

# **What demography accounts for in conflicts of the North Caucasus?**


**I. Starodybrovskaya  
K. Kazenin**

**Moscow 2014**


# North Caucasus




# The age structure in 1959




Daghestan



Kabardino-Balkaria



Karachaevo-Cherkesia




Russian Federation (RSFSR)


# Adults 15-29 to adults 15-64 in 1959

Russian Federation	Daghestan	Kabardino-Balkaria	Karachaevo-Cherkesia
40,8%	46,7%	46,6%	44,4%


# The age structure in 1989




Daghestan



Kabardino-Balkaria



Karachaevo-Cherkesia




Russian Federation (RSFSR)

# Adults 15-29 to adults 15-64 in 1989

Russian Federation	Daghestan	Kabardino-Balkaria	Karachaevo-Cherkesia
32,7%	45,4%	38,6%	36,3%

# Cohort fertility in Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkesia in 2002



# Urban population in Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkesia, %


<b>Year</b>	<b>1959</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>1979</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2010</b>
<b>Daghestan</b>	29,6	35,3	39,3	43,6	42,8	45,2
<b>Kabardino-Balkaria</b>	39,5	47,6	57,6	61,2	56,6	54,5
<b>Karachaevo-Cherkesia</b>	23,6	32,6	42,9	48,6	44,0	43,5




# Adults 15-29 to adults 15-64

	<b>Russian Federation</b>	<b>Daghestan</b>	<b>Kabardino-Balkaria</b>	<b>Karachaevo-Cherkesia</b>
1959	40,8%	46,7%	46,6%	44,4%
1989	32,7%	45,4%	38,6%	36,3%
2002	34,0%	45,1%	38,8%	36,8%
2010	31,6%	42,4%	37,2%	35,0%


# The age structure in 2010




Daghestan



Kabardino-Balkaria



Karachaevo-Cherkesia



Russian Federation

# Demographic framework for 3 regions

## 1. Youth bulge:

- all three regions are in the medium position;
- In Dagestan youth bulge is bigger than in the other two regions.

## 2. Birth rate:

- TFR is decreasing in all three regions;
- In Dagestan TFR is higher than in the other two;
- By mid-1990-s demographic transition was completing or has been completed in all three regions.

# TFR by regions

	1990	1995	2002	2010
Dagestan				
Total	3,1	2,4	1,9	1,9
rural	3,5	2,9	2,2	2,3
KBR				
Total	2,4	1,7	1,2	1,7
rural	3,1	2,2	1,5	1,8
KChR				
Total	2,2	1,7	1,4	1,5
rural	2,5	2,1	1,5	1,7
Russian				
Total	1,9	1,3	1,3	1,6
rural	2,6	1,8	1,6	2,0

# Reality is different

We can suppose that:

- conflict should not be very sharp in all three regions;
- Situation in Dagestan is quite different from the other two.

In reality:

- There are sharp conflicts in Dagestan and KBR;
- There were acute nationalist conflicts in KChR in the end 1990-s, religious conflicts are mild.

# Possible explanations

Hypothesis 1: Policy matters

# Confessional policy in KBR

1998-2005	Islamic organization alternative to official Muftiyat exists: Jamaat KBR, several thousand people
1998-2000	No repressions
2000-2003	Administrative pressure
2003-2005	Heavy repressions, closing of mosques, torture of muslims
August 2003	No support for jihad ideas
Winter 2004-Spring 2005	First calls for jihad, split on this issue
October 13, 2005	Paramilitary attack on Nalchick, massive killing
2010-2011	Peak of paramilitary and terrorist activity

# KBR - consequences

- Vicious circle of violence;
- Separation of Islamic fundamentalists from the rest of the society;
- Pressure from both the state and paramilitary groups;
- Socialization problems: youth considers rebel leaders as heroes.



# Confessional policy in KChR

Several bursts of radical Islamic activity:

Beginning of 1990-s	Mix of nationalist and political Islamic movement
2004-2006	Peak of terrorist activity
2010-2011	Troubles in one district

Policy:

- no massive repressions against Muslims;
- Openness of official Muftiyat to young Islamic students with different views;
- Reasonable state attitude.

# KChR - consequences

- No vicious circle of violence;
- No paramilitary infrastructure;
- No romantic views about rebel leaders;
- Free communication between groups of different religious and secular views.

Possible explanation

Hypothesis 2: Urbanization  
matters

# Urbanization indicators for 3 regions

Year	1959	1970	1979	1989	2002	2010
Daghestan	29,6	35,3	39,3	43,6	42,8	45,2
Kabardino-Balkaria	39,5	47,6	57,6	61,2	56,6	54,5
Karachaevo-Cherkesia	23,6	32,6	42,9	48,6	44,0	43,5

	1959	1989	2002	2010
Makhachkala	119334	314767	462412	572076
Nalchik	87617	230641	274974	240203
Cherkessk	41709	112307	116244	129069

# Consequences of urbanization

- Anomy
- Generation conflict
- Blocking of vertical lifts

# Consequences of urbanization

- Demand for norms and “rules of the game”
- Demand for ideology different from previous generation
- Demand for protest ideology

# Consequences of urbanization

- Spread of radical ideologies
- Spread of violence practices

# Demographic consequences of the conflict

Demographic drainage in some districts of  
KBR



**Thank you for your  
attention**