akhstan, Uzbekistan), as well as to China if the second gas pipeline is launched.[1] Currently, supplies via the existing pipeline to China are reaching their technical limits. At the same time, by the end of 2025, Russia had taken second place (after Qatar) in LNG supplies to China, which is likely to remain a promising direction in 2026.[2]

3.4. The state of agriculture and food availability in 2025[3]

3.4.1. Production in agricultural sector

According to Rosstat, in January–December 2025, agricultural production in the Russian Federation amounted to 104.9% compared to the same period last year. The main contribution to this change was made by grains (+10.2% compared to 2024), which accounted for 78% of the increase (among the main types of crop and livestock production, *Fig. 9*). High potato prices in late 2024 and early 2025 stimulated an increase in acreage, which, combined with higher yields, led to an increase in gross harvest (+9.4% compared to 2024, contribution — 20%). The increase in chicken egg prices in 2024 led to an increase in their production in 2025 (+4.3%) and an increase in their contribution to the growth of agricultural production (+7%). Sunflower seeds (+0.8%) and milk (+0.5%) production deviated slightly from the 2024 level in a positive direction, while meat (−0.2%) and vegetables (−0.9%) production deviated in a negative direction. The latter product will make the largest negative contribution (−6%) to the overall dynamics of production of Russia's main agricultural products in 2025.

The total volume of agricultural production in constant prices in 2025 exceeded the average level of the previous five years by 6.4% (*Fig. 10*). These impressive production figures were achieved thanks to both crop production (which even exceeded the maximum grain harvest in 2022) and livestock production (+10% and +2% respectively compared to the five-year average).

The structure of changes in the size of cultivated areas (*Fig. 11*) reflects a decrease in grain crops (mainly wheat) and an increase in oilseeds (mainly sunflower). This trend is consistent with the dynamics of the profitability of these crops — a decline for grains and an increase for oilseeds — which has been observed since 2023 (*Fig. 12*) and is largely explained by fluctuations in world prices for these products.

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1. Russian gas is paving new paths for export growth. URL: https://ria.ru/20260128/gaz-2070585971.html
2. Experts have made a forecast for gas production in Russia and its exports for 2026. URL: https://rg.ru/2025/12/29/kto-ostalsia-na-trube.html?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F
3. Authors: *Shagaida N.I.*, Doctor of Economic Sciences, Head of Center for Agricultural Policy IAES RANEPA; *Ternovsky D.S.*, Doctor of Economic Sciences, Leading Researcher, Center for Agricultural Policy IAES RANEPA.



Fig. 9. **Structure of absolute growth in physical volume of production of key agricultural products in Russia, 2025 relative to 2024, %**

Source: own calculations based on Rosstat data.



Fig. 10. **Dynamics of agricultural production in Russia in 2017–2025, % (2017=100%)**

Source: own calculations based on Rosstat data.

The increase in grain production in 2025 compared to 2024 is a result of higher yields and a reduction in acreage. While the total area under cultivation decreased by 1.1% during the period, the area under grain and leguminous crops decreased by 5.1% and reached its lowest level (43.8 mn hectares and 55.2% of the total area under cultivation) since at least 2019.

At the same time, the increase in areas under oilseed crops covers 95% of the absolute reduction in areas under grain crops. The issue of replacing one crop with another, on the one hand, has an obvious quantitative assessment, and on the other hand, requires in-depth study in terms of establishing cause-and-effect relationships.



Fig. 11. **Absolute increases in sown areas (spring survey) in 2025 compared to 2024 by crop type in Russia, thousand hectares**

Source: own calculations based on Rosstat data.



Fig. 12. **Dynamics of profitability of grain and oilseed cultivation in Russia, 2017–2024 (%, left axis), and world price indices for grain and vegetable oils, 2017–2025 (2014–2016 = 100, right axis)**

Source: own calculations based on Rosstat and FAO data.

An assessment of the redistribution of land between grain and oilseed crops allows us to set its upper limit at 76%, if we use simplifications and assumptions in the analysis of regional data (more accurate estimates could be made if data were available for individual agricultural producers). This means that approximate-

ly three-quarters of the land taken out of grain production was converted to oilseed crops. At the same time, more than 80% of the land converted to oilseed crops was provided by land taken out of grain production.

The redistribution of cultivated land affected regions that are leaders in oilseed cultivation and also have significant reserves of grain crops (*Table 18*). Thus, the three regions that are leaders in terms of the size of the redistribution of cultivated land from grain to oilseed crops (Altai krai, Saratov and Orenburg oblasts, which account for 40% of the redistributed areas) held leading positions in terms of oilseed crop area in both 2024 and 2025.

Table 18

Regions leading the redistribution of cultivated land between oilseed and grain crops in Russia, 2024–2025

Regions	Sown area, thousand hectares						Contribution to area growth:	
	cereals			oilseeds			grain reduction, %	oilseed growth, %
	2024	2025	increase	2024	2025	increase		
Russian Federation	46128	43796	−2332	18860	21065	2205	76.4	80.8
Altai krai	3098	2753	−345	1601	1982	381	100.0	90.4
Saratov oblast	2440	2247	−193	1676	1863	187	96.9	100.0
Orenburg oblast	2559	2389	−170	1294	1566	272	100.0	62.5
Novosibirsk oblast	1419	1200	−219	372	534	162	74.1	100.0
Republic of Bashkortostan	1649	1379	−270	494	640	147	54.4	100.0
Omsk oblast	2029	1877	−152	416	562	145	95.6	100.0
Chelyabinsk oblast	1374	1175	−199	248	359	111	55.8	100.0
Republic of Tatarstan (Tatarstan)	1377	1286	−91	483	582	99	100.0	91.7
Ulyanovsk oblast	688	624	−64	314	394	80	100.0	79.7
Orel oblast	768	701	−68	420	478	58	85.9	100.0

Source: own calculations based on Rosstat data.

The shift towards oilseeds is part of a global trend. When Russia became the world's leading wheat exporter and there was talk of expanding its production and exports, the US saw a different trend — a move away from expanding wheat production and towards exporting soybeans and soy products as more profitable.[1] The rise in global

1. The US and Russian Ministries of Agriculture have entered into a forecasting battle. URL: https://www.ng.ru/economics/2019-08-13/1_7648_battle.html

wheat prices since mid-2020 has ensured high profitability for Russian agricultural producers. The level of world prices, the high competitiveness of Russian wheat on the foreign market, and the absence of domestic price restrictions (as was done with sunflower oil) created incentives to expand production for profitable exports. In June 2021, Russia introduced floating duties as part of a grain damper to protect the domestic market. After peaking in March-May 2022, global prices began to decline and are currently at April 2020 levels, making wheat production and exports less profitable. At the same time, domestic demand for wheat for the production and export of other wheat products is limited. All this makes the wheat production business less sustainable and attractive for investment.

The situation is different for sunflower oil. First, even with an export duty on sunflower seeds (50%), the high global price of sunflower oil supports demand from domestic processors. A large number of oil extraction plants have been built in Russia, which compete with each other for raw materials, keeping purchase prices high for agricultural producers even with restrictions on sunflower seed exports. Secondly, the price on the foreign market has fallen since its peak in 2022, but remains well above pre-pandemic levels, providing incentives for agricultural producers to expand production. Third, a by-product of sunflower oil production, meal, is also in demand for feed purposes. Thus, a combination of factors, the main one being global prices, determines the attractiveness of oilseed production and the redistribution of acreage in its favor.

Livestock numbers are changing in different directions. The number of large (cattle) and small ruminants continues to decline: cattle by 2.9% (including cows by 3.0%), sheep and goats by 6.5%. The poultry population remained almost at last year's level (–1.8%), while the pig population grew by 2.0%.

Agricultural production in private households continues to decline. Where they occupied significant positions — potato production (59.0% of total production), vegetables (45.5%), milk (28.9%), cattle (36.5%), sheep and goats (43.3%) — a decline in production was recorded everywhere. For livestock products such as meat, milk, and eggs, the decline was about 5% compared to 2024. Given that private farms are a difficult sector to monitor, the level of decline in production is traditionally revised upwards after the agricultural census, during which continuous data is collected (the next census was scheduled for 2026 but has been postponed to 2027). This will lead to an adjustment in overall agricultural production volumes. On farms that produced a small portion of livestock products, there was also a decline in meat, poultry, and milk production of nearly 4%, while egg production increased by 4% in 2025. The latter indicator demonstrates how quickly farmers responded to the sharp rise in egg prices in 2024 and increased production. The decline in production on private farms is affecting the food market. Accordingly, products that were largely produced on private farms are at risk of price increases due to reduced production on these farms, unless the decline is offset by growth in agricultural organizations and farms.

As the analysis has shown, compensation for the decline in production in private households, if it occurs at all, is difficult (dairy production). The exception is pork production, where the decline was forced and compensated for by the construction of huge livestock complexes.

The reduction in the number of cows is accompanied by an increase in milk yields. This can be considered an unconditional achievement of Russian livestock farming. In agricultural organizations (except for small businesses), milk yields per cow in 2025 amounted to 8.94 tons, compared to 8.53 tons in 2024. The average milk yield per cow (including private farms), for example, in the Leningrad region exceeds the average milk yield in Finland and Sweden (9.97, 9.7, and 9.7 tons, respectively). For comparison: at the beginning of the reforms in 1991, milk yield per cow was 2.6 tons. This is, in fact, all you need to know to characterize the state of agriculture and its efficiency during the Soviet period.

3.4.2. Trends in agricultural support

Funding from the federal budget for four state programs of the Russian Ministry of Agriculture and the state program for the development of the fishing industry grew until 2024, but declined in 2025, leading to a drop in the share of spending on agriculture and fisheries in the federal budget (*Fig. 13*). This imbalance could have been corrected by increasing support from regional budgets, since agricultural issues, including its support, are under the joint jurisdiction of the Federation and the regions in accordance with Article 72 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Data confirming this has not yet been made publicly available, which limits the possibility of analysis. Nevertheless, the share of expenditure on agriculture and fisheries in 2025 remains high relative to 2014–2017 and 2021–2022 (*Fig. 13*).



Fig. 13. **Share of expenditures on agriculture and fisheries in the structure of federal budget expenditures, %**

3.4.3. Investment in agricultural sector

Investment in the agricultural sector continues to decline. Compared to 2017, the decline has been at the same rate since 2021 (*Fig. 14*), which poses risks to the sustainability of agricultural production. However, unlike investment in agriculture, production itself remains stable.



Fig. 14. **Index of physical volume of investment in fixed capital in agriculture**

Source: Rosstat.

3.4.4. Food prices

In 2025, food products lost their status as a driver of overall price growth. While retail prices for all goods and services rose by 5.6% in December 2025 compared to December 2024, food prices rose by 5.2% (*Fig. 15*). At the same time, the difference in index dynamics recorded in 2024 remains unchanged. The increase in food prices is not directly related to agricultural production. Thus, in December 2025, compared to the same period in 2024, producer prices for agricultural products fell by 2.4% and, taking into account seasonal adjustments, entered a phase of active decline in the second half of 2025. This decline was due to lower prices for livestock products, which are the main item in the food consumption basket.

Despite the decline in producer prices, livestock products are the main contributor to food price inflation, as confirmed by the decomposition of retail price growth rates by individual product groups (*Fig. 16*). Meat and meat products, together with dairy products, account for 2.6 percentage points of the 5.2 percentage points of food inflation. At the same time, both categories show price increases (+6.9% and +6.5%, respectively) above the general inflation rate (the dotted line in *Fig. 16* — 105,6%). After a prolonged period of stagnation, alcohol prices are rising (+11.1%), which is associated with an increase in import duties, as well as the reaction of domestic producers to this, and an increase in minimum retail prices.



Fig. 15. **Dynamics of retail prices for food items and producer prices for agricultural products in Russia in 2019–2025, seasonally adjusted (January 2019 = 100)**

Source: own calculations based on Rosstat data.

The sharp rise in prices for fish and seafood (+10.6%) is caused by a combination of factors, ranging from reduced catch volumes to increased production and logistics costs. The increase in prices for groceries, sugar, and confectionery is mainly due to external factors (rising prices for coffee and cocoa beans, while sugar is becoming cheaper (−6.4%)). The rise in ice cream prices in this category (+11.0%) correlates with the increase in milk prices (+7.7%). The rise in prices for bread and bakery products (+10.0%) looks abnormal against the backdrop of stagnant prices for flour, cereals, and pasta (+0.0%). At the same time, bread prices are already significantly ahead of the average real level of the last 5 years and are at their highest level, taking into account overall inflation, since at least 2014. The decline in vegetable prices (−9.0%) is mainly due to the fall in the price of borscht ingredients (−17.4%) and potatoes (−21.5%).[1] In turn, the more modest decrease in fruit prices (−0.9%) is due to the decline in the cost of tropical fruits and grapes (−7.5%) under the influence of stabilizing world prices and the strengthening of the ruble, while traditional fruits are becoming more expensive (+3.9%). Finally, chicken eggs, offsetting the sharp price increases of 2023–2024, fell in price by 20.0%, returning in real terms to the price level of 2018–2021.

The potato case is notable because the rise in potato prices in spring of 2025 sparked widespread public outcry. The potato market is small; production is geared toward domestic consumption (as is the case with open-field vegetables) and has historically been concentrated among private households. The product is inexpen-

1. At the same time, potato prices rose sharply in the spring of 2025.



Fig. 16. **Changes in food prices by product group, December 2025 compared to December 2024**

Source: own calculations based on Rosstat data.

sive. For both economic and social reasons, its production on household farms is declining. As recently as the mid-1990s, the average Russian had to work 45 hours to earn enough for a year's supply of potatoes. Today, it takes only 4–7 hours of work to do so, i. e., 10 times less (*Fig. 17*). It is evident that the majority of producers from household farms have become consumers.

In spring of 2025, a significant increase in potato prices was recorded. While in January–March 2024, the average monthly per capita income could purchase 1,717.7 kg, in January–March 2025, it could purchase only 964.4 kg. However, by September 2025, a 25-kg bag of potatoes could cost less than Rb500 in Moscow stores. This came after 1 kg of potatoes could be bought for more than Rb100 at retail in May of that same year, and on average across the country, according to Rosstat, for Rb94.8. Although potatoes account for between 0.29% (2024) and 0.42% (2025) of consumer spending, the price surge was widely discussed.

Similar situation is unfolding with regard to vegetables, which are also inexpensive and are still largely produced by private households. The economic and social incentives for their production are diminishing, which increases the risk of sharp price spikes during certain periods.



Fig. 17. **The number of working hours required, based on the national average wage, to purchase an annual supply of potatoes for consumption in Russia, 1991–2021**

Source: according to Rosstat.

Table 19

Number of instances in which the government could have imposed price caps on essential food items

Years	Total	Including seasonality	Years	Total	Including seasonality
2022	37	35	2024	35	22
2023	27	22	2025	18	7

Source: own calculations based on Rosstat data.

In 2025, food price volatility remained high. However, there were fewer instances where conditions existed under which the state could impose maximum retail prices on socially significant food products[1] (*Table 19*).

3.4.5. Food affordability

Over the past 20 years, there has been a significant transformation in Russia's agricultural policy. In 2023–2024, negative price support for agricultural producers at the expense of consumers was observed (while positive price support for meat

1. The RF Government Resolution No. 530 of July 15, 2010 (as amended on February 1, 2025) "On the Approval of the Rules for Establishing Maximum Permissible Retail Prices for Certain Types of Socially Significant Essential Food Products, the List of Certain Types of Socially Significant Essential Food Products for Which Maximum Permissible Retail Prices May Be Established, and the list of certain types of socially significant food products for the purchase of a specified quantity of which a business entity engaged in commercial activities is not permitted to receive remuneration."

and greenhouse vegetable production remained in place). According to estimates for 2025, this situation has changed: transfers from consumers to producers are re-emerging.

The structure of Russia's agricultural budget does not include an expenditure item for food aid, as is the case in the agricultural budget of, for example, the United States. However, similar support is provided in Russia from the budgets of other government agencies, where regional budgets fund food expenses for certain categories of citizens, as well as school meal programs. These expenditures (calculations for 2023; data was subsequently withheld) already amounted to approximately 120 billion rubles. Compared to the four state programs in the field of agriculture and rural development funded through the Russian Ministry of Agriculture, the amount of such food support accounts for 14% of the total funding for these state programs. In addition, state social subsidies (excluding pensions) account for about 5% of households' cash income.[1] If we assume that the portion of state subsidies received by Russian households goes toward food in the same proportion as household cash income as a whole, then, as calculations have shown, the "food" portion of subsidies creates demand for food equivalent to 6% of total food expenditures (including eating out and alcohol) in the country. In the top decile by disposable income, this share already reaches 23% of families' food budget. These funds are spent on purchasing food, generating income for agricultural producers. This amount exceeds Russia's agricultural budget under the four state programs of the Russian Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, the state actively supports agriculture both through direct subsidies to producers (via the agricultural budget) and by subsidizing consumers (through social programs).

Agricultural policy, which traditionally declares its goal to be the support of agricultural producers, has contributed to increasing the affordability of food, including even such products as milk, sugar, and meat. While the first two products have become quite competitive, meat has not yet reached that level, although the situation has improved significantly (*Table 20*).

Assuming comparable growth in agricultural producer prices in Russia and the FAO World Food Price Index (−2.3%) in 2025, along with a 10% appreciation of the ruble in 2025 compared to 2024, it can be expected that in 2025 the overall NPCc will not exceed 1.1. This means that, according to preliminary estimates, there will be a return to a situation where consumers will overpay Russian producers relative to world market prices. This corresponds to the average NPCc levels in 2015–2020.

The affordability of food is assessed in various ways, most commonly using the indicator "share of food expenditure in total household expenditure." There is only one explanation for this: this indicator is included in the statistics of many

1. Rosstat, 2023. Sample surveys of household income and participation in social programs. Household survey results have not been published since 2024

Table 20

Consumer Nominal Protection Coefficient, NPCc

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Total	1.05	1.00	1.03	1.00	1.01	Sunflower seeds	0.86	0.90	0.96	0.90	0.96
Wheat	0.95	0.93	0.73	0.86	0.97	Raw milk	1.07	1.00	1.16	1.00	1.00
Barley	1.10	0.93	0.85	0.67	1.11	Beef and veal	1.23	1.03	1.17	1.18	1.13
Corn	0.99	0.81	0.85	0.61	0.82	Pork	1.41	1.48	1.65	1.30	1.19
Oats	0.79	0.69	0.78	0.56	0.59	Poultry	1.11	1.02	1.07	1.04	1.01
Raw sugar	1.39	1.04	1.28	1.07	0.95	Eggs	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Potatoes	1.00	1.00	1.03	1.00	1.00	Other items	1.00	0.98	0.99	0.97	0.99

Source: OECD.

countries, which simplifies cross-country comparisons and the assessment of trends in food affordability in each of them. Typically, in Russia, this indicator is compared with those of other countries, leading to the conclusion that there is a significant gap between them. However, when assessing the share of food expenditure in total household expenditure, several factors should be kept in mind. First, the value of the indicator depends on traditional lifestyles, the level of development of the food service industry, and business taxation. For example, in Lithuania, food expenditures account for 30% of total expenditures, while in Russia they account for 32.2% (2022). At the same time, expenditures on cafes, restaurants, and hotels[1] accounted for 5.8% in Lithuania and 2.9% in Russia. Overall, spending on food at home and away from home is higher in Lithuania than in Russia.[2] In Switzerland, food expenses account for 12.8%, while spending on cafes, restaurants, and hotels accounts for 11.2%. In this regard, it is hardly appropriate to analyze the indicator based solely on spending on food at home. Second, the share of food expenditures is an indicator of overall well-being or hardship in a family or country. However, it does not imply that where this indicator is higher, access to food is restricted. For example, in Dagestan, the share of food expenses in total consumption expenditures is 65%, compared to the Russian average of 38%[3] (*Fig. 18*).

At the same time, an analysis of actual consumption of various food products on average across households shows that the diet in Dagestan is more nutritious than the Russian average. Thus, the structure of expenditures may lead to incorrect conclusions when assessing food affordability.

1. Rosstat and the statistical agencies of other countries use standard classifications (e. g., the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose, COPF). Within these classifications, there are often aggregated groups that are presented in statistical reference books. CPA 55 and 56 ("Accommodation services" and "Food services") are often grouped together.
2. URL: https://riarating.ru/countries/20221212/630234118.html
3. Rosstat, 2024.



Fig. 18. **Trends in the share of food expenditures in total consumer spending in Russia and Dagestan, %, 2019–2024**

Source: Rosstat.



Fig. 19. **The number of minimum food packages that can be purchased with the total amount of a family's food expenditures (at home, away from home, and alcohol) and in-kind contributions**

If we assess food accessibility in Russia based on the indicator "the share of households that reported a lack of money for food when evaluating their financial situation," we can conclude that food accessibility has long been ensured in Russia: only 0.02% of households reported an accessibility problem.[1] Estimated food accessibility indicators can be obtained by comparing household expenditures on food (at home and away from home), including alcohol, with the cost of a minimum food basket. From 2012 to 2024, this indicator fluctuates within a fairly narrow range (*Fig. 19*).

Less optimistic conclusions can be drawn if we compare household food expenditures (both at home and away from home, including alcohol) with an assess-

1. Rosstat, 2023.

ment of food contributions in kind and the cost not of a minimum food basket, but of a balanced diet[1] (a diet necessary for a fulfilling life). The ability of households to provide themselves with a balanced diet is taken as an indicator of the economic affordability of food[2] (*Fig. 20*).



Fig. 20. **Food affordability (the ratio of actual food expenditures (including alcohol) and the value of food received in kind to the cost of a balanced diet), %**

Source: Rosstat; own calculations.



Fig. 21. **Changes in retail food sales (in 2012 prices), % compared to the corresponding month of 2012**

Source: Rosstat.

1. Approved by the Russian Ministry of Health.
2. This approach is used at the Center for Agri-Food Policy at IAES RANEPA.

The trend in retail food sales (*Fig. 21*), which illustrates changes in supply and demand, indicates that affordability in 2025 was no lower than in 2024.

Since 2020, trends in retail food sales have been characterized by high volatility in sales volumes, yet an upward trend has persisted.

3.4.6. Food export and import

In 2025, the trend of food imports growing faster than exports continued (*Fig. 22*). In 2025, exports of agricultural products decreased by 4.1%, while imports increased by 15.0%. As a result, the value of imports amounted to $43.4 billion, exceeding the value of exports by $2.5 billion, or 6.0%.

The price factor also contributes to this imbalance. In 2025, average global prices for grain — the main product of Russian agricultural exports — as measured by the FAO Food Price Index, stood at 107.9 points, compared with 113.5 points in the previous period (*Fig. 23*). At the same time, global prices for dairy products (one of the main components of food imports) rose from 129.7 to 146.7 points, or by 13.1%. In addition, the growth in imports may have been temporarily influenced by large-scale purchases of alcoholic beverages made by importers in anticipation of further increases in import duties.

* * *

Based on the findings of the study, the following conclusion can be drawn: in 2025, the agricultural sector will experience positive growth. However, given the decline in production in 2024, the growth in 2025 will offset this decline.



Fig. 22. **Russian agricultural products export and import in 2024–2025, bn USD**

Source: FCS.



Fig. 23. **Global food prices as measured by the FAO Food Price Index in 2024–2025, p.**

Source: own calculations based on FAO data.

The structural restructuring of agriculture continues, involving the redistribution of production both among types of agricultural producers and among different crops. Both of these changes are driven by market signals.

Federal budget funding for agriculture remains at 1.4% (which falls within the established range of 1.2–1.7% over the past decade). At the same time, investment in agriculture has continued to decline since 2020, posing risks to the sustainability of agricultural production. As the experience of post-Soviet transformation has shown, agriculture is extremely inertial, and the decline in investment has not yet affected production volumes.

Food prices remain high, and their cumulative growth rate exceeds that of prices for other types of goods in Russia. However, there are fewer instances in which the government has grounds to impose maximum retail prices, as provided for by Russian law.

Access to a balanced diet for the population has improved slightly over the past three years. However, this improvement in average indicators does not negate the fact that there is a small segment of the population (about 2% of the population) whose members face significant difficulties in accessing food. An extensive social support system creates additional demand for food, the cost of which exceeds the volume of state support for agriculture.

Russia has been a net food exporter since 2020; in 2025, the volume of imports exceeds the volume of exports by 6%. However, this imbalance arose due to a significant drop in the prices of key food export commodities on the global market—grain (to a greater extent) and vegetable oil (to a lesser extent).