

International Research Laboratory on Political Demography  
and Social Macro-Dynamics,  
Moscow December 2014

Second conference on Global Ageing and Russia's  
Future.

*Migration as a factor of diversity  
among European populations.*



David Coleman, University of Oxford


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<http://www.spi.ox.ac.uk/oxpop>

# The demographic power of immigration: an example.

## The growth of US population from 1770.

Joseph Chamie, 2014 (forthcoming). "International Migration Trends and Perspectives for the United States of America".



# Migration and Europe - a simple overview.

Historically, Europe a region of emigration.

Large-scale immigration in peacetime mostly from 1960s, mostly to West:

Guest-workers, former colonial subjects, dependants and new spouses  
created Chain migration from outside Europe to Western Europe.

Migration to Eastern Europe and Russia very modest before 1989/1992.

*promoted and facilitated by:*

Mismatched demographic and economic transitions between Europe and the rest of the world.

Revolutions in information, transport, rights, EU expansion. Policy important but erratic.

Migration today mostly from 'South' to Western Europe (and Russia), plus Eastern Europe to Western Europe (except Russia).

# How is Russia exceptional?

Biggest, Easternmost country in Europe.

Late economic and demographic transitions, delayed ageing.

Highly diverse geographically, ethnically; irregular age-structure.

High death rate moderates population ageing – ageing all due to low fertility.

Low emigration, but high immigration since 1992.

The only European country with a long border with the developing world (similar to USA?).


The only European country with substantial non-European indigenous minorities; ‘Eurasian’ orientation.

No experience of 19<sup>th</sup> century transatlantic emigration.

Almost no migration exchange with the West before 1992.

Very limited immigration from remote non-European countries.

Mismatched demographic, economic and democratic transitions – the ultimate driving factors behind post-war migration.



Unequal pace and timing of demographic and economic transitions in ‘North’ and ‘South’.

Population growth in rich countries ending as population growth continues in poorer countries > pressure to migrate.

Weak economic development interacts with population growth and ‘youth bulges’.


Most movement to West, not East – except Russia.

# A Western example of mismatched transition: Turkey and Western Europe 1950 – 2050.

an example of a demographic transition gap between neighbouring populations


**Population trends and projections, selected European countries and**

**Turkey 1950-2050 (millions).** Source: United Nations 2004-based estimates.




# An Eastern example of mismatched demographic transition: Russia and the Central Asian Republics 1950 - 2100.

Population Trends, Russia and Central Asian Republics 1950 - 2100 (thousands). Source of data: UN 2012.



# ...of which Uzbekistan is the most prominent.

Population trends, Central Asian Republics 1950 - 2100 (thousands). Source of data: UN 2012 Medium Variant






# A reminder of the recent scale of migration: European Union (net) 1960 – 2011 (thousands).

N.B. EU figures include intra-EU movement – about 40% of total.


**Net immigration to EU countries, 1960 - 2013 .** Source: Eurostat,



# A national example: Long-term migration trends to the United Kingdom 1967 – 2013, UK and non-UK citizens.


UK net migration by citizenship, calendar years 1967 - 2012 (thousands).

Note: there are discontinuities in this series from 1991 and 2011. Source: ONS International Migration Statistics Series MN, ONS Statistical Bulletin, Migration Statistics 2013.



# Net migration to selected Western European countries 1997 – 2012 (thousands). N.B. UK, Germany comparable to Russia.

Net migration, selected European countries 1997 - 2012, thousands. Source: Eurostat.




# Net migration to Italy and Spain 1997 – 2011 (thousands).

Note: increase partly due to illegal immigration and regularisation of illegal residence through amnesties.

## Net migration, Spain and Italy, 1997 - 2011 (thousands).


Source: Eurostat.



# Net migration to / from selected Central and Eastern European countries 1980 – 2013.

N.B. recent net migration (inflow) to Russia about 295,000 – off the scale.

Source: Eurostat.



# A word of caution – migration data are often terrible.


## Two stories on emigration from Hungary, 2003 – 2012.

Source: Godri, HDRI Research Highlights No 17 Figure 2.


Figure 1. Hungarian citizens emigrating from Hungary (according to Hungarian statistics) and immigrating into EEA countries (according to 'mirror' statistics), 2003–2012  
Sources: Eurostat database (updated on 4 April 2014), for 2009–2012 supplemented with data from Destatis (Germany) and Statistik Austria; Hungarian Demographic Yearbook, 2012.

Note: Eurostat data are missing for the UK since 2006 and for France for the whole period.

■ Hungarian citizens immigrating into European countries  
■ Hungarian citizens emigrating from Hungary




The divergent consequences of migration and fertility trends.  
 Projected percent population change 2014 – 2060, selected  
 Western and Eastern European countries, with and without  
 migration. Source Eurostat EUROPOP 2013.



# Population gain in the West – rapid population growth in the UK, mostly from migration. Source: data from ONS and OXPOP.

United Kingdom 2012-2086, 2012-based Principal Projection, zero-migration projection and new 2014 projection (millions).


Source: data from ONS





# Population loss: Trends in population size, Central and Eastern Europe 1990 – 2014, 1990 = 100. Source:

Population Trends, Central and Eastern Europe 1990 - 2014, 1990 = 100




# Population loss: proportion of population living abroad, Central and Eastern European countries 2000, 2010, 2013.

Source: Godri HDRI Research Highlights No.17 Figure 2.

Figure 2. Emigrant stock of EU8 and EU2 countries: the share of those residing outside their country of origin in the total population (2000, 2010 and 2013)  
Source: United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev. 2013; author's calculation.

2000 2010 2013




# Consequent variety in size of immigrant populations, 2012.


N.B. OECD gives a much smaller percent of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation.

Selected European populations, percent of residents born abroad, 2012. Source: UN 2013.

Percent of population born abroad, selected European countries. Source of data: UN 2013.




How migration can affect the age-structure. UK Potential Support Ratio 2011-86 (population 15-64 / population 65+) at different levels of net annual immigration. Source of data: ONS.




# ‘Solving’ population ageing: the case of the UK.

UK population size required to maintain given PSRs by immigration, 2000  
- 2100 (millions)



# Solving population ageing – the case of Korea.


Source: data from UN 2000.



# Projected Potential Support Ratio, Russia 2010 – 2100. Source: data from UN 2012.

PSR = population 15-64 / population 65+


Aged Potential Support Ratio, Russia 2010 - 2100. Source of data UN 2012 medium variant.



# Potential support ratio (population 20-64 / population 65 and over) selected countries, 2014-2080.

Source: Eurostat 2013 projections, UN 2012.


Potential Support Ratio, selected countries 2014 - 2080. Source: Eurostat 2013 projection; UN 2012.





# Effects on projected UK PSR of different fertility levels, 1998

— 2100. (Source: Population Trends 103)



Demography not the only factor in managing population ageing – or even the most important.

Workforce participation.

Workforce productivity.

Pension entitlement age and actual age at retirement.

Pension replacement rate.

Healthy or unhealthy old age.

All these differ substantially between European countries, unfavourably in Russia.



## International migration and ethnic change

Continued migration from one population into another which has sub-replacement fertility, must eventually replace one with the other.

If incoming populations have higher fertility, the process will be accelerated.

Migration, not differential fertility, is usually the dominant factor in ethnic transition.

In these respects different countries and regions of Europe are highly divergent.

# Growth of ethnic minority population, Great Britain

1951 – 2011. Sources: 1971 – 2011 Census, LFS. 1951, 1961 estimated.

	Ethnic Minority		percent
	number	percent	annual
	(millions)	total	growth
1951	0.05	0.1	20.8
1961	0.40	0.8	12.3
1971	1.37	2.5	4.2
1981	2.09	3.9	3.7
1991	3.02	5.5	7.7
2001	6.51	12.5	5.2
2011	10.94	19.5	

# Towards an ethnic majority population. London

1991 – 2011. Source: Census of England and Wales.

In 2001 9/33 boroughs (21%) were ‘minority-majority’, in 2011 21/33 were (64%).

<b>Ethnic change in London 1991 - 2011</b>					
	<b>1991</b>		<b>2001</b>		<b>2011</b>
<b>Population totals and percent</b>					
Total population (millions)	6.7		7.2		8.2
Non-white (millions)	1.4		2.1		3.3
Percent of total	20.8		28.8		40.2
White (millions)	5.3		5.1		4.9
Percent of total	79.2		71.2		59.8
White British (millions)	n/a		4.3		3.7
Percent of total			59.8		44.9

# Numbers of live births, natural increase and net migration around 2010, selected countries.

	Population 1st Jan 2010	Live births	Natural increase	Net migration	Net migration as percent of births
	data in thousands				
Switzerland	7786	80	13	61	<b>75</b>
Belgium	10840	127	23	89	<b>70</b>
Norway	4858	61	17	42	<b>69</b>
Italy	60340	562	-7	312	<b>55</b>
Austria	8375	79	2	27	<b>35</b>
Denmark	5535	63	9	17	<b>27</b>
UK	62027	807	246	163	<b>20</b>
Germany	81802	678	-181	130	<b>19</b>
Russia	141915	1797	-129	329	<b>18</b>
Spain	45989	485	107	60	<b>12</b>
France mét	62791	802	262	75	<b>9</b>
Greece	11305	115	6	-1	<b>-1</b>
Total of above	503563	5657	366	1304	<b>23</b>
Australia	22696	293	149	176	<b>60</b>
Canada	34108	381	127	216	<b>57</b>
New Zealand	4370	64	35	10	<b>16</b>
United States	298363	4217	1840	844	<b>20</b>

# Projections to 2061 of percent of population with 'foreign background'. Source: Eurostat (Lanzieri 2010).

## Percent of national population with 'foreign background'.

	Lanzieri 2009 Model 4		assumed net migration (1000s)	net migration 2010 (Eurostat)	earlier estimates (various sources, %)	to year
	Percent of population with foreign background 2011	2061				
Austria	21	<b>54</b>	43	27	<b>28</b>	2050
Spain	21	<b>49</b>	246	60		
Belgium	20	<b>48</b>	43	89		
Germany	18	<b>45</b>	289	130	<b>24</b>	2050
Italy	13	<b>40</b>	224	312		
United Kingdom	17	<b>40</b>	229	163	<b>47</b>	2061
Sweden	19	<b>39</b>	32	50	<b>32</b>	2050
Denmark	14	<b>36</b>	18	17	<b>14</b>	2050
Netherlands	16	<b>31</b>	33	32	<b>29</b>	2050
Czech Republic	9	<b>27</b>	29	16		
France	16	<b>22</b>	104	75		
Latvia	19	<b>11</b>	1	-8		
Poland	6	<b>7</b>	14	-2		




Population replacement: TFR compared with a measure of 'Combined Reproduction' incorporating migration. Selected countries 2008 – 2011. Source: Ediev et al. 2013.

	TFR	'Combined Reproduction'	Time to half replacement (years)
EU high GDP	1.70	2.07	105
EU low GDP	1.41	1.50	>200
EU new members	1.39	1.37	.....
Norway	1.94	3.21	41
Switzerland	1.43	2.27	45
Italy	1.42	2.11	52
Sweden	1.81	2.35	80
UK	1.82	2.33	85
US	2.01	2.42	112
France	1.96	2.29	131
Germany	1.37	1.53	196
Czech Republic	1.48	1.62	>200
<b>Russia</b>	<b>1.54</b>	<b>1.65</b>	<b>&gt;200</b>
Netherlands	1.72	1.77	>200
Ukraine	1.45	1.45	>200
Lithuania	1.58	1.03	.....

# The paradigm of ethnic transition. Projection of the US population by race and Hispanic origin, percent, 2010 - 2050.


**Projection of the US population by race and Hispanic origin, 2010--2050 (percent).**

Source: US Census Bureau 2008.




# Netherlands 2005-2050. Percent of 'foreign origin' with and without migration. Source: CBS.

**Netherlands 2005- 2050. Percent of population of foreign origin ('Western' and 'non-Western') with and without migration.** Source: CBS.




A projection of ethnic change in the UK 2006 – 2056. TFR = 1.84, net immigration = 180,000 / year. Source: Coleman 2010.

**FIGURE 2 Standard scenario, percent of UK population in three major ethnic categories, 2006–2056**



**FIGURE 4a Percent of population in three major ethnic categories 2006–2056, standard scenario and natural change scenario**



## Why does it matter (or does it)?

Not easy to distinguish economic and demographic arguments from other arguments; political, cultural, psychological.

Transaction costs.

Threat to unity of society; could become subdivided into separate communities.

Diminished solidarity, national identity, unity of purpose.

Risk of intercommunal hostility, incomprehension

Foreign and domestic policy complications: religion and morality.

Natives obliged to live in some areas as in a 'foreign country', new customs, mores, political control.


# The end of ethnicity : the faces of the future?



# An end to 'ethnic' categories? The rise of mixed populations.

Probabilistic projections of the UK 2001- 2100, median outcome for major groups (percent).

UK Version 2 probabilistic projection: mean of percent of each major ethnic group in the total population, 2001 - 2100.



# Conclusions

Migration primary driver of population change in Western Europe, not so far in most of Central, Eastern Europe and Russia.

Diversifies population growth patterns.

Promotes substantial growth in NW Europe combined with a robust birth rate.

Maintains population in Germany, Russia.

Emigration accelerates decline in poorer low fertility countries (Bulgaria).

Moderates pace of population ageing but cannot solve it.

Leading to ethnic transformation in most Western countries, unlikely (?) in most CE countries and Russia.

A primary driver of diversity within European countries and divergence between them, in population trends and ethnic composition, and between Europe and the rest of the world.