

Population Aging the Probability of Great Power Conflict

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

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

United States

Relationship between Fertility Rate and the Probability of Onset of International Conflict





Source: Brooks, Brooks, Greenhill, Haas

Relationship between Life Expectancy and International Conflict



Source: Brooks, Brooks, Greenhill, Haas


Relationship between Old-Age Dependency Ratios (Ages >65/15-64) and International Conflict




Source: Brooks, Brooks, Greenhill, Haas

Relationship between Median Age and Probability of International Conflict

Initiator



Target



Source: Brooks, Brooks, Greenhill, Haas

The Causal Links

- Demography is likely to shape the probability of conflict by two sets of causal mechanisms.
 - The first set examines how demography affects states' military capabilities.
 - The second set explores how demography affects individuals' preferences for conflict.
- For both sets of mechanisms, demography can both increase and decrease the incentives for international aggression.

Population Aging and the Effects on Capabilities

- Aging will tend to have three major effects on states' military spending, all of which will negatively impact their ability to project power:
 - slowing economic growth;
 - massive new governmental expenditures for elderly welfare;
 - incentives to shift within military budgets more money to personnel costs compared to weapons.

Predicted Public Benefits to Elderly as a Percent of GDP

Country	Increase in Public Elderly Care Spending, 2010-2040	Total Public Commitments, 2040
Russia	2.7	10.9
UK	5.0	18.9
France	5.7	24.3
Japan	5.8	20.9
Germany	6.3	24.3
USA	7.4	18.5
China	7.6	11.0

Source: Global Aging Preparedness Index (2013)

Population aging is likely to push
militaries to spend more on personnel
and less on other areas, including
weapons development and
procurement.

Effects on the Probability of Conflict

- Reductions in military spending due to the effects of population aging could result in both increased and decreased incentives for aggression.
 - In the long-run, reductions in military spending are likely to make international conflict less likely because states' ability to project power is likely to be reduced.
 - In the short run, reductions in military spending may increase the incentives for conflict by creating windows of opportunity for aggression.

Aging and Preference Formation

There are three primary ways by which the factors associated with population aging could decrease the motives for international conflict.

- First, as family size shrinks as fertility levels fall, societal aversion to conflict is likely to increase.
- Second, falling fertility rates are likely to increase casualty sensitivity not only at the societal level, but in governmental and military circles as well.
- Third, the relative growth of older-age cohorts in aging societies is likely to be a force for peace based on changing preferences if people tend to become more pacific as they age.

Aging and Increasing Bellicosity

The effects of population aging could increase preferences for conflict by two main pathways.

- First, the effects of aging could increase the incentives for governments to engage in “diversionary” wars.
- Second, population aging could create preferences for international conflict by increasing ideological polarization and thus incentives for ideology-based international hostilities.

Fertility in the Great Powers

	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Japan	1.32	1.44	1.56	1.64	1.70
Germany	1.35	1.44	1.52	1.58	1.63
Russia	1.37	1.57	1.68	1.75	1.80
China	1.59	1.68	1.73	1.77	1.80
United Kingdom	1.77	1.88	1.89	1.89	1.90
France	1.92	1.98	1.99	1.99	1.99
USA	2.05	1.97	1.98	1.98	1.99

Source: UN World Population Prospects (2012 Revision)

Fertility in Russia's Neighbors

	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Eastern Europe	1.33	1.52	1.63	1.72	1.76
Caucasus Countries	1.81	1.81	1.79	1.79	1.80
North Korea	2.00	1.97	1.89	1.85	1.84
Mongolia	2.22	2.38	2.21	2.09	2.02
Central Asian States	2.61	2.54	2.31	2.16	2.07

Source: UN World Population Prospects (2012 Revision)

Life Expectancies in the Great Powers

	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Russia	66.1	68.2	69.5	70.8	72.1
China	73.9	75.6	77.0	78.4	76.6
USA	77.6	79.2	80.7	82.1	83.2
United Kingdom	79.0	80.8	82.3	83.5	84.7
Germany	79.2	81.0	82.5	83.8	85.0
France	80.2	82.1	83.6	85.0	86.3
Japan	82.2	83.9	85.4	86.7	88.1

Source: UN World Population Prospects (2012 Revision)

Life Expectancies in Russia's Neighbors

	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Mongolia	65.1	67.9	69.9	71.7	73.4
Central Asian States	65.8	67.3	68.7	70.0	71.3
North Korea	68.2	70.5	72.8	74.8	76.8
Eastern Europe	68.7	70.5	71.0	73.2	74.5
Caucasus Countries	71.3	73.4	74.7	76.0	77.3

Source: UN World Population Prospects (2012 Revision)

Median Ages in the Great Powers

	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
China	34.6	37.7	42.1	45.9	46.3
USA	37.1	38.2	39.5	40.4	40.6
Russia	38.0	39.4	42.4	43.2	41.6
United Kingdom	39.8	40.9	42.3	43.3	43.3
France	40.0	41.3	42.3	43.0	43.4
Germany	44.3	47.6	49.1	51.0	51.5
Japan	44.9	48.3	51.6	53.1	53.4

Source: UN World Population Prospects (2012 Revision)

Median Ages in Russia's Neighbors

	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Central Asian States	24.8	27.8	30.4	32.3	34.6
Mongolia	25.7	29.3	32.0	33.3	35.7
Caucasus Countries	32.4	35.8	40.1	43.4	43.5
North Korea	33.1	35.0	37.3	39.8	41.1
Eastern Europe	38.5	40.4	43.5	45.4	43.8

Source: UN World Population Prospects (2012 Revision)

Old-age Dependency Ratios in the Great Powers

Ages > 65 / Ages 15 -64

	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
China	0.11	0.17	0.24	0.35	0.39
Russia	0.18	0.22	0.28	0.28	0.33
USA	0.20	0.26	0.33	0.35	0.36
United Kingdom	0.25	0.30	0.36	0.40	0.42
France	0.26	0.33	0.39	0.44	0.45
Germany	0.32	0.36	0.48	0.57	0.60
Japan	0.36	0.49	0.54	0.65	0.72

Source: UN World Population Prospects (2012 Revision)

Old-age Dependency Ratios in Russia's Neighbors

Ages >65/15-64

	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Mongolia	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.15	0.20
Central Asian States	0.07	0.08	0.12	0.14	0.17
North Korea	0.13	0.13	0.18	0.28	0.29
Caucasus Countries	0.15	0.17	0.26	0.29	0.35
Eastern Europe	0.19	0.24	0.29	0.32	0.39

Source: UN World Population Prospects (2012 Revision)