they set the tune for economic reforms. The migration inflow appears closely correlated with the level of development of the private economic sector, while this particular sector develops faster in the noted central and southwestern areas with more diverse economies, better communication lines and located closer to Europe.

The center–periphery polarization is universal, and it manifests itself in setting both an inter-regional and intra-regional settlement and population hierarchy. Having attracted roughly 30% of regional populations, capital cities of the Subjects of the Federation on average are 6-fold bigger than their second cities. While  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the European Russia’s remote countryside is thinly populated, its depopulation in the 20<sup>th</sup> century doubled the scarcely populated (1–10 persons per sq. km.) zones – by 1 million sq. km<sup>8</sup>. While bringing together the elite centers of the world semiperiphery with the leading nations’ centers, the leaps of catching-up and mobilization development are always fraught with divergence of their respective domestic peripheries<sup>9</sup>, and this is what is also noted in Russia: qualitative contrast are growing intense again, and modernization of capital cities goes hand in hand with archaization of provinces.

Once relative (though the RSFSR used to be considered a federation because of autonomous entities), **the Russian – ‘ethnic axis’** became a reality. However, Russia is not a mini-USSR: Russians here account for  $\frac{4}{5}$  (and not  $\frac{1}{2}$ ), in 17 out of 32 autonomous regions they number more than the titular nations. The latter dominate in 8 regions, including Chechnya, but these regions together make up just 2% of the area and 3% of the population of the country. Given such a small

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<sup>8</sup> *Gorod i derevnya v Evropeyskoi Rossii: sto let peremen*. M.: OGI, 2001, p. 300.


<sup>9</sup> Gritsai O.V. et al. *Center i peripheria v regionalnom razviti*. M.: Nauka, 1991.

mass, their demographic activity has a loose impact on the overall Russian one. By all parameters, the Russian homeland is greater (that is particularly why the RF is firmer than the USSR), but also appears heterogeneous by composition of its population and by the ‘record’ of their presence in the country, which, given new geopolitical circumstances, affects the Far Eastern and southern Russian borders, and the Kaliningrad enclave.

Most of krais and oblasts have been under the effect of their age-old status of a part of a single centralized state. Sub-ethnic differences among contemporary Russians are rudimental and appear less distinctive as, for instance in Germany, where many Saxons still openly dislike the ‘Prussian spirit, while the far-from-museum Bavarian dialect still so much differs from the *Hoch-Deutsch* that simply appears incomprehensible to residents of other *Lander*. In Russia, such phenomena still can be noted in the south, with Cossacks (especially in the Kuban area) and in the north, with Pomors. But, even after vigorous and universal attempts to re-galvanize local identity and regionalism they still appear exceptions rather than regulations.

Fig. 16

**The Profile of Russia’s Population along the Russian – Non-Russian Homelands Axis in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (seven regional clusters, partly varying composition)**



By contrast, some autonomous regions with the domination of titular indigenous retain language and religious uniqueness, traditional rural culture and demographic behavior that differ from the contemporary averaged Russian-urban ones. It is republics of the eastern part of the North Caucasus, Kalmykia, Tyva, partly Yakutia, and other Siberian republics and okrugs that are especially notable in this respect.

## 2.7. Forecast Hypotheses and Some Consequences of Their Implementation

The population dynamics along the aforementioned four axis (*Figures 13–15*) show that the ‘profiles’ of Russia’s population were evolving in different ways. While the east-western and the Russian-ethnic profiles underwent slight changes, shifts are more evident in terms of North–South section: yet by the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century (post-collectivization and *kulaks*’ exile, ethnic deportations and creation of *GULAG*), the taiga zone rose, and the profile lost its symmetry and became more broken. The growth of capital cities and semiperiphery was noted along the center–periphery axis, as those were destinations for the migration flows ignited by industrialization and urbanization. As a result, 86 million (59%) of Russians now live far from centers, while 51 million (35%) in semiperipheral and often depressive regions that stuck in the industrial era, with rudiments of the agrarian one.

The Russian axes are not unique by themselves, but their combinations appear specific. In Russia, the more eastward, the more it becomes ‘northern, for it grows colder (in Primorsky krai, the Far North standards are justified in the same latitude as French Provence’s). In turn, the more down to the South, the more oriental the ethnic specificity grows, which is true even for the European Russia (the Buddhist Kalmyks and the Islamic Caucasus). Such specifics have always imposed certain constraints upon territorial development, and architects of Russia’s development did not always realize and consider these objective constraints. Even now the government continuously fails to identify a required combination of social, regional and national policies and demonstrates a poor understanding of their original immanent conflict and impossibility to substitute for one with another, hence of the impossibility of simple solutions.

It is these axes that *largely pre-set Russia’s geodemographic development options and its strategies*, nonetheless. Any of them should take into account the irreversibility of already quite evident shifts, on the one hand, and their incomplete nature, on the other. Such shifts include:

- deceleration of all the macro changes determined by the demographic transition that is coming to an end and stabilization of the demographic situation



that does not promise changes in major inter-regional proportions even in the case the population's migration mobility returns, say to the late-Soviet level;

- the turn of migrations from the north and east towards the country's center and further to its south-east has already happened and is unlikely to be reversible. That was the reaction to a long, insistent expansion of the Russian 'universe' which apparently has reached its bounds, rather than to the crisis of the 1990s. The transition to its compression<sup>10</sup> mirrors a change of the trend in population under the leap of industry eastward, given that the production has grown more mineral-based. In making their choice, people now are steered by living and labor standards, and consumer opportunities rather than by production itself;
- the inevitability of getting out of a transitional stage of the so-called 'polarization reversal (from getting people to major centers to population deconcentration), which, however, is unlikely to happen soon. The signs of the start of this particular stage were noted yet in the 1980s and intensified by the shocks of the 1990s<sup>11</sup>. In 1990–1994, the rise in the rural population took place, which was associated with hundreds of settlements' refusal from their urban status in favor of rural benefits and with arrivals of distant migrants to the countryside. There has not been any exodus from centers (as it had occurred in 1917–1921), but, when people once again became keen to return there, they ran into new barriers, especially housing prices. 'Visible' migrants do not compensate for the natural urban loss: with the decline of external migration, since 1995 the countryside has naturally shared this destiny.

The situation on the whole is unstable. External factors can delay or accelerate sub- and counter-urbanization dictated by the stadial logic, and this is true as long as all the trends are concerned. Let us consider two main scenarios of demographic development that can affect them – *an inertia-driven scenario and an optimistic one* (which implies accelerated growth in the economy, job opportunities and population's incomes), while the difference would tell on migrations rather than on natural movements.

*In terms of West–East*, any realistic scenario would hardly imply a change in the 'pro-western trend'. Even against the background of an insignificant natural loss or increment (for the local population is not the oldest one), the exodus from

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
<sup>10</sup> See: Pivovarov Yu. L. Alternativnaya konceptsiya macroregionalnogo razvitiya Rossii: szhatie intensivno ispolzuemogo prostranstva // *Mir Rossii*, 1996, # 2, pp. 63–74.

<sup>11</sup> See for details: Differential Urbanisation. Special issue of *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geographie*, 2003, Vol. 94, No 1 / Kontuly T and H.S.Geyer (guest eds.).

the eastern part, trans-Yenisei, of Russia, the former scenario with moderate migrations promises the decrease of the population from the current 14 to 7.5 million by 2050, or from 9–10% down to 6%. The situation is especially dramatic in the Far East, whose share would fall from 5 to 2%. It should be remembered that this region already lost 0.9 million in the 1990s and undergoes unfavorable exchanges with all the regions, including the European North from where people out-migrate, too.

Fig. 17

**Latitudinal Profiles of the Population Density in the Northern Eurasia in the 20<sup>th</sup>-21<sup>st</sup> Centuries (Basing on the UN Forecasts and the Authors' Estimates)**



The situation can be changed only through migration inflow under the version of an accelerated development of the country, which would make it attractive to its neighbors. The question is which ones? Let us remember the geopolitical motive of the eastward shift, or, to put it simple, ‘the sinophobia. The Eurasian profile (Fig. 17) mirrors the height of the ‘demographic wave’ over the thinly populated Russian areas, hence projects of new migrations eastward. But, providing the population instantly doubles there (which in the old, better times took 40 years), we would reduce the imbalance just from 1:30 to 1:15,

while to be equivalent to the northern China, we need half a billion people, or the whole Europe. Where can Russia get such a population mass, if ... not from China itself?

**The North–South** profile appears less steep. The density rate along the Arkhangelsk–Krasnodar lane changes in the same way as from the Chinese Inner Mongolia towards Guandong (though all the figures are smaller in Russia). The amorphous debate on the destiny of the North had been under way for good 20 years, until even the most needed staff began to leave the area. However, Northern territories differ from each other: while the European ones and Yakutia lost 10–15% of their residents, Tyumen okrugs and Taimyr and Norilsk were growing. According to the inertia version, by 2050 there would remain only 4–5 million out of current 9 million residents in the North, or 3–4% of Russia's population.

A successful development of mineral exporting regions (the Tyumen model) can attract migrants from abroad, and it appears the least dangerous in this particular zone. Southerners more seldom reside there or get assimilated faster than in other regions<sup>12</sup>. These risks appear much greater in the South of Russia, for the general tension there is closely associated with migrants, and it does not promise any lessening. It should also be noted that the share of the South (here the Southern Federal okrug, plus all the Chernozem area up to the Volga) in the country's population will certainly grow up to 32–37%, depending on a scenario, from the current 28–29%. The real challenge of the 21<sup>st</sup> century for Russia's South will lie with more than 40 million residents there, of which one-third will be rural, with the growing proportion of migrants from the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

**The center–periphery** contrasts work in favor of centers. According to the inertia version of the forecast, all the northern and eastern remote areas of the RF would lose 10–11 million residents, but their proportion would unlikely fall under  $\frac{1}{5}$  (from the current  $\frac{1}{4}$ ). While capturing people in severe, crisis and expensive locations, poverty and immobility challenge their adaptation to market. The proportion of the central-western regions will be growing under an absolute decline in the country's population, however there, particularly in the Non-Chernozem area, clearly emerges its own inner polarization.

One of the poles is formed by large agglomerates and their groups (we even have Moscow megalopolis, though of a smaller size compared to Western ones). The number of actual residents of the Moscow and St. Petersburg agglomera-

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<sup>12</sup> There are, of course, exceptions: some southerners, e.g. Azerbaijanians have long and successfully settled down in the Trans-Arctic zone (Migratsionnaya situatsia v stranakh SNG i Baltii.-M.: Komplex-progress, 1999, p. 85-86

tions conflicts with the official statistical data, for it is unlikely that it dropped over the 1990s and there hardly be any further decline, even though the last census could not expose all illegal migrants there. Large regional centers have hardly lost their attractiveness, too. But now the overall migration pressure on large cities is weaker than before, which can be explained by a general discontinuation of the demographic growth and the exhaustion of rural demographic pools.

The other pole is formed by remote areas that account for  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the European Russia's territory and  $\frac{1}{4}$  of its population.

What will be the destiny of large urban agglomerates in the sea of periphery? All optimistic variants should concern 'islands' and 'coastal waters' of suburban areas, where human and capital flows meet each other, semi-shadow land and housing market function, and such busy spots would attract if not 'own, then 'alien people, if not to the very centers, then close to them, and if not explicitly, then latently.

The probable pressure on the part of ethnic migrants would compel townsfolk to separate themselves following the example of the US gated communities. This segregation model had once been opposed by the Soviet aggregation one, while Europe found itself somewhere between them, but the immigration tide there also fueled the eagerness to self-isolation, at least, for the sake of safety<sup>13</sup>. By the way, European political scientists argue that the base of support for ultra-rights (Le Pain-type) usually lies with less wealthy strata of the indigenous population: having no resources to move to better places to get rid of 'aliens who have invaded their localities, such people demand for the authorities to toughen immigration regimes. By itself, this fact tolls the alarm bell for Russia.

However, the Soviet urban model was also segregating, though not in the ethnic sense. Residents of uncomfortable city outskirts (the so-called 'Shanghais'), suburban commuters, *limitchiks*, and, sometimes, prisoners filled in the economic and social niches that in Western Europe belong to Arabs, Turks and migrants from the Black Africa. In any case, Russians witnessed their own versions of 'ghettoization' in the US downtowns or of the European 'banlierization'.

By contrast, the exodus of wealthier residents to the suburbs (the Western fashion of segregation) is constrained in Russia by a set of factors, including their small numbers. The migration pressure on cities anyway is capable of accelerating counter-urbanization by transforming wealthier individuals' second countryside residences into main ones. Under such a scenario, the migration vectors can diverge by social and ethnic signs (should it become centripetal for one group, it would become centrifugal for other) and stimulate growth in the market

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<sup>13</sup> Jaillet M.C., Donzelot J. (dir.). La nouvelle question urbaine. Collection "Recherches", PUCA, 2001.

for two houses with adjoining land (their potential is great anyway, while its propulsive role is still underestimated).

In the distant future, under Russia's high tech spurt, semiperipheral areas would revive and attract people: those will be heirs of the Soviet MIC (in the Urals and others) and new technopolises, 'Russian Silicon Valleys', etc., but any guesswork about future types of settlement and its pools is vain.

Most likely, the future of remote forest lands is sad. The inflow of 'crisis migrants' has been short-term, and it did not solve anybody's problems. However sorry one is about the old arable land between St. Petersburg, Bryansk and Kirov, its further abandonment (except for sub-capital, central-oblast and a few other sites) is inevitable. Forests have long occupied roughly  $\frac{1}{2}$  of this territory on average, but they would spread over idle fields up to  $\frac{2}{3}$ . By and large, those who still reside there merit 'remote' compensations similar to the northern allowances. The depopulation can be resisted by having Russians return there from cities or by peasant migration from Asia. The former way implies the use of small sites and summer recreation, and it does not promise anything greater than that, while the latter implies alien cultural enclaves in the heart of the country that would suppress the remaining indigenous population and in some places even block the first way.

A direct intervention in the complicated center-periphery proportions did not reach its (dubious) objectives before and is unlikely to help in the future. What should not be done is to confuse the sociodemographic aspect of the problem with the economic agri-food one. The problem basically implies a variation of the well-known 'equity vs. efficiency dilemma. Centers host the country's territorial elite and provide residence to its political, intellectual and business elites. Hence their advanced development, a certain egocentrism and contacts to equal counterparts, both domestically and abroad, over the head, and even at the expense of smaller peripheries. However, another conclusion is also true: it will not be possible to eventually get periphery out of depression, unless centers themselves manage to do it.

**The Russian-ethnic asymmetry** is noted in recent population dynamics. Of 39 Subjects that did not lose their population between 1989–2001, 19 were 'autonomous', with 30.5% of growing regions' and 13.6% of Russia's population. Their contribution to the increment accounted for 47.5%. The increment accounting for hundreds of thousands was shown by Dagestan (ranked number 2 after Krasnodar krai), Ingushetia (with its Chechen refugees), Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Khanty-Mansy AO (although the indigenes are few in the okrug); as well, the North Ossetia and Altay demonstrated outstanding population growth rates. The effect of growing titular ethnic populations sometimes overshadowed the mechanical outflow of others – Russians and Russian-speaking.

It is hard to count on the country's demographic renewal at the expense of its national outlying areas, nonetheless, for modernization of population reproduction and the demographic transition will soon cover almost all of them. Notably enough, in the autonomous regions of the Volga, Siberia and even Southern Russia the natural increment has already been negative or declined rapidly, while the birth rate in Dagestan and Ingoushetia is lower than in Turkey. The rural ethnic regions are likely to possess the capacity for urbanization on their own basis. Given that the inflow to genuine Russian territories from there appears generally more preferred than, say, from the foreign Asiatic states, it should be taken into account that not all the noted ethnic groups are apt to leave their domain regions even if those are overpopulated.

All the above once again emphasizes the fact that *gastarbeiters* form the only option in the main, critically important Russian zones and centers, especially as far as their accelerated development options are concerned. At this point, negative and unexpected consequences are fairly likely, but we have not pioneered this path and will have to survive through that. So it would be better if such survival is ensured in a civilized fashion rather than otherwise, and we need to learn seriously and start learning right away.

### **3. Immigration challenges**

#### **3.1. The visible immigration trends**

The pessimistic forecasts of natural increase in Russia's population compel one to put a greater attention to the other component of population growth, that is, migration. It is yet more important, given that already today the migration increase to a certain extent plays the role the natural increase played before.

Long-term tendencies characteristic of Russia and the respective experiences of most of industrially developed nations prove that the changing balance of the natural and migration increases is not accidental. Rather, it appears a turning point in Russia's demographic development. As the analysis and forecasts of its population reproduction show, even under the most favorable dynamics of natural growth which one can assume in the framework of realistic hypotheses, it is only an immigration inflow, to a greater or less extent, depending on the volume and composition of migration flows, that can counteract the fall in the size and aging of the country's population.

Russia has not been used to the role of an immigration country, but it is not absolutely new for her. Since the late 1970s, in the frame of the population exchange between the republics of the USSR, Russia turned from the donor area into the recipient one. Since then the country, which had used to witness centrifugal migrations for centuries, has increasingly formed an arena for migration movement from the periphery of the empire to its center, or from other Soviet republics to Russia. Their scope was not particularly great, and until certain moment immigration was not viewed as an important source of growth in Russia's population, however, it would be untrue to argue that its potential role was absolutely ignored. Analysts and experts have long predicted the emergence of a natural loss of the Russian Federation's population and vigorously debated plans of replenishing Russia's scarce demographic reservoir by means of migration from the so-called 'labor-excessive areas'.

At the time, the plans were not implemented, for 'labor-scarce areas' – the Russian center or Siberia – were not ready to seriously accept migrants, while 'labor-excessive areas' of the Central Asia in turn were not ready to supply them. So far Russia has not experienced a considerable migration inflow, and the rise in that from the former USSR republics in the 1990s should not generate any illusions.

Indeed, in the 1990s, especially at the beginning of the decade, there occurred a considerable rise in the population's migration that accounted for 3.5 mn. per-

sons over 1990–2000 vs. 1.8 mn. reported over the period between 1980–1989. The registered net migration reached its peak in 1994 (810,000), but was steadily declining hence. In 2000, it plunged to 214,000, and further down to 72,000 in 2001. The migration increase in Russia's population in the 1990s was fueled by the former republics of the USSR, in exchange with which Russia increased its population by 4.5 mn., while in parallel with that, it lost 1 mn. in exchange with other countries.

However, even the rise in Russia's migration in early 1990s was taking place under a drastic fall of the migration movement, in-and, particularly, outgoing alike. Given a 2.4-fold drop in the migration into Russia from the CIS and the Baltic states (350,000 in 2000 vs. 855,000 in 1989), the migration from Russia plunged by over 8 times (83,000 vs. 692,000, respectively). It was a faster contraction in the migration from Russia to the former Soviet Republics (and not thanks to the reverse flow) that caused a considerable migration increase over the past decade. But on the threshold of the new century, the possibilities for maintaining the migration inflow at the expense of contracting the outgoing migration have exhausted, for it simply had no capacity for further contraction. In 2001, the registered migration from Russia to the CIS and the Baltic states (62,500 persons) became almost equal to the registered emigration to other countries (58,600).

It should be noted that the aforementioned estimates concern the registered migration. However, the general opinion is that it forms just a visible part of the iceberg, with a great number of illegal and unregistered migrants currently residing in the country. In reality, however, there are no reliable data on the scope of the illegal migration, while media sources sometimes cite absolutely fantastic figures, and even state officials provide substantially different data.

The range of estimates of the magnitude of illicit migration is extremely broad. By the moment the migration policy implementation functions were assigned to the RF Interior Ministry, they accounted for between 1.5 to 15 mn., i.e. differed 10-fold. Officials in charge of implementation of the national migration policy cited between 6 (Mr. A. Chernenko, then the head of the Federal Migration Service of the RF Interior Ministry) to even 10 mn. (Mr. V. Ivanov, then Deputy Head of the presidential Administration) illegal migrants<sup>13</sup>. These data can hardly be trustworthy. In particular, the authors of a report developed by the US NGO The Committee on Problems of Refugees also questioned objectivity of estimates of illegal migration in Russia. As the authors confessed, it appeared impossible to provide reliable data on the overall number of illegal immigrants in

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<sup>13</sup> *Commerzant-Daily*, 4 April 2002; *Argumenty i Fakty*, 10 April 2002.



RF over the period covered by the study, as all the data available are ‘extremely unreliable’<sup>14</sup>.

It is not at all excluded that the scope of the phenomenon was deliberately exaggerated to secure a successful passing through the Duma of a very harsh anti-foreigner bill ‘On the legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation’, while the lower figures cited later might be associated to its enactment.

At the same time one cannot help but consider that the rise in the scope of illegal migration in Russia (and the decline in the registered, legal one) has recently been affected by the change in the registration procedures of the CIS and the Baltic states’ citizens. The essence of the change is that as of October 2000 they are subjected to the same procedure of registration at the place of their permanent residence as citizens of the traditional Far Abroad countries, i.e. they have to apply for residence permit first. The change immediately resulted in a drastic fall of this specific category of migrants: already in October 2000, according to Goskomstat, the number of visitors from the CIS and the Baltic states fell by 6,000 vs. the prior month, while in November – by 17,100 (there were no such falls registered in 1999 and the prior years at that time of the year). In 2001, the number of those who came to Russia accounted for 186,200, thus having fallen nearly twice. As a result, the population migration increment, with account of emigration to the traditional Far Abroad states, accounted just for meager 72,300.

The comparison of the Goskomstat data on immigration into Russia and comparable data on most of the CIS countries allows to argue that only due to changed procedures of accounting non-citizen immigrants from the CIS countries and the Baltic states, since October 2000 the Russian statistical agencies failed to account 172.6 Thos. migrants in 2001 and another 38.9 Thos. between October-December 2000 which makes up a total of 211.5 Thos.<sup>15</sup> These unaccounted immigrants have contributed substantially to the overall number of illegal immigrants against whom Russian authorities have been fighting lately.

Thus, so far the estimates of the current scope of Russia’s migration exchange with other countries, and, accordingly, its population migration increment cannot be considered too reliable. If one focus on the Goskomstat’s registered migration statistics, the contemporary migration trends testify to a rapid decline in the population inflow, while the country needs it to grow- and very significantly. Once adjusted to the failure to register all the illegal migration, which, perhaps, is very significant, the situation with migration may expose the

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<sup>14</sup> ITAR-TASS, June 7, 2002.

<sup>15</sup> For more details, see: Mkrтчan N. Vosmoznye prichiny snizeniya immigracii v Rossii v 2000–2001 // Voprosy Statistiki, 2003, № 5, S. 45–50.

fact that an actual (and usually criticized) state of affairs to a greater extent match the country's real needs, than one would expect.

But what are the needs?

### 3.2. Perspective Needs in Immigration

Estimates of Russia's perspective needs in immigration are based upon a specially developed analytical stochastic prognosis of Russia's population up to 2050. They show that in order to just maintain the population size unchanged at the level of 2000, the country should have started, yet from the beginning of the new century, to receive annually over 700,000 migrants on average (net migration) and should gradually increase this amount up to 2030–2035, when it should make up 1.2–1.3 mn. migrants a year. These figures expose the median value of net migration. But, depending on an actual development of the situation in the frame of given scenario-based birth and mortality rate hypotheses, some fluctuations around the noted values are possible, as it is shown in *Table 12*.

*Table 12*

**The Amount of Annual Net Migration Needed to Maintain Russia's Population Size Unchanged between 2001 through 2050. An Analytical Stochastic Prognosis, as Thos. of Persons**

Years	Median value of the prognosis	The prognosis with 80% confidence interval	The prognosis with 95% confidence interval
2001–2005	721	612–838	484–1000
2006–2010	853	614–1110	348–1453
2011–2015	874	547–1222	187–1668
2016–2020	998	626–1393	205–1888
2021–2025	1164	801–1542	406–2045
2026–2030	1256	918–1636	572–2218
2031–2035	1267	874–1695	482–2329
2036–2040	1256	794–1743	272–2458
2041–2045	1253	745–1772	130–2566
2046–2050	1252	752–1796	71–2678

In the meantime, Russia is far from receiving such a number of immigrants. Even if one believes the official data seriously lower the scope of population inflow into the country and there also is a considerable number of illegal and non-registered immigrants, the total volume of net migration can hardly reach

even a half of its desirable, from the perspective of maintenance of a stable size of Russia's population, volume. That is why it continues contracting.

Prognostic estimates of the need in net migration appear very great against the background of both recent years and vs. longer-term indicators. Overall, over the 50-year period (1950–2000) the net migration into Russia accounted for 3.4 mln. (or 70,000 annually), while the respective figures for the past 25 years (1975–2000) made up 5.8 mn. (230,000) annually, and during the past 15 years, when immigration reached its peak (in 1984–1988) – 4.5 mn. (300,000 annually). The latter figures should be doubled or even tripled already now, which seems fairly unrealistic, though.

Russia is unlikely to avoid receiving large immigration flows in the future, nonetheless.

Their inevitability, on the one hand, is dictated by the domestic demographic situation. The contracting population compels Russia to face a very tough choice. It should either to resign herself with a rapid loss of its position in the global demographic hierarchy and with a nonstop deterioration of its already unfavorable correlation between population and territory, with all the logical consequences such a situation may generate, or to open widely her doors for immigration. Both solutions have their minuses, and the country will have to choose between two evils.

On the other hand, while forecasting future developments, one cannot help but take into account the demographic situation outside Russia and particularly the overpopulation of her neighbors to the south of her and the growing mobility of their populations. Hence, the inevitability of their migration pressure, which will manifest itself, at least, in illegal migration that will be increasingly harder to resist and to which the country will have to react by extending legal possibilities for immigration.

The panic updates from the European countries that one after another demonstrate their eagerness to tighten their immigration policies and to block illegal immigration testify to a rapid rise of migration pressure generated by the developing world that currently experience demographic boom. The recipient countries' capacity does not match the pressure, which will continue to grow, and it will be increasingly hard to resist it, given the parallel growth of overpopulation in the third world and its population's mobility.

However, the nature of these challenges is found not only outside, but inside the recipient countries (including Russia) as well, and, more particularly, it takes roots in the specifics of their national labor markets.

### 3.3. The Labor Market as a Main Engine of Immigration

The dominating demographic tendencies in Russia preset the growing role of immigration as a main source of increase of the country's population, which suggests an inflow of a real **population** into the country, people of all ages, their naturalization, bringing up their children in the country as Russian citizens, etc. But the main vehicle that regulates the inflow is the labor market, for it is the situation in this particular market that determines chances for immigrants to get sources for their own and their families' subsistence and to settle down in the country.

Generally speaking, the concepts that stress underpopulation of a country as a main reason for workforce shortages are fairly senseless. Given other conditions being equal, the country's long-term need in workforce is determined by the number of the existing population and nothing else: they should service – in economic terms – themselves. Should the population contract, their needs shrink, too.

There are, however, numerous structural and other factors that seriously hold this theoretical assumption away from the reality. More specifically, the cyclic nature and generally any changes in the time of both economic and demographic development, which as well can appear 'desynchronized'.

Post-World War II, all the developed Western European nations faced the conflict between their rapid economic growth and the contracting able-bodied population, and none of them was capable to rely exclusively on their labor resources, and all of them vigorously attracted immigrants to fill in job opportunities. (The other critically important remedy became displacement of manufacturing capacities to poorly developed countries.)

As far as short-term prospects are concerned, Russia's economy will find itself strongly dependent on migration. In the second half of this decade the demographic window of opportunity determined by the specifics of Russia's age pyramid will close, and the nation consequently will witness the start of a rapid loss of its able-bodied population, while labor will turn into one of the most critical goods, if not the most critical one. The loss of labor resources, perhaps, would not be visible, as it could be compensated by contraction in the accumulated unemployment and some increase of the pension age (which in this case would form a reaction to the short supply of labor resources rather than to the population's aging). But, if the current economic growth becomes sustainable, the necessary workforce pool can be found only in immigration. (Given that the Western way of displacement of manufacturing capacities to less developed countries would hardly help Russia with her far lower labor productivity rates and a greater steepness of its demographic fall).

Yet year 2000, the first year of a notable economic growth, highlighted the shortage of offer in the national labor market. Reviving enterprises faced dramatic workforce shortages, and just in one year the focus of their concerns shifted from unemployment problems onto the short supply of labor force. The latter emerged in a country that experiences a natural increment of able-bodied population (1.2 mn. over 1995–2000) and under an unprecedented migration increase. The short supply of workforce has already formed the major obstacle for the development of the national economy, though the use of production capacities is still far from the respective indices of 1990. But during the reform period the country's economy underwent notable structural shifts, sectors of the tertiary sphere emerged and, at least, one-fourth of the population became employed in small businesses or self-employed. Such individuals are not particularly fond of getting back to industrial enterprises, and clearly one should not count on that, which further aggravates the problem of short supply of labor force.

### **3.4. Functions of Immigration and Conflicts Between Them**

At this point, we arrive to the heart of the problem of immigration. The need in immigration inflow appears to be of structural nature rather than solely quantitative one. While growing richer, more educated and qualified, societies inevitably need to complete the 'bottom' of their social, not demographic pyramid, for that constitutes one of the necessary conditions of efficient use of their own relatively high-quality human potential. That is the way the economic and social niches are formed, which Western European, and now Russians as well no longer want to fill in, but which less exacting immigrants from poorer countries are keen to occupy instead.

Moreover, at the beginning they are ready to fill them in under most unfavorable for them conditions, which opens vast opportunities to increase 'exploitation standards' and a rapid enrichment of exploiters, and for a new form of 'the primary wealth accumulation', which appears critically important for such a relatively poor country as Russia (and the Western European countries were such immediately post-war, and the first generations of immigrants they had received passed through *bidonvilles*). The immigration from the less to the more developed countries essentially constitutes yet another form of 'neocolonialism'. As any colonialism, it gives a lot to both parties, but in the conditions of their inequality, anyway.

That is why such immigration is extremely favorable for recipient nations, and illegal immigration is the Heaven's gift, simply because an absolutely powerless immigrant is especially suitable for a boundless exploitation. The benefits

from immigration are dispersed, and everyone who deals with immigrants – be that an employer, landlord, consumer of services, or even a representative of the law-enforcement authorities – can feel it. A centralized combat against immigration, including illegal one, is futile, because it is the struggle against evident needs of one's compatriots, and so far no government has succeeded in this area.

The genuine problem is that suppressed to the bottom of the social pyramid and marginalized, immigrants gradually emerge as a source of a serious social tension that can expose itself in various forms (the rise of criminal communities and a general criminal environment; political extremism and its ideologies – 'class', nationalistic, religious; mystic sects; youngsters' counter-cultural movements, unmotivated violence, among others). The situation is further aggravated by the fact that current immigrants, especially those in Europe, feel connected with countries of their origin, which nowadays are marginalized themselves, undergo the modernization shock and, at the same time, remain poor. They give a rise to strong extremist ideologies and movements that exercise a strong influence on broad strata of immigrants residing in wealthier countries.

In such a situation, various forms of manifestation of the social tension associated with immigrants' position, which takes its roots largely in the economic area have a nationalistic, religious or, at best, 'socio-cultural' interpretation both among immigrants and in the mass public opinion of indigenous population of recipient countries. The society begins to grow prejudiced against immigrants, and sometimes this sentiment is so strong it can even block their inflow or reverse it. This is one of responses to the immigration challenge – a conservative and totalitarian one: let it be like it was before, and we do not care of changes in the world and in the country.

The mission is, without disclaiming the challenge itself (which, alas, often happens) and recognizing its priority significance, to try and find an alternative, a (moderately) liberal remedy. It cannot be very simple. It is easy to offer immigrants the same economic conditions and opportunities, as those the indigenous population enjoys, but such an offer has low chances for fulfillment. The immigration inflow is objectively justified by the structural function that immigrants carry out, and that generates inequity. That is why one should not hope that the knot can be cut easily, and he has to look for palliative, adjustment measures of immigrants' adaptation, their 'processing' into citizens that can enjoy equal rights with the others, while the immigration inflow is continuously fed by newcomers. And such a 'conveyor' is important.

### 3.5. Potential Migration Donors

Where do main sources of completion of Russia's population lie? Naturally, it is migrants from the CIS and the Baltic states that the country would prefer to receive: they are our former compatriots, most of them are Russian speaking and well aware of how to live in Russia.

Nowadays, Russia attracts population from all the post-Soviet states, except Belarus. In the 1990s, of the overall migration from the former Soviet republics one-third was secured by Kazakhstan, another one-third – the Central Asia, while the remaining one-third was split between the Trans-Caucasian zone (some 20%), the Baltic countries (5%), and Ukraine and Moldova (a. 9%).

Most of the migrants from the post-Soviet states are ethnic Russians. They ensured the overall population increment in Russia in 1992, and their proportion in net migration has been declining since then, however never plunging below 60%. About 10% falls on other ethnic groups of Russian Federation.

What is ethnic Russians' migration capacity? By our estimations, Russia so far has received some 3.3 mn. out of 25.3 mn. of ethnic Russians who had resided in the former Soviet republics in 1989, which is 6-fold superior to the size of the Russian repatriation in the 1980s., the Russian Diaspora in the non-Slavic post-Soviet countries plunged by 22%, thanks to the repatriation. The aggregate loss of those countries was even greater, as some Russians (roughly as much as 15% of their migration flow) went to Ukraine and Belarus, while another part emigrated outside the borders of the former USSR, and the account of migrants, especially compulsory ones, was inaccurate and incomplete.

One can conclude that the process of repatriation of Russians from the Trans-Caucasian countries and Tajikistan that witnessed large-scale armed conflicts is close to an end. These countries have already lost over half of their Russian population. In Tajikistan, there still are some 100,000 Russians, and another 300,000 reside in the Trans-Caucasian area. Not all of them, of course, will be keen to leave the countries, but if the pace of their leaving would remain the same as over the past several years, their potential will come to an end very fast. As concerns Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, an intense competition in the local labor markets and the overpopulation makes it impossible for both Russians and other newcomers to retain their positions in the countries. It is most likely that the development of the situation would encourage them to leave, but, with the account of age, family and other suchlike circumstances, not all of them will do it. There still are some 2 mn. Russians in these countries, while their aggregate maximum migration capacity can be estimated at the level of some 1.5 mn. Should the social situation in the post-Soviet zone remain relatively calm, their

departure may last for a long time. On the other hand, Russia's economic revival can accelerate it drastically.

The situation appears not so unambiguous in Kazakhstan that has lost some 20% of its Russian population (out of 6.3 mn., according to the 1989 census), and flows from there to a significant extent will be determined by the correlation between the economic and social situations in the country and in Russia. In 1994, every fifth Russian was ready to leave Kazakhstan, while in 1997 – every third one. Being most concerned of losing the qualified population, the Kazakh leadership undertake measures to cease its outflow, and recent years have witnessed some progress in this area. However, even without considering some decline in the Russian outflow from Kazakhstan, if one believes that everyone who expresses his eagerness to leave the country will definitely do it, the migration capacity of the 'Kazakh Russians would not exceed 2 mn. persons.

Findings of numerous studies do not provide any grounds to expect a mass repatriation of Russians from the Baltic states: their aggregate outflow so far has made up less than 10% (of 1.7 mn. as of 1989). Similarly, Ukraine and Belarus's losses of Russians in the 1990s were so insignificant (3% and 1.5%, respectively) that give no grounds to discuss repatriation. In all likelihood, migration within such a range is determined by a current state of affairs.

Hence **an actual capacity of the Russian repatriation to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus can be estimated at the level of some 4 mn. persons, of whom 3–3.5 mn. may make up Russia's share.** Another 0.5 mn. can be provided by other ethnic migrants whose bulk live in Russia, chiefly Tatars.

In addition, Russia can count on a certain inflow of the title populations from the CIS countries that renewed since 1994. Between 1994–1999 the net migration of this category accounted for 710,000, or roughly one-fourth of the overall migration inflow. Their list is dominated by Ukrainians (39%) and representatives of Caucasian ethnicity (45%), of whom Armenians accounted for 28%), and Central-Asian migrants (10%). In addition, a considerable part of migrants from the CIS reside in Russia without registration. Some studies provide convincing evidence that at any given moment there are not less than 3 mn. labor and commercial migrants from the CIS in Russia, of whom a. 1 mn. has lived in the country for over 3 years, i.e. permanently.

As far as the inflow from the CIS countries is concerned, the future seems rather confusing. On the one hand, one can expect that the outspread of the Shengen visa procedures over the Central and Southern European states that together with Russia are migration partners for Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus should to a greater extent turn emigration from these three countries towards Russia than before. On the other hand, Russia should promptly capitalize on such a favorable opportunity, as Ukraine should emerge relatively soon as Russia's



major rival in terms of receiving the CIS migrants, because the Ukrainian demographic situation is yet more serious than Russia's. The inflow of Trans-Caucasian migrants seems to reach its peak now and can hardly grow further on. The Middle-Asian countries retain a considerable migration capacity of their title populations, but this particular resource can be used in a longer run, as their populations' mobility is still low.

So, the total migration capacity of the CIS states can be estimated at the level of 7–8 mn., including ethnic Russians. This probably would be enough to basically meet Russia's need in population during the coming decade. However, in a longer run, Russia should also exploit other immigration donors, primarily China, that does not have any competitors in this respect. By the 2050s it may well happen that Russia will have received up to 10 mn. Chinese who then would form the second biggest ethnic group in the country after the Russians.

### **3.6. Regions as Potential Recipients of Migration**

Though the Russians cannot any longer be counted on as a ~~pool~~ source for completion of the contracting population of the great space, the foreign migrants' capacity does not appear unlimited in this respect, either. In the contemporary world, migrants are attracted not by 'nobody's and thus suitable for settling land itself, but by some other factors and primarily living standards, though this complex, dynamic category can be assessed in different ways. In the past days of mass colonizations and compulsory and voluntary migrations, it often was the 'land of plenty' that would form an ideal and a main attraction for both the landless peasantry and large landlords. However, at the time, the world lacked the current demographic and social contrasts (the difference in guarantees, etc.), the economy was less commodity-based and less productive, while travels were longer, harder and often meant no return.

There exist numerous migration models, but their common feature is that their vector directs from poorer, less developed, labor excessive and, due to various reasons, dangerous places to those that appear directly opposite. At the same time, migrations very promptly react to any changes that put different motives to the forefront. Thus, the first post-Soviet migrations were fueled by the eagerness to repatriate to a historical homeland and to migrate to relatively inexpensive places, with affordable housing, minimum sources of food, relaxation and support: they often followed the scheme: a country house with a vegetable garden instead of a job and salary in the city. That used to preset main directions of 'stress-driven' flows. But the times are changing. Assuming further normalization, the regions' migration capacity and attractiveness should be assessed from

the broader perspective, taking into account economic, social and demographic characteristics. An attempt of such an assessment is given below.

One of the main criteria is the region's 'well-being', its **Gross Regional Product**, with the account of national and regional parities of purchasing power of different currencies. This particular criterion allows to single out dozens of regions that are potentially attractive to 'economic migrants. The worse is the situation in a donor country, the greater their number is, and the wealthier and more productive recipient regions are. For example, if per capita GRP-PP in a Russian region is over \$ 4,000, which, theoretically, should attract migrants from the countries with yet lower GDP=s (Syria, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan), then the number of regions with such a sufficient for them economic capacity would make up 31–32<sup>16</sup>. Should the margin be lowered to \$ 3,000, thus extending the composition of the donors in the Near Abroad zone (as far as the former USSR is concerned, it is 'the average resident' of the Baltic states and Belarus who would ignore this GRP), the number of regions would account for 55. According to this logic, Chinese migrants would be happy to settle down in 68 regions, while Vietnamese, Mongols, North Koreans (as well as many Africans) – in up to 80 regions, i.e. almost all of them.

Even assuming a very rigid selection, among these regions one would find those that have been receiving many immigrants recently (the capital regions, Belgorod and other Black-soil oblasts, Samara oblast, Krasnodar krai). At the same time, 32 regions that occupy 51% of the developed, comfortable territory and host 54% of the country's population provide 87% of all the national output. However, the list contains numerous northern and eastern and not necessarily oil-producing (e.g. Murmansk and even Arkhangelsk) oblasts where migration balances are sharply negative. That is why the correlation between per capita GRP and results of the overall migration movement is low, even if one excludes from the list of regions North Ossetia and Ingoushetia that received too large refugee flows driven by the motives other than economic.

The level of correlation would rise up to 0.3–0.4 (which in this case is significant by F-criterion), should GRP be replaced with **HDI** and its Russian analogues<sup>17</sup>. In Moscow region it is close to the Southern and Eastern European

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<sup>16</sup> Of the total of 86 – exclusive of the Chechen Republic, while Moscow and St. Petersburg (as it was made while computing territorial 'stock') were united with their neighboring oblasts.

<sup>17</sup> The latter differ from HDI computed for all the nations by UNDP by a set of measures, though they usually return to the same income (adjusted to subsistence minimum), indicators of people's longevity and health (life expectancy and infant mortality rates), education and often other characteristics, including the situation on the market for labor. In this particular case, the authors use the average versions of living standards indicators (LSI) in

countries (Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, The Czech Republic), East-Asian (Singapore, Brunei, the Republic of Korea), while in ethnical outsider regions – to Mongol, Indian, African and Central American ones. Having taken the marginal level of 0.745 – the one of Armenia and slightly higher than those of Ukraine and Kazakhstan – one would end up with just 10 Russian regions attractive to the ‘average’ migrant from the noted countries by a complex social criterion (the two capital regions, some northern and numerous middle-Russia regions). Should the margin be lowered, the number of attractive regions would grow once again. Thus, 32 regions, including a number of South-Siberian and Far-eastern, have HDI higher than the Chinese one (0.718), while Tajikistan’s index (0.662) and therefore those of any CIS country are lower than in 70 Russian regions, except the most ‘unhealthy’ Caucasian and Siberian republics and okrugs.

The coefficients of net migrations and **natural increment** expose roughly the same correlation. The correlation (–0.35) implies pushing population out of regions of active reproduction and its attraction to epicenters of the ‘demographic vacuum’. At the same time, the current migrations show yet better correlation with a natural movement of the 1980s that had pre-set the correlations between today’s grown-up cohorts. But, if we are trying to somehow look into the future, it would be better to consider the data around 1990 (today’s teenagers). At the time, the increment was still positive in RSFSR, but numerous regions could not any longer be on even terms with their neighbors: Ukraine, whose respective index was yet worse (even zero), anyway, found itself in a better position than 24 Russian neighboring regions, mostly of Russia’s old agricultural nucleus, while in 67 regions the state of affairs was worse than in Moldavia, in 81 – than in Kazakhstan and China, with their average increments against the world indicators, while the Middle-Asian republics had no rivals among Russian regions at all.

It would be appropriate to separately consider the **population’s employment rate**. However, the statistical correlation between migration attraction indices to the regions with a share of unemployed, the number of pretenders per an announced job or with the correlation between employed residents and able-bodied once appears slightly negative (between 0.1 to 0.2). Though such regions as Moscow, St. Petersburg, Belgorod oblast, of course, attract numerous *gastarbeiters* (while the official statistics fails to consider them), there still are nu-

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Russian regions developed by the Moscow State University for the RF Ministry of Economy basing on 6-7 groups of signs. They are adjusted to a form comparable with the cross-country HDI as of 2000-01.

merous migrants in the areas with labor markets of different kind – in Kalinin-grad, Vladimir, Penza, Astrakhan oblasts, not to mention Dagestan<sup>18</sup>.

But developed countries with a higher unemployment rate can also receive migrants from the countries where the official unemployment is lower. This is not a statistical ‘trick, but a serious problem. Typically, migrations hold the inertia preset by a stable image of a country, while on the cultural and household level – by related and ethnic ties. Migrants can hope for the guarantees their compatriots have long, for generations, enjoyed after becoming ‘professional unemployed’ in the West. But more importantly, they look for, find, and extend their labor, economic, social and territorial niches that a local population does not occupy even under unemployment, for the latter often is of structural nature.

Every Muscovite is aware that it is cheaper and simpler to hire *gastarbeiters* to build or repair public buildings, apartments or dachas! And there numerous suchlike professional niches in various spheres: trade, services, and the small business area on the whole. In the Far East, Chinese truck farmers are well respected for their talent to ensure such yields, which have ever been unheard of there. Such examples can be found along Russia’s southern board. For example, surveys in the steppe Trans-Volga area revealed niches occupied by local Kazakhs and now Chechens as well (the pasturable sheep-breeding). Interestingly, local farmers prefer Chechens for quality and effectiveness of their performance. Plus, there also are Koreans (who have migrated from Kazakhstan to where they had been deported under Stalin) whose profile is an intense melon-growing. Russian peasants there traditionally deal with grain, granger’s cattle-breeding, and they also work for the Koreans at their plantations without trying to compete with them.

Let us draw some conclusions. *Fig. 17 (A-B-C)* each shows 35 regions ranked according to the noted assessments of their social and demographic conditions that favor potential migrants. The maps allow to understand easily that each kind of capacity has its own specifics. Thus, the economic capacity notably concentrates in the north of the country, while the social one is dispersed relatively evenly throughout the country’s territory (though to a certain extent it appears similar to the economic one, in particular, thanks to the top ten regions with their best indicators), while the demographic one is more shifted to the western borders and narrows, taking wedge form, eastward. At the same time two or even

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<sup>18</sup> Dagestan remained in the list of evaluated regions, though a relatively moderate inflow there was basically of the same nature as the one into Ingoushetia and Ossetia. By the way, the return of these two regions seriously increase the correlation and makes it positive: it consequently shows that migrants go to places with no job opportunities, which, once again, highlights the difference between compulsory migration and ‘normal’ one.

three high scores can concentrate in a single region, for instance, in Moscow region.



*Fig. 19* shows a broad dispersion of various combinations or a high mono factor capacity, though there are only 38 regions singled out there, which accounts for less than a half of Russian regions. One can find a clear dominance of the European and West-Siberian regions that in some locations make out continuous zones. Sometimes. Like in Kalinigrad oblast, there are a few even not so much outstanding conditions that appear sufficient to ensure the region's high score. Such regions are mostly economically powerful and have a large population. Their aggregate proportion in Russia's territory accounts for 30%, while that in the country's populated territory with comfortable conditions for living makes up 45%, and they concentrate 58% of population and produce 90% of the nation's output.


Clearly, they do not cover all the 'excessive' (thinly or unpopulated) lands, but still they occupy 1.9 mn. sq. km., or 56% of Russia's land. Regions with such reserves, plus capable of attracting migrants due to other motives, are also located in the northwestern, southern parts of Russia, in the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East. In those regions, agrarian migrants and land tenants can contribute to resolution of the chronic Russian problems. Most importantly, that requires no compulsion, and migrants practically would not supplant anybody from there.

However, someday there would emerge a strategic risk, especially in the bordering territories, and from this perspective migrations to large cities of 'inner regions' appears more preferred. As international experiences show, both migrants' adaptation and their relationships with local population will be more difficult, but there would never arise the problem of a 'new reconquista', separatism or especially seizure of lands they will be populating. At the same time, the regulation of migration flows and an identification of their status in Russia, a border regime (say, transformation of Amour river into an analogue to Rio-Grande) will make up a special block of problems.

Fig. 18

**Russian Regions Outstanding in Terms of Their Scores of Economic (A),  
Social (B) and Demographic (C) Conditions for Immigrants**






The intensity scale reflects the nature of the ranking of regions in each case.

Fig. 19

### The Aggregate Immigration Attractiveness Score



Main conditions and their combinations:

1 – the most attractive and diverse; 2 – economic and social under fairly high attractiveness; 3 – the same, but under lesser degree of attractiveness; 4 – chiefly economic, 5 – largely social and demographic; 6 – chiefly demographic; 7 – chiefly social; 8 – regions with vast and thinly populated, and suitable for the population territories.


### 3.7. Immigration Policy: the Western Experiences

At present, the nation has not yet bothered to think, at least, in the most general terms, of an unavoidable need in an inflow of a large number of immigrants. The government has no articulate immigration policy, and to the extent it pursues what is known under this name, it appears to be restrictive and focused on constraining the population inflow, even when it implies repatriation of the population sharing the same cultural values that has remained outside the Russian Federation after the USSR had collapsed. All debates around the future tacitly imply the ideal of the country's 'closeness' from migration inherited from the USSR.


By contrast, for industrially developed countries with low indices of natural reproduction completing the population by means of immigration is a regular practice. Nowadays, in EU, the migration increase substantially greater than the natural one, given that the latter still remains positive.

*Fig. 20*

**The General, Natural and Migration Population Increase in EU and in Russian Federation, 1960–2000, per 1,000**







As *Fig. 20* shows, Russia and the EU had much in common over the past 40 years with respect to components of increase in their populations. The general increase curve largely has been following the natural increase curve, while the natural increase was declining. Both curves more and more converged to the migration increase curve, which, having a moderate trend to growth, remained fairly stable. By the end of the last century, the aggregate and natural increase curves in Russia and the EU diverged, which highlights a greater (positive) role of immigration. In Russia, the immigration increase curve consequently began to approach zero level, which resulted in a new convergence of the general and natural (that became negative by that time) increase. By contrast, despite a greater and still positive natural increase in the EU, the Union's migration increase also remains relatively high (over 2 per 1,000 residents), so the general increase there is likely to follow migration rather than natural increase.

The role of immigration appears even more important for the USA. In the 1980s, the absolute migration increase of the US population was much greater than in Russia. The gap further grew in the 1990s, and the growth appeared steady, not short-term, as it was in Russia (*Fig. 21*). The US enjoys the much better demographic situation than Russia and the EU: the level of fertility is higher, while level of mortality lower there, which results in a positive natural increase. Despite that, the US long-term demographic projections provides a continuously high level of migration increase. It is envisaged that overall it should account for some 45 mn. persons over the first half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (*Table 13*).

Fig. 21

**Net Migration into Russia and the US between 1980 to 2000**




Table 13

**The Projection of Net Migration into the US up to 2050**

Year	Net annual migration, Thos. Persons
2005	878
2010	720
2015	740
2020	757
2025	918
2030	1067
2040	1018
2050	990

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 2001. Washington, 2001. P. 9.

The Western experiences of receiving large masses of immigrants testify both to the growing role of immigration as a major source of demographic growth and to the fact that a large-scale immigration cause serious economic and social problems in the recipient societies that compel Western policy makers and governments to pay an increasing attention to the development and implementation of adequate migration policies. For Russia that has just recently faced the immigration agenda the West’s successes and failures in this particular area are no doubt important. This paper allows just a brief review of the respective experiences which, should Russia’s migration policy – and even in a broader sense its migra-

tion strategy – be developed seriously, should be studied in every detail. At present, Western countries cast their immigration policies in the conditions of ongoing conflicts between the structural need in the elastic offer of workforce and a free flow of services on the one hand, and attempts to retain differentiated wages conditions and limited social security and cultural homogeneity, on the other. The policies to a significant extent depend on the existence of an international regime of ‘fixed liberalism’ that comprises documents on human rights and international agreements<sup>19</sup>. The system of international agreements in the migration policy area to a certain extent constrains a single state’s sovereignty.

The economic fundamentals underpinning immigration policy are most perfectly mirrored by the so-called ‘class model’. It essentially brings the need in a spare army of industrial workers in line with an actual necessity to avoid social riot and intense conflicts between domestic and foreign workers<sup>20</sup>.

In Western countries there has long been vigorous debates on ‘losses’ and ‘benefits’ immigration and immigrants bring to the society. Arguments against migration are:

- immigrants grasp jobs designated for the country’s residents<sup>21</sup>;
- immigrants take more than give, thus creating an additional burden for taxpayers, as they use social programs;
- immigration inflow results in an excessive increase in the urban population density rate and in a growing tension between the indigenous population and peoples of other cultural traditions.

In addition to rejecting the above arguments, those who advocate immigration argue that:

- with their more ‘progressive’ age structure, immigrants increase the tax base and help compensate for the growing social costs associated with social provision of elderly population;
- immigrants are both workers and consumers. While occupying jobs, they at the same time contribute to growth in consumer demand, thus propelling a rising employment<sup>22</sup>. Before becoming workers, they first become consum-

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<sup>19</sup> *Holliefeld J.* The Migration Crisis in Western Europe // Migration, Ethnicity, Conflict / K. Bade (ed.). – Osnabruck: Universitätsverlag Rasch, 1996. P. 367–402.

<sup>20</sup> *Christiano Kodanyone.* Migratsionnaya politika kak planirovanie nau-gad/Immigratsionnay politka zapadnykh stran: Alternativy dlya Rossii / G. Vitkovsky (ed.); MOM. Moskovskaya issledovatelskaya programma po migratsii. M., Gendalf, 2002, p. 11.

<sup>21</sup> *Simon J.* Economic Effects of Immigration: Theory and Evidence // The Immigration Dilemma / D. Gliberman (ed.). The Fraser Inst. Vancouver, BC, 1992.

<sup>22</sup> *Grubel H.* The Economic and Social Effects of Immigration // The Immigration Dilemma / D. Gliberman (ed.). The Fraser Inst. Vancouver, BC, 1992.

ers, that is why they can even contribute to a decline in unemployment in the short run;

- with their high qualification, immigrants can improve the country's professional base; representing a great variety of cultural and traditional backgrounds, they create and promote new kinds of services, intensify specialization and introduce innovation. To crown all that, the recipient country does not need to invest in their education<sup>23</sup>.

The Western countries' migration policies have always been (and still are) dictated not only by economic appropriateness, but also by their geopolitical interests. For example, the policy of receipt of refugees post-World War II was senseless from economic perspective, but quite rational in the light of foreign policy objectives in the 'Cold War' era<sup>24</sup>. Those policies can be regarded as a particular case of foreign policy.

One should not forget that in the Western countries the state as a governing agent has its fundamental domestic and international interests, and it is capable to impose those on powerful coalitions of social circles. The current convergence of European states' immigration control policies to some extent can be explained by new horizons that open before their authorities and government agencies<sup>25</sup>.

The Western countries pursue their migration policies through the 'front door', when it constitutes the result of negotiations between, and building coalitions by main players – entrepreneurs, trade-unions, churches and ethnic associations keen to get specific benefits. The 'back-door' policy manifests itself in illegal migration as an active strategy that secures the presence of a flexible workforce and control over secondary sectors of the labor market. Illegal migration does not result from the state's poor border guarding. Rather, it derives from a firm's objective eagerness to import immigrants in the most weak position from legal perspective.

In the West, pursuing an immigration policy is, in a sense, an art, for the states there have to coordinate trans-national and international agreements with all their domestic affairs.

There are countries (by the way, wealthy and prosperous as they are) that emerged thanks to immigration and immigrants. In the Soviet time, they were called 'the countries of migration capitalism': those are the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the South-African Republic, and Israel.

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<sup>23</sup> *Globerman D.* Background to Immigration Policy in Canada // The Immigration Dilemma.

<sup>24</sup> *Holliefield J.* The Migration Crisis in Western Europe // Migration, Ethnicity, Conflict / K. Bade (ed.). Osnabruck: Universitätsverlag Rasch, 1996. P. 367–402.

<sup>25</sup> *Bido D.* Police en réseaux, l'expérience européenne. Paris: Presses de Science Po, 1996.

Their migration policies, basically immigrant-friendly, underwent substantial changes. For example, the US adopted the first restricting laws that prohibited immigration of criminals and prostitutes as early as in 1871. Since the 1920s the country put into effect quota practices, while in 1929 – a sophisticated system of computation of national quotas (abolished only in 1965)<sup>26</sup>.

In the past, while shaping their immigration policies, many immigration countries would consider the concept of ‘preferred’ or ‘undesirable’ immigrants dictated by the prejudices with respect to their ethnic origin or race. In the US, when immigrants from the Southern and Eastern Europe, Ireland and even China began to increasingly challenge the dominance of the Northeastern Europeans in the immigration inflow, the consequent negative public reaction resulted in quantitative restrictions on the immigration.

In Canada, until the end of World War II the group of ‘preferred’ immigrants comprehended the British, including those of the US origin, as well as the immigrants from the northern and western Europe; the newcomers from the southern and eastern Europe fell under the category of ‘acceptable’ immigrants, while Afro-Americans, Chinese and other ethnic Asians were viewed as ‘undesirable’ elements, and the Canadian authorities tolerated them only because they were ready for a hard, physically exhausting work that the Canadians would not accept<sup>27</sup>.

Ethnic and race immigration constraints consequently were lifted everywhere. In the conditions when an immigrant is regarded as a bearer of a unique human potential, economics defeated numerous prejudices and most of countries concentrated their efforts on helping newcomers integrate into the receiving society rather than selecting them by the color of their skin or hair.

In all the countries that practice constraints of entry, stay and naturalization, immigration happens on legal and illegal grounds. In most of the Western countries, the legal immigration implies three main channels:

**Family reunion.** The US annually receives 550,000–600,000 immigrants on these particular grounds, while France – 100,000. The scope of this kind of immigration is huge in all the countries that received substantial amount of immigrants over the past century. Some European countries would grant preferences to the peoples of their colonies: the UK received Indians and Pakistani, while France – Algerians and Moors, and citizens of these very countries apply for the

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<sup>26</sup> *Caren Landsness, Kathaline Newland. Chetyre sostavlyauschikh immigratsionnoy politiki SSHA // Immigratsionnaya politika zapadnykh stran: Alternativy dlya Rossii, p. 187–188.*

<sup>27</sup> *Casy Wonder Plough. Istorija immigratsionnoy politiki v Kanade // Immigratsionnaya politika zapadnykh stran: Alternativy dlya Rossii, p. 76–92.*

family reunion-type of immigration. For example, Germany continues to receive Turks and citizens of the former Yugoslavia.

The US so far has not introduced quantitative restrictions for immediate family members (minors, spouses, and parents of US citizens under the age of 21). Other family members are eligible for a limited number of Green Cards, and their number is computed according to a sophisticated formula, with account of the category of filiation and the country of origin<sup>28</sup>. In many Western European countries marriage, does not imply a prompt and easily available citizenship, which is dictated by the authorities' eagerness to preclude or reduce to a minimum the immigration through pro forma marriage.

**Labor immigration** (immigration through the employer's mediation). It implies a clear understanding that it is impossible to find such a specialist in the given country. Most of immigrants using this particular channel are highly qualified professionals, and it is not accidental that the policy on their receipt in recipient countries is known as 'head hunting'.

To cite a particular example of labor immigration, one could refer to the so-called 'independent' immigrants in Canada selected basing on a mark system. Marks are awarded depending on an educational and qualification level, personal qualities and age, intention to settle down in a particular location, command of English or French, and a preliminary agreement on a job.

In the US, in compliance with the Heart-Seller Act (1965), there exists a system of preferences, which favors the immigrants having relatives in the US, followed by researchers and specialists, as well as potential employees in specific sectors of the economy. As concerns immigrant investors that bring in money to invest in new jobs, they enjoy a special, out-of-quota, status.

Between 1955–1973 Germany also widely practiced receiving labor migrants under a series of agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. The overall amount of *gastarbeiters* the country received during the period in question accounted for nearly 5 mn<sup>29</sup>. Despite a consequent decision to discontinue hiring foreign workforce, their outflow from the country was short-term and appeared insignificant. The foreign population (chiefly Turks) have contributed greatly to improving German negative demographic trends.

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<sup>28</sup> *Caren Landsness, Kathaline Newland. Chetyre sostavlyauschikh immigratsionnoy politiki SSHA // Immigratsionnaya politika zapadnykh stran: Alternativy dlya Rossii, p. 187–188.*

<sup>29</sup> *P. Polyan. Opyt immigratsionnoy politiki gosudarstva I polozhenie inostrantsev v Germanii // Immigratsionnaya politika zapadnykh stran: Alternativy dlya Rossii, p. 41.*

**Granting asylum to individuals.** This channel of immigration is associated with humanitarian reasons. In the US, this process is carried out in the frame of an official program of re-settlement of refugees, while the number of the latter is identified at annual consultations between the Department of State and the Congress. At the same time those who were granted asylum within the US territory are not included in the refugee quota. The possibility for getting the refugee status is stipulated in the respective provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and the 1967 Protocol to it.

Developed nations incur fairly substantial costs associated with this particular type of migration. The high costs of the procedure are explained by the need to provide food, accommodation, legal counseling and financial support to such immigrants. Having obtained the refugee status in the noted states, individuals enjoy such living standards they may have never had in their homelands<sup>30</sup>.

According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Refugees, between 1989 to 2000 the European countries alone received a total of 5 mn. of compulsory migrants of different categories<sup>31</sup>.

Nowadays, practically all the noted governments are keen to significantly cut down the volume of refugee flows to their countries. To achieve the goal, they deploy a whole arsenal of tools, of which most popular are<sup>32</sup>:

- cutting off social benefits (allowances, subsidies, the amount of support, among others). The whole group of the 'wealthiest' nations (Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands) has recently substantially reduced the size of social benefits, which now became slightly lower than analogue allowances payable to their needy residents. In addition, in many such countries refugees began to receive aid in the natural (foodstuffs, clothing, and housing), rather than monetary form;
- limiting interpretation of criteria for who should be considered an actual refugee;
- the threat of detention. Some governments use the procedure of detention to control the territorial migration of the foreigners who seek asylum upon their arrival, during the consideration of their appeals, and later to control those whose claims were rejected and who were awaiting their expulsion. Critics of such actions argue that the governments de facto use the threat of deten-

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<sup>30</sup> Polozhenie bezhentshev v mire. Yatdesyat let gumanitarnoy deyatelnosti. M., ZAO 'Interdialect', 2001.

<sup>31</sup> Refugees and Other of Concern to UNHCR-1998 Statistical Overview//UNHCR, 1998.

<sup>32</sup> Ryzantsev S. Vliyanie migratsii na sotsialno-ekonomicheskoye razvitiye Evropy: sovremennyye tendentsii. Stavropol, Stavropolskoye knizhnoye izdatelstvo, 2001, p. 3051–356.

tion to intimidate potential refugees and make them abandon the idea to seek asylum in the given country.

The evaluation of legal acts, systems of immigrant receipt and integration allows to argue that the Western European countries have opted for creation of 'less favorable conditions' for newcomers seeking asylum as a migration policy strategy. In 1997, only 11% of asylum seekers in Europe were recognized as refugees in compliance with the 1951 Convention. This happens, because many European countries seriously concern of the problem of the growing compulsory migration and the rise in the respective costs, and other Western states share their concern.

The category of states with a liberal model embraces Scandinavian states, UK, Switzerland, and Bulgaria. Their governments mostly comply with the documents and agreements that regulate the process of granting asylum. They also are major donors to the UNHCR and provide the institution of 'temporary asylum'.

France, Benelux, Italy, Greece, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and some others fall under the category of countries with a relatively liberal model. Seeking membership in the EU, the noted eastern European states substantially tightened their border policy towards the third countries.

Finally, Austria, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Poland and Slovenia make up the group of countries with the conservative model, and some of them have opted for the limiting interpretation of the definition of 'refugee'<sup>33</sup>.

In addition, in some countries, there are specific categories of immigrants who were granted with a right to entry, stay and for naturalization. In Germany, those are the so-called 'contingent refugees' – Hebrews from the former USSR, – as Germans still recognize their responsibility for the genocide of Jews in World War II.

In the US, there exists a unique program of support of multiculturalism. In contrast to many countries that are keen to build a mono national state, the US is anxious to ensure a great variety of ethnic, cultural and confession groups in the society. That is why the nations that have no record of migration relations with the US enjoy participation in special 'green card lotteries, while their representatives enjoy priority in receiving the US entry visas<sup>34</sup>.

The final, crucial phase of the immigration process is naturalization, or granting the citizenship to the immigrant. The Western countries practice two approaches to this problem. The US, UK and France use 'the ground principle'

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 357–358.

<sup>34</sup> *Caren Landsness, Kathaline Newland*. Chetyre sostavlyauschikh immigratsionnoy politiki SSHA // Immigratsionnaya politika zapadnykh stran: Alternativy dlya Rossii, p. 191.



‘right of place’ (*jus soli*), which implies that an individual born in the given country is her citizen. Other nations that pursue a targeted policy of attraction individuals of ‘their nationality apply ‘right of blood’ (*jus sanguinis*): with all the differences in purposes pursued by their government policies, the most shining examples in this respect are Germany and Israel, while Greece, Hungary and the Baltic states also sue similar practices.

In compliance with the national Constitution and the 1953 Act on Exiles and Refugees, Germany undertook the responsibility for receiving and granting citizenship to all ethnic Germans who had been expatriated from the native lands in the 1940s and until May 8, 1945, resided in the former German Eastern *Landers* or outside Germany (in the eastern European countries and the USSR, and China). In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century 4 mn. individuals used the right. The migrants received a large-scale aid to ensure their complete integration into the German society, including provision of housing, allowances and settlement loans, tax exemptions, credits, and professional orientation, language training programs.

In 1989, the Bundestag passed the Law on Residence Destination as an amendment to the noted Act on Refugees (further amended in 1996 and 1997), that provided a de-facto fixing of migrants to destined lands and even localities. This procedure has already been effective for 4.5 years, and its major purpose is to ensure an even distribution of newcomers throughout the country’s territory.

Migrants are received in the frame of an annual quota. In 2000, the quota was reduced to 100,000 persons, while requirements to the evidence of the German origin and language became stricter. At the same time, the volume of state benefits granted to newcomers was cut down<sup>35</sup>.

By contrast, Israel perceives the ethnic immigration as a conscious necessity that derives from the concept of creation of the Jewish state rather than a luxury or a generous humanitarian gesture. Israel views immigration and the related demographic policy in conjuncture with national security challenges dictated by the geopolitical reality of the emergence and development of the state. That is why the Israeli policy towards immigration is straightforward and unambiguous: the country is open for the Jewish immigration and at the same time is keen to undertake any action aimed at attraction of immigrants and easing their adaptation<sup>36</sup>. The Israeli absorption programs are costly, but the country has to enter the competition for immigrants with the US, Germany, and France.

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<sup>35</sup> P. Polyak. Opyt immigratsionnoy politiki gosudarstva I polozhenie inostrantsev v Germanii // Immigratsionnaya politika zapadnykh stran: Alternativy dlya Rossii, p. 32–38.

<sup>36</sup> Semenchenko N. Israillskaya politika immigratsii i absorptsii // Immigratsionnaya politika zapadnykh stran: Alternativy dlya Rossii, p. 97.

Other countries also would enter the competition for immigrants. The rise in demand for workforce post-World War II resulted in its shortages in many countries, and Canada took the path of abolition of the barriers to immigration it had been setting in the prior decades. In particular, in 1948 the Canadian government abolished the Preclusion of Chinese Immigration Act and established immigration offices in Italy<sup>37</sup>.

The tension in the society often arises due to dissatisfaction with the presence of immigrants, and to a significant extent it is associated with a policy the recipient countries pursue with respect to their integration into the society. For example, Germany and France carried out different policies in this respect. Germany attracted immigrants basing on the idea they would leave the country after some fixed time, which was mirrored by the ‘came-worked-repatriated’ pattern. For that purpose, German authorities favored the emergence of ethnic schools and put no barriers to ethnic separation between iasporas and communities. By contrast, France emphasized a prompt elimination of separation between the French and immigrants. As a result, Germany currently faces greater problems with recent immigrants than France.

Despite the structuring and toughness of the West’s migration policies, actual volumes of immigration are substantially greater than officially permitted ones. As a result, the Western states witness an immanent presence of fairly numerous groups of illegal immigrants employed mostly in the informal (shadow) sector of their economies. Generally, illegal immigrants are a blessing both for indecent employers who benefit from using a cheap and to a serious extent powerless workforce and to a government that does not spend a cent from social funds on them.

To combat illegal migration, many countries try legalization programs (legal amnesties), which imply a timeframe during which one can submit his appeal, or set a minimal term of illegal stay (between several months to 5 years).

Steered by merely practical considerations, the US, Australia, France, Greece, Italy tried migration amnesties. For example, according to the US Congress Task Force’s recommendations on the 1986 Foreigner Legalization Program, there existed two reasons for its implementation:<sup>38</sup>

1. Economic. With a slowdown of the development pace and unemployment growing, the nation becomes increasingly concerned of the appearance of foreigners in the labor market, which fuels the desire to regulate conditions of their

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<sup>37</sup> *Troper H. Canada’s Immigration Policy Since 1945 // Passion for Identity / D. Taras, B. Rasporich (eds.). Scarborough, ON: Intern. Thomson Publishing, 1997.*

<sup>38</sup> *The Cautions Welcome: The Legalization Programs of the Immigration Reform and Control Act / S. Gonzalez Baker. [S. I.], 1990, p. 57.*

employment, for their labor, as a rule, is cheaper than locals', and they prove to be efficient competitors for a limited number of jobs.

2. Political. The rise in the number of illegal migrants in the US territory was so considerable that it became impossible to solve the problem by means of routine immigration procedures.

Interestingly, the major force behind the legalization program in the US became the agrarian lobby rather than human rights activists, because the whole agrarian economy of the Southern states is based upon the labor of illegal Mexican *peons*.

The Western countries also pursue their collective migration policy: in 1995 the Shengen Agreement was put into effect. The Agreement serves to a free population migration as well as a free exchange of goods and services across the borders of its member states.

The Agreement also make it binding for the participating states to carry out a uniform visa policy, for they have no border guards between them and exercise uniform board control procedures along their external borders. At the same time, each country is free to identify its capacity with respect to receipt and integration of immigrants.

Out of the EU 15 member states, it is only the UK and Ireland that have not joined the Shengen zone as yet. The EU enlargement and accession of eastern European countries should result in an increase of the number of states whose residents will be able to migrate freely in a search of a job. That should provide a greater room for maneuver with respect to labor resources and, perhaps, would lower many states' dependence on immigration from the third countries.

On the other hand, in some countries, regions themselves are among agents involved in pursuance of an immigration policy. For example, in Canada immigration policy falls within the concurrent authority of the federal and provincial governments, and while setting ultimate immigration quotas, the former seeks the provincial governments' consent. Quebec established its own Department of Immigration, and the provincial government's major concern is to attract as many French-speaking immigrants as possible and to integrate them into the Francophone community<sup>39</sup>.

The Western nations possess both a far greater experience of, and capacity for regulation of immigration than Russia. High living standards combined with liberal standards of public behavior and freedom for individual make these countries extremely attractive to immigrants. That is why they can afford being masters of the ceremony and treat the problem in the 'as-I-like-it' fashion. However,

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<sup>39</sup> *Casy Wonder Plough*. Istorija immigratsionnoy politiki v Kanade // Immigratsionnaya politika zapadnykh stran: Alternativy dlya Rossii, p. 76–92.

even they have to consider numerous constraints whose number does not fall in the course of time.

The recent Western immigration policies has provided an evidence of them being in a search for new, more pragmatic selectivity criteria, and priority is more often granted to the immigrants with outstanding personal features and capable to contribute greatly to the recipient countries' economies. By contrast, having lost their ideological background of the Cold War era, the programs for asylum seekers are increasingly subjected to reduction.

Post-09. 11, in many countries immigration policy has formed an arena for political speculations that resulted in the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments in some European countries and contributed greatly to the success of ultra-right, nationalistic forces in France and Netherlands. Though there has not been any substantial change in the immigration legislation as yet, nonetheless, the law enforcement practices became harsher, and in a number of cases they diverge from the common human rights standards.

The general impression is that the Western immigration policy finds itself at crossroads and searches for new approaches and remedies, which would better meet new challenges of a rapidly changing world.

### **3.8. The Immigration Policy: Challenges Facing Russia**

While the Western nations have to partially revise and improve their immigration policies, Russia finds itself at the beginning of an ambitious mission of developing a policy that would serve as the nation's response to the immigration challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. So far, basing on a superficial evaluation of the current state of affairs, Russia's migration policy has absolutely diverged from the critical and long-term development interests. Generally speaking, now it emphasizes police and constraining measures, and these particular features tend to intensify further on. However, it should first of all focus on encouragement and a rational regulation of immigration into the country, especially from other NIS=s. The government should put forward a new detailed migration policy program, including thoroughly developed measures on an effective integration of migrants and the use of this particular resource for the nation's benefit.

Given the number, structure and settlement of the country's population, Russia has no chance for an intensive development without new residents, which makes improvement of living standards impossible, either. The policy makers and experts, who do not understand this link and migrant values, excite enmity and carry out discrimination of immigrants, lead the country to the dead-end. As the migrants from the CIS meet with the obstacles – bureaucratic procedures, overly rigid citizenship requirements, various artificial difficulties associated

with residence registration, the police racket and the red-tape tyranny, among others – they begin to try other countries, such as Turkey, and western and eastern European states. Thus Russia misses the opportunity to attract the best, suitable for local conditions, workforce.

An immigration policy that meets Russia's objective interests suggests creation of a totally different, migrant-friendly environment in the country, including cultivation of a friendly attitude to them on the part of local residents, development of a diverse, flexible and simple legal frame concerning granting them with residence permit, employment, private entrepreneurship, land rent, property acquisition and ownership. A part of immigrants would inevitably become permanent residents in Russia, which makes it mandatory to develop some mechanisms of their institutionalization in this capacity, something similar to the US Green Card system.

Meanwhile, the priority task in the immigration area should become creation of preferences for the migration of the CIS residents to Russia.

Elimination of legal and administrative barriers to the entry of labor migrants from the noted countries would meet interests of the Russian labor market's development. An important step could be mitigation of the requirements of the compulsory linking of provision of social guarantees to becoming a Russian citizen. Such requirements put migrants in very hard conditions, as they force them to expatriate, thus leaving them with no withdrawal in the case of failure. Foreign citizens residing in a country with a legal residence permit and enjoying the same rights as the local population (except some voting rights) – this is what constitutes a normal practice in many countries, and does not pose any threat to Russia, either.

Free registration and more liberal standards of granting the citizenship and a residence permit form crucial conditions for an effective integration of compulsory migrants. Because the state always show a limited capacity to extend material help to them, it is necessary to create a favorable environment for them to cope with challenges they face by themselves.

Quite a bulk of the CIS labor migrants' income is returned to their native countries in the form of transfers, which some experts in Russia are apt to consider as a threat to her economic security. However, this problem can be viewed from the different perspective: such transfers contribute greatly to the maintenance of a relatively stable situation across the border. Stability also is a very important resource, for which one has to pay, too. Plus, it should be remembered that such transfers constitute a worldwide phenomenon, and billions of Dollars and Euros labor migrants transfer to their native countries worldwide are comparable to the largest world foreign trade turnover items. Indeed, they constitute a part of the foreign trade turnover: why, if one can pay for importation of food

stuffs, minerals or energy sources, not to pay for the import of workforce, especially if it is, as a rule, very cheap?

The country needs a more liberal approach to the immigration from outside of the CIS, too. Today, legalization of immigrants from the Far Abroad is possible only through granting the refugee status to them, however, only a very limited circle of individuals is eligible to that. As concerns alternative ways of granting residence permit to various categories of immigrants, which constitutes a necessary condition of ensuring control over, and lower crime rates among them, they have not been developed as yet.

The regulation of the Chinese migration currently appears the most plumbing issue for the Russian authorities. In the regions that border China they seem confused, on the one hand, while nursing hopes for the old remedies, such as resettlement and a strict border regime, on the other, and, as if it were not enough, they appear blind to the future demographic situation in Russia.

With all due appreciation of the threat the Chinese expansion indeed poses for Russia, the inflow of the Chinese into the country is both a threat and the need. The Chinese issue is a matter of the nationwide importance, rather than a regional challenge, and as such it demands for development of a national long-term strategy. At the same time, the question 'How to prevent?' should be replaced with a strategic question 'How to organize?' (immigration and co-existence). The strategy of relationship with China should be built from the perspective of the 21<sup>st</sup> century rather than yesterday, and Russia should not try to build barriers between herself and the objective reality by means of ephemeral isolationist tactics.

From the perspective of securing Russia's integrity, perhaps it would be more sensible to open the door for the Chinese in the western part of the country, thus creating conditions for their more even spreading throughout Russia's territory. This would allow to avoid their concentration in the Russian Far East and especially in the thinly populated eastern Siberia. As well, to avoid the domination of a single ethnic group, it may also be wise to attract as broadly as possible Vietnamese, Koreans, and, perhaps, Indians and Africans.

Speaking of immigration policy, one cannot not help addressing the problem as to what extent it should be democratic and liberal. In any country immigrants or individuals pretending for this status from the very beginning find themselves in an unfavorable position caused by the most routine immigration procedures: a quota system, an examination of their documents, a legally defined possibility to have one's right for immigration or a residence permit rejected, a limited term of stay in a country, etc. All such procedures were developed in the course of time and with account of innumerable experiences, but still they are imperfect, for

which they are criticized. They are changed from time to time – sometimes for the better, or to the worse, sometimes they grow more merciful, or tougher.

But, in parallel with purely technical changes, there goes a search of basic fundamentals of immigration law. One can effectively block the entrance of a foreign worker to Russia's labor market. But, having allowed his access to the market, can one limit his competitiveness on this particular market? For example, to close some professions in the non-government sector? Or to limit his territorial mobility – say, by making Siberia available for him, while Krasnodar krai – not? Even if one abstracts from such fundamental problems as human rights, social guarantees, etc., that would be the best way to establish a new economic society based upon the labor of powerless semi-serfs. Will it serve for the benefit of the society's economic and social health?

These questions are new for Russia, and answers to them so far seem simple. President Putin argues that immigrants should go where we need them to go rather than to where they wish. But, going where 'we need them to go' necessitates higher salaries and wages there, and 'we need' consequently would sound in harmony with 'they want'. By contrast, if we send them where 'we need' and ensure miserable wages, then it not be a labor market, but something else. And a natural question arises as to whether we are in need of that.

Should Russia ensure its sustained development, similar to the US in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, it will have reasonably good chances to become a major recipient of immigration in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, one should be very well prepared for the mission.

## **4. Immigration and Russia's Multiethnicity**

### **4.1. Immigration and Changing Ethnic Composition**

Russia has always been and still is a multiethnic country where ethnic Russians form a dominant ethnic component, while the Russian language makes the core of the national culture. Just recently the Russian Federation has been a part of the USSR where, like until 1917, the proportion of ethnic Russians never accounted for more than 55%. Whilst assuming that the Russian/Soviet ethnic complexity might have caused certain political and cultural problems, anyway, they were not so grave to be considered fatal or posing a main threat to the integrity of the state and to its security. After the USSR collapsed, Russia's ethnic profile became much more homogenous, for the share of the ethnic Russians soared to 80% (2002 census). In the meantime, the recent 2002 population census demonstrated that this country is going through serious transformations not only in the sphere of economy and politics but in ethnic demography as well. Because of growing ethnic awareness and mobilization, the nomenclature of ethnic groups is increasing (more small groups strive for a separate and recognized status they were denied in Soviet time). The hierarchy of major ethnic groups is changing because of differences in demography, migration and identity changes (see *Table 14*).

Should the more or less mass migration into Russia be implemented, a notable change in its population's ethnic composition would form one of major challenges for the nation. What will be consequences of such a change, especially with account of ethnically determined differences in the population growth rates, sometimes within a single region, local community, or even an urban block? The Russian society is overloaded with deep and rapid transformations and in this situation of growing social disparities and of unequal access to power and resources these new challenges may be perceived in ethnic terms and may cause xenophobic attitudes and violent manifestations. Even such routine facts as many children in a family of one ethnic origin may generate concerns and a negative attitude of representatives of other nationalities, whose families have less children. That in turn may ignite ethnical tension. However, it is clear that today Moscow yards and classes have undergone an irreversible change of the composition of children playing and studying there, and adults should just learn from them how to co-exist peacefully.



Table 14

**Ethnic Composition of Russia's Population, 1989 – 2002**

Ethnic groups	2002		1989		% to 1989, в %
	Thous.	%	Thous.	%	
<b>All population</b>	<b>145164,3</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>147021,9</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>98,74</b>
Russians	115868,5	79,82	119865,9	81,54	96,67
Tatars	5558,0	3,83	5522,1	3,76	100,65
Ukrainians	2943,5	2,03	4362,9	2,97	67,47
Bashkirs	1673,8	1,15	1345,3	0,92	124,42
Chuvash	1637,2	1,13	1773,6	1,21	92,31
Chechens	1361,0	0,94	899,0	0,61	151,39
Armenians	1130,2	0,78	532,4	0,36	212,28
Mordva	844,5	0,58	1072,9	0,73	78,71
Belorussians	814,7	0,56	1206,2	0,82	67,54
Avars	757,1	0,52	544,0	0,37	139,17
Kazakhs	655,1	0,45	635,9	0,43	103,02
Udmurts	636,9	0,44	714,8	0,49	89,10
Azerbaijanis	621,5	0,43	335,9	0,23	185,03
Mari	604,8	0,42	643,7	0,44	93,96
Germans	597,1	0,41	842,3	0,57	70,89
Kabardins	520,1	0,36	386,1	0,26	134,71
Ossetians	514,9	0,35	402,3	0,27	127,99
Dargins	510,2	0,35	353,3	0,24	144,41
Buryats	445,3	0,31	417,4	0,28	106,68
Yakuts	444,0	0,31	380,2	0,26	116,78
Kumyks	422,5	0,29	277,2	0,19	152,42
Ingush	411,8	0,28	215,1	0,15	191,45
Lezgins	411,6	0,28	257,3	0,18	159,97
Others	5780,0	3,98	4036,1	2,70	143,21

Some low-qualified experts and square-minded policy makers begin to build scaring prognoses, and the authorities attempt to react to this mostly artificial challenge by inadequate means. More specifically, the ‘extinction of Russians’ has been emphasized recently. This tune is one of major arguments in the arsenal of the extreme jingoistic, ethnic nationalism. Such an overly dramatized and politicized attitude to the problem of different birth rates of different ethnic groups

in Russia cannot have any positive effect. The data on the population's natural and migratory movement across Russian Federation over the past decade allows the following prognosis of the composition of the 'Top Ten' largest ethnic groups in the country by 2050 (in the decrescent order):

1989	2002	2050
Russians	Russians	Russians
Tatars	Tatars	<i>Ukrainians</i>
Ukrainians	Ukrainians	Tatars
Chuvashs	Bashkirs	Chechens
Bashkirs	<i>Chuvashs</i>	Armenians
Belorussians	Chechens	Belorussians
Mordvinians	Armenians	Kazakhs
Chechens	Mordvinians	Chuvashs
Germans	Belorussians	Avars
Udmurts	Avars	Uzbeks

At the same time, the number of Russians should plunge from the current 120 to some 80 mn. Even without regard to the immigration factor, these are fairly serious changes, while with account of that, there may occur even greater ones. Some experts have already speculated that, sooner or later, Chinese should form the second largest ethnic group in Russia. The accuracy of this statement can be questioned,, but the hierarchy of main non-Russian ethnic groups should undoubtedly undergo some changes: more specifically, the number of the so-called 'Southern' peoples and those representing the 'Islamic' cultural traditions should grow in the 'Top Ten' of ethnic groups.

This, however, is a very vulnerable forecast, which is likely not to realize in its core part, that is, the overall number and proportion of the Russians in the composition of the country's population. There are sufficient grounds for this assumption, which comprise both objective factors and possibilities to exercise political influence on these processes. However, this will require a new level of comprehension of the situation and substantial adjusting the policy itself.

#### 4.2. The Inevitability of Doctrinal Adjustments

Whilst considering the ethno-demographic factor in Russia's development, one should proceed from a mobile and complex nature of ethnicity, which cannot be reduced just to an analysis built upon a rigid classification of groups (peoples or nations) and an interaction between their groups (be that biological, social or cultural interaction). The doctrinal clichés of 'multinationality' and 'national policy', and a social-science evaluation and political practices built upon them

have become hopelessly obsolete, and they increasingly become self-destructive. This is, by the way, one of the reasons why the Western 'experts of Russia acknowledge the Soviet language of ethnonationalism which justifies the conclusion that the existing ethnic communities constitute nations that enjoy the right for 'their national states'. In the political sense this means that Russia is not *fait a compli* nation-state, and the second round of disintegration of the post-Soviet space thus appears possible and even desirable, now of course at the expense of Russia as a kind of 'mini-empire'. The Soviet doctrinal legacy and the dominating mentality do not allow accomplishing two key re-valuations in the domain of the Russian (national) identification and Russian citizens' individual identities. Even linguistically, 'multi-nationality' excludes the possibility for considering the Russian Federation as a national state, while Russian citizens as a multi-ethnic civic nation. The concept of 'ethnos', or people as a collective body with their mutually exclusive identity (in Russia, one can be only a Russian, or a Jew, or a Tatar, etc., with no other options available) conflicts with social and cultural traditions, and citizens' everyday interactions as *Rossiyan*. This cross-ethnic, *demos* type of identity is just emerging and should be encouraged.

With its high level of ethnically mixed marriages and profound cultural interactions, Russia still does not recognize a complex and mutually non-exclusive identity, which leads and will increasingly be leading to an unjustified tension between ethnic groups, further intensification of ethnic differences, and to the mitigation of the process of appreciation of the priority and the fundamental importance of civic identity.

While a fundamental strategy in the migration policy area implies encouragement of migration and mutual adaptation of a recipient society and newcomers, similarly the main strategy in the ethnic policy area should center on the recognition of Russia's multi-ethnic nature without rigid categorization of citizens across different groups and on the denial of institutionalized ethnicity, and on encouragement of a complex identity basing on the civic loyalty and cultural specificity.

Russia's prospects and political strategies should base upon a more modern and more sensitive attitude towards the ethnic factor. The old-fashioned approaches exposed their inadequacy in the course of the 2002 census when, like in the old times, one had to divide the population into 'nationalities': the struggle for status and numbers resulted in tense situations in a number of regions and ignited an intense debate. But the problem remained unresolved, and regional authorities were de-facto mandated to cope with it at the final stage. That will inevitably raise a wave of dissatisfaction, claims and legal suits after the census's results on the so-called 'national composition' of the population are published. One of the reasons for the tension that emerges on the ethnodemographic

grounds (to which ethnic group one should be assigned and how the hierarchy of the groups should be built) is the refusal to respect the possibility for, and the right of a citizen to cite a multiply ethnic origin.

All the above does not mean a refusal of the policy of recognizing and supporting the country's ethnic and cultural diversity, which should grow in the course of time, particularly fueled by immigration. But that indicates rather an essential change of doctrinal grounds, a renewal of approaches in the area of the scientific evaluation and a concrete policy that leads to the recognition of the factor of cultural diversity not only at the level of collective communities, but at the individual level as well. National policy is a policy that ensures Russia's national interests, while ethnocultural policy constitutes a policy aimed at maintenance of ethnic diversity and securing citizens' rights and requirements based on their ethnocultural affiliation.

The above also implies a more complex interpretation of the situation of, and prospects for the country's ethnodemographic development. The ethnical composition of Russia's population takes shape under the influence of three factors: a) natural movement; b) migration, and c) changes in citizens' identities under the effect of assimilation or acculturation. Both experts and policy makers undervalue the latter factor, but its effect is significant. Historically, the number of Russians was not so much determined by birth rate or migration rate. Rather it was determined by a mutating concept of 'being Russian' (be that 'belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church' or 'participating the Russian culture') and the assimilation of representatives of other ethnic communities into the Russian-language culture. The same factor that induce many non-Russians, including immigrants, to opt for 'being Russian' will retain its role as one of the key factors in determining the number of the given ethnic community.

It is important to extend the comprehension of what to be and to be considered Russian in Russia means and not to please racist and jingoistic concepts by limiting this comprehension with a phenotypic appearance, a spelling of the name or 'purity of blood'. Should a more inclusive, rather than exclusive approach dominate in Russia, millions of its citizens would declare their Russian identity, because today they are constrained by the currently dominating stereotypes, which dictate that a person with the Asian appearance or an Armenian surname cannot be considered Russian. Being Russians by their culture and self-consciousness, many our co-citizens are not considered such, for the existing set of identities refuses to recognize 'a Russian Jew' or 'a Russian Armenian'.

Likewise, one should also change the comprehension of such a category as 'native language', which is often conceived as a language of one's ethnic group. This leads to a distorted language reality and induces tension in the society. According to the international practice, native language is understood as a main

language an individual has learned and primarily uses in his everyday life. In this case, the Russian language does not constitute an exclusive property of ethnic Russians, for it is equally a native language for the Russian citizens who have learned it and use as a main language both at home and in public. The Russian language was declared the official language of the Russian Federation not because it is the native language of 'the main ethnic group'. Rather because most of the country's population, regardless of their ethnic origin, speak Russian.

Should the problems of a more liberal formation of Russian citizens' identities be included into the political agenda, it will inevitably affect the country's ethnodemographic profile by freeing the society from apocalyptic predictions and ethnic, anti-immigrant phobias.

### **4.3. Assessment of Threats and Counteraction Strategies**

Nonetheless, it does not mean that one can underestimate the current demographic asymmetry between the Russian and the non-Russian regions. Theoretically, the power of the 'demographic explosion' of the rural population in a relatively small number of the non-Russian regions can be absorbed by their own urbanization. That necessitates the existence of the respective economic and social prerequisites, which are not present everywhere. For example, an inflow into the Russian territories of, say, rural residents from the North Caucasus so far has been blocked by their low mobility against the background of high birth rates there, as well as the current 'anti-Caucasian' sentiments in Russia. Hence, numerous challenges facing overpopulated and resource-scarce areas, while high social expectations and poverty aversion fuel tension, conflicts, and they compel citizens to abandon the legal field, and it is not at all comforting that such areas are relatively small: even accounting for 1% of Russia's population and territory, the Chechens and Chechnya can form a base for a armed secession and full-fledge military conflict.

Would a mass inflow of ethnic immigrants from overseas and a consequent change in the ethnic composition of Russia's population cause yet greater problems that could destroy Russia from within?

This depends on numerous factors, particularly on external ones, which cannot be directly influenced and controlled by Russia's political establishment (however, in such cases there always is a possibility to influence the situation by adequate political means).

Whilst considering acceptability or unacceptability of the change in the ethnic composition of Russia's population, one cannot help understanding that similar to other countries, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century Russia will exist (and already does) in the conditions of a drastically changed and already rapidly changing ethnic com-

position of the world population. This factor makes prospects for pursuance an ethnic isolationism strategy very unlikely.

There are enough multiethnic national communities in the world that have emerged resulting from large migration waves induced by flows that originated from different ethnic pools rather than by means of conquest or integration of the already existed state and tribal entities (which formed the historical way of creation of the Russian Empire-USSR, and the Russian Federation itself). Even acknowledging the existence of fairly serious challenges caused by this particular kind of multi-ethnic entities, one cannot help seeing that the migration openness is far greater compatible to the current situation in the world than the Soviet-Russian type of isolationism.

It is not easy to overcome such isolationism; it is not our fault, but our problem, and it constitutes a part of our political legacy, which we cannot reject easily, though it can put Russia on the verge of disaster.

The contemporary world does not witness a single state with a rigid hierarchy of ethnic communities, and in each state assimilation processes usually take place in favor of a dominating culture. In Russia, that is the Russian culture and language, or, more precisely, the Rossian (*Rossiiskaya*) culture that is based upon the Russian language.

Meanwhile, the nation still preserves the old, Soviet attitude to the so-called 'national problem'. It suggests essentially a strict governmental institutionalization of citizens' ethnicity and an unjustified exaggeration of the role ethnic communities play, that is, as some basic social groupings ('peoples', or '*ethnoses*') the sum of which forms the Rossian civic and socio-cultural community. Accordingly, the nation retains an old practice of the official division of its citizens into 'peoples', or 'nationalities', while the ethnic statistics plays political role. The fundamentalist division of the population into collective bodies, '*ethnoses*' is persistent, and it is conducted by means of both research and mass media, censuses, and corporate personnel and local housing management agencies' questionnaires. The so-called 'national structure' (meaning, the ethnic composition of the population) often constitutes a single vehicle of justification an ethnocentric governance and political mobilization of the citizenry.

There are countless cultural identities, such identities are multi-level and are not mutually exclusive. These are not different communities in terms of membership (which is a grave error of the domestic experts), but coalitions formed by individuals, across which their individual self-consciousness carries out a drift of loyalty or can find itself in all the mental manifestations at the same time.

While cementing rigid ethnic borders with its authority, the state follows ethnic elites' intentions and just contributes to the reinforcement of the basis for ethnic nationalism, the 'Great-Russian' and periphery (the one of non-Russian

ethnic groups) one, which sometimes tends to take an extreme form, including armed separatism, thus eventually being destructive for the state itself.

The ideological core of the ethnic nationalism is unification of 'ethnic nations' that are understood as communities united by the common past, be that an actual or, more often, a mythological or strongly mythologized one, and in some extreme cases even by common biological roots (racism).

The ideologically ethnic nationalism finds its opposition in the civil patriotism. The latter is based upon understanding the national attribution as citizenship, while nation is understood as an aggregate of individuals united by the common future and sharing the vision of a common 'projection' of the future. This particular type of ideology unfolds in the course of development of civil society, and it also finds its bearers and advocates who are keen to sweep out a historical mess and to create a 'fair play' environment that would not appreciate any historic merits and privileges.

Though civil patriotism has had an impressive record in Russia (particularly even because it was a perfect match to the 'imperial' interests and the concept of indivisibility of an integral whole), the contemporary Russia has inherited to a greater extent from the 'distempered times' of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and the Soviet national policy the idea of an ethnic nation, flirting with the ethnic nationalism, 'national liberation movements', among others. At present, this legacy manifests itself in the rise of both the Russian and other ethnic nationalisms.

The current rise in the Russian nationalism and the nationwide xenophobia, especially against migrants from the Caucasus and the Middle Asia blocks development of the all-Russia (civil) patriotism and the consolidation of the population for the sake of social prosperity and democratic transformation of the country. Though false doctrines of some 'state-core nation' coupled with debates on 'the Russians' destiny' (extinction, uniqueness, grandeur, etc.) may contribute to the rise in the ethnic consolidation of some part of the population that consider themselves 'ethnic Russians', but they can result in the country's disintegration, even given its current relatively high rate of socio-cultural homogeneity.

While the Khans as a major ethnic group in China stand down in favor of the multi-ethnic Chinese nation, the Castilians – in favor of multi-ethnic Spanish nations, and the English – in favor of the British nation, the ethnic Russian likewise will have to give preference to the Russian community and the Russian patriotism in which the Russian language and culture dominate, nonetheless. This critically important doctrinal re-valuation appears clearly protracted and even witnesses some backtrack recurrences, but it must be urgently accomplished within a decade, providing it is based on the 'many-nations' formula and rejection of 'the Russian nature' as a high collective value.

Russia also faces an equal threat to its integrity posed by non-Russian nationalists that capitalize on the idea of ‘oppression’, loosing ‘national roots’, ‘the glorious past’, etc. One should not of course deny or conceal dark moments of the past, both pre- and post-Revolution, but it is impossible to live only in memories, trying to turn the values of the past into the base of the projected future.

Like in many other countries, ethnic nationalism in Russia is advocated mainly by numerous, especially with the humanitarian background, intellectuals. They forge its intellectual and emotional components by mixing ethnic mythological background, excerpts from political and religious doctrines, etc., thus putting out the flames of dissatisfaction. The main consumers of their prescriptions are ethnic elites, and their most active representatives conduct a successful mass mobilization and are capable to create extremist groups. At the same time, a part of representatives of the liberal democratic camp have confused the minorities’ radical nationalism with a form of human rights movement and often advocate that.

So, even under the present level of multiethnicity in Russia, it generates numerous challenges that sometimes gain a greater significance. Today, both the country and the society are challenged by the need to resist ethnic nationalism, unmask the myths of ‘national movements’ and ‘national revival’ that comprises a conflict mythology and de-facto appears a way of mobilization of the ethnic factor in the situation of struggle for power and privatized resources. It is necessary to implement new strategies of resisting extremism, which, apart from legal prosecution, would provide refusal of access for extremists to mass media, incorporation of their out-of-system activists in the civilized environment, educational and enlightenment measures and a special training of the law enforcement corps, especially investigators and judges on the issue.

Another important area is the incorporation of non-Russian elites in the Center and making the center of the state (all the institutions – from the authorities to mass media) multicultural. That would allow to partly bridge the gap between the ethnic periphery and the rest of the state and the bulk of Russia’s population. This is a huge area of action, which ranges from textbooks to visual images and languages used in broadcasting.

All the above tasks cannot be addressed without a fundamental doctrinal turn from the ethnic to the civil concept of nation, from the unification on the basis of the common past to the one based on the common future, for without such a turn the country will be swamped in continuous ethnic conflicts, and it will of course be incapable of receiving millions of immigrants of other cultural backgrounds.

Even such ideological and political upturn does not guarantee a painless integration of immigrants into the Russian society. There are enough social and cultural factors that make such an integration a hard mission. However, once specif-



ic and rationally appreciated challenges are identified, they can be tackled using a rational, well thought-over strategy, policy, law, etc. By contrast, dealing with paradigmatic taboo makes any rational policy impossible.

At present one is unlikely to predict when and how many of immigrants start to arrive in Russia. But, whatever the situation will be, it can be argued with confidence that the ethnic and cultural diversity of Russians will be expanding both thanks to non-Russia immigrants from other countries and due to higher birth rates among the non-Russian population in the country (in the North Caucasus, migrants from the Middle Asia and China, among others). That is why in practical terms in the coming decades major efforts should be focused on supporting the population's cultural diversity coupled with maintenance of a proper level of their integration in the nationwide socio-cultural community basing on the Russian language. The development of the bilingual and, at the same time, culturally diverse population constitutes the most optimal strategy for the non-Russian population and for the part of the ethnic Russians residing in ethnoterritorial autonomies.

An optimal strategy is to avoid drastic changes in proportions of population at the local community level and large urban centers. Equally, one should also avoid the spatial ethnic segregation (ethnic quarters). It is also important to pursue the policy of cultural and socio-political integration, to lower the significance of ethnicity, to recognize the existence of plural identity ('multinationality' at the level of individuality), to refuse the government interference with problems of ethnic identification of, and fixing a 'national identity' in official documents and even more so – by local housing management and registration bodies.

## Conclusion

The current domestic and external migration trends both do not meet Russia's interests in the long run. While prospects for their change are vague, they obviously will be closely interrelated.

The Russians' migration mobility appears relatively low now, and one has every reason to assume that once the socio-economic situation stabilizes and sustained economic growth is achieved, the mobility should grow. But, given the falling population, even with a far greater population's territorial mobility than the current one, domestic migrations will not any longer play their usual role of major vehicle that ensures large-scale shifts in the population's settlement patterns. Russia simply lacks sufficient demographic resources to ensure such large territorial transformations as a shift of its center of population eastward or another urbanization spurt with the emergence of new or a sharp rise of the high-rank existing urban population clots. In this sense domestic migrations have ultimately lost their former role.

By contrast, external migrations are going to gain such a role in Russia's life they have never had before, for only they can form a real pool of a real completion of the country's increasingly scanty demographic resources and at the same time ensure at least partial accomplishment of the geodemographic mission that cannot any longer be solved solely by means of domestic migration. The population inflow from outside will also feed and encourage the domestic migration.

Though Russia clearly is in need of a large-scale population inflow, while with account of the global situation it is likely to be even inevitable, the prognosis of its actual appearance involves a great deal of uncertainty. The latter is associated chiefly with the assumption that receiving a great number of migrants generally, and particularly those speaking foreign languages, having different cultures and belonging to different confessions is a very painful process whose complexity doubles, given the current social environment in the country. This is in the air already today, and no doubt that migration and associated issues that the society has lately been ignorant to from now on will find itself in the center of public debates. The objective conflict nature of large-scale immigration effects in Russia cannot be questioned, and there is no bigger mistake than a thoughtless denial of their negative and even dangerous side. At the same time, one should not ignore their positive side, both generally (with reference to international experiences) and particularly for Russia, for which a population inflow is vitally necessary.

A constant emphasis and exaggeration of undesirable effects from immigration (let us once again stress, they are actual, not imaginary) provides bullion for a political game that sometimes is 100% safe and promising electoral success, and other quick political pay-offs. But such a game can take Russia far away from the actual challenges without addressing which she will very quickly lose her still quite high place in the world and fall to the level of second- and even third-rank nation. Perhaps, she would also suffer territorial losses.

The alternative is to mobilize a broad societal consensus and the one among political elites on the immigration matter understood as one of priorities in the national security area. It is such consensus that can form the base for Russia's future efficient migration strategy, whose main purposes should be a vigorous attraction of immigrants, their effective integration into the Russian society, and neutralization of potentially negative effects from the growing proportion of immigrants and their offspring for Russia's population. The implementation of such a strategy can be very costly, but, as the Russian saying goes, 'A greedy man eventually always pays a double price'.

## **Annex. Federal Okrugs and The Subjects of the Russian Federation That Fall into Their Borders**

### **Central federal okrug**

1. Belgorod oblast
2. Bryansk oblast
3. Vladimir oblast
4. Voronezh oblast
5. Ivanovo oblast
6. Kaluga oblast
7. Kostroma oblast
8. Kursk oblast
9. Lipetsk oblast
10. Moscow oblast
11. Orel oblast
12. Ryazan oblast
13. Smolensk oblast
14. Tambov oblast
15. Tver oblast
16. Tula oblast
17. Yaroslavl oblast
18. City of Moscow

### **North-western federal okrug**

19. Republic of Karelia
20. Republic of Komi
21. Arkhangelsk oblast
22. Nenetsky autonomous okrug
23. Vologda oblast
24. Kliningrad oblast
25. Leningrad oblast
26. Murmansk oblast
27. Novgorod oblast
28. Pskov oblast
29. City of St. Petersburg

### **Southern federal okrug**

30. Republic of Adygea
31. Republic of Dagestan
32. Republic of Ingoushetia

33. Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria
34. Republic of Kalmykia
35. Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia
36. Republic of Northern Ossetia-Alania
37. Chechen Republic
38. Krasnodar krai
39. Stavropol krai
40. Astrakhan oblast
41. Volgograd oblast
42. Rostov oblast

**Volga federal okrug**

43. Republic of Bashkortostan
44. Republic of Mary-El
45. Republic of Mordovia
46. Republic of Tatarstan
47. Udmurt Republic
48. Chuvash Republic
49. Kirov oblast
50. Nizhny Novgorod oblast
51. Orenburg oblast
52. Penza oblast
53. Perm oblast
54. Komi-Permyatsky autonomous okrug\*
55. Samara oblast
56. Saratov oblast
57. Ulyanovsk oblast

**Ural federal okrug**

58. Kurgan oblast
59. Sverdlovsk oblast
60. Tumen oblast
61. Khanty-Mansy autonomous okrug
62. Yamal-Nenetsky autonomous okrug
63. Chelyabinsk oblast

**Siberian federal okrug**

64. Altay Republic
65. Republic of Buryatia
66. Republic of Tyva
67. Republic of Khkassia
68. Altay krai
69. Krasnoyarskiy krai

70. Taymyr autonomous okrug
71. Evenk autonomous okrug
72. Irkutsk oblast
73. Ust-Ordynsky autonomous okrug
74. Kemerovo oblast
75. Novosibirsk oblast
76. Omsk oblast
77. Tomsk oblast
78. Chita oblast
79. Aginsky Buryatsky autonomous okrug

**Far-eastern federal okrug**

80. Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)
81. Primorsky krai.
82. Khabarovsk krai
83. Amur oblast
84. kamchatka oblast
85. Koryak autonomous okrug
86. Magadan oblast
87. Sakhalin oblast
88. Jewish autonomous oblast
89. Chukotka autonomous okrug

\* As of January 2004, the part of Perm oblast.