

5.2. Russia in key international institutions¹

Interaction within the multilateral institutional system in 2025 was characterized by two trends. On the one hand, international organizations continued to weaken due to growing contradictions and tensions between leading members and increasing distrust in the diplomatic potential of negotiating platforms. The most striking example of the failure of multilateral efforts as a result of contradictions between members² and US pressure on participants in the extraordinary session of the International Maritime Organization's Environmental Protection Committee (IMO)³ was the failure to agree on framework rules for the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, including a new fuel standard for the gradual reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and a corresponding global pricing mechanism.⁴ Although many countries, including Russia and Saudi Arabia, are not interested in the forced approval of new rules, it was precisely the use of threats and blackmail against sovereign states that determined the decision to postpone the negotiations, which significantly undermined confidence in multilateral diplomacy.⁵

On the other hand, despite the politicization of a number of economic and financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and the crisis of legitimacy of international organizations, solving common problems requires the establishment of pragmatic multilateral cooperation. Russia and its partners continue their efforts to reform the international monetary and financial system (IMFS), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the United Nations (UN), to create instruments of cooperation to protect against new threats, and to develop and agree on rules for the digital economy and artificial intelligence (AI). Thus, in October 2025, the UN Convention against Cybercrime was signed.⁶

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2. Extraordinary IMO MEPC meeting fails to adopt Net-Zero Framework. URL: <https://www.cimac.com/news-press/news/extraordinary-imo-mepc-meeting-fails-to-adopt-net-zero-framework.html>
3. Trump Officials Accused of Bullying Tactics to Kill a Climate Measure. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/06/climate/trump-climate-international-bullying.html>
4. IMO approves net-zero regulations for global shipping. URL: <https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/imo-approves-netzero-regulations.aspx>
5. US Climate Deal: 'Bully-Boy' Tactics Accusations. URL: <https://time.news/us-climate-deal-bully-boy-tactics-accusations/>
6. The convention was developed and agreed upon as a result of cooperation on an initiative put forward by Russia in 2019 to develop a universal international treaty on combating the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) for criminal purposes.

At the 80th session of the UN General Assembly (GA), a Global Dialogue on AI Governance was established.¹ The expansion and deepening of BRICS cooperation continued.

5.2.1. BRICS

In 2025, BRICS members demonstrated their commitment to the decisions agreed upon in Kazan. BRICS countries fulfilled 83% of the key commitments of the 2024 summit, exceeding the average fulfillment rate of 77% (2011–2023). Indonesia's accession completed the expansion process. The meeting of leaders in Rio de Janeiro, comprising 10 members² and 11 partner countries,³ confirmed the growing importance of the alliance, its ability to ensure continuity of decisions and to act collectively despite differences in interests. The leaders agreed on 164 specific decisions, which were reflected in the text of the declaration “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance,” adopted the Statement on Global AI Governance and the Framework Declaration on Climate Finance, and launched the BRICS Partnership on Socially Determined Morbidity. At the invitation of the Brazilian presidency, the summit meetings in the “BRICS Plus” and “BRICS Outreach” formats were attended by heads of state and government of the Global South and East⁴ and the African Union, heads of the secretariats of the UN, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the WTO, and the leadership of multilateral banks.⁵ Russia views increasing the representativeness of BRICS as a factor in strengthening its influence on the processes of reforming the global governance system, creating the foundations for a new model of governance, and ensuring sustainable development and inclusive growth.⁶

The final documents reflect the consolidated positions of the chairmanship, Russia, and BRICS partners on common priorities, including the tasks of ensuring peace, security, and international stability. The growing understanding among BRICS members of the root causes of the crisis in Ukraine, support for initiatives aimed at a peaceful political settlement, including the Chinese, Brazilian, and African peace initiatives, and the partners' condemnation of attacks on civilian infrastructure in the Russian Federation are all positive developments.

1. Speech by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister S.V. Vershinin at the inaugural session of the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2049021/

2. Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Iran, UAE, Ethiopia, Indonesia.

3. Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Nigeria, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Vietnam, Uganda, Uzbekistan.

4. Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Kenya, Nigeria, Turkey, Palestine.

5. New Development Bank (NDB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Latin American Development Bank (CAF).

6. Speech and answers to questions from the media by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov following the BRICS summit. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2034668/

Although the document issued by finance ministers and central bank governors on their vision for reforming IMF quotas and governance does not contain any new specific proposals on the quota calculation formula, it is important to confirm the aspects of the Fund's governance changes that are significant for all BRICS countries: quotas should be the main source of IMF borrowing resources; their share in the Fund's total resources should be increased; quota shares should be reviewed as part of the 17th General Review; the share of basic votes in the total number of votes should be increased to enhance the influence of low-income countries in decision-making processes; priority should be given to revising the quota calculation formula based on GDP at purchasing power parity; The archaic "gentlemen's agreement" on the appointment of European and US leaders to the IMF and World Bank, respectively, needs to be revised.

The BRICS countries have expressed their support for the development of a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation aimed at creating a fair international system for the exercise of sovereign tax rights by states. In doing so, they supported the long-standing demand of developing countries, which consider the processes of coordinating approaches to the redistribution of tax rights in relation to the profits of the largest TNCs and the introduction of a minimum tax rate within the framework of the OECD's Inclusive Program and the G20's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative. However, it is unlikely that there will be a real shift in influence over international taxation rules to the UN platform. This is especially true given that many BRICS members and partners — Brazil, Indonesia, Thailand (as part of their roadmaps for joining the OECD), India, South Africa, China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt — have joined the BEPS instruments and are implementing measures to implement them.

Overall, the implementation of the IMFS transformation tasks, which remain a priority for BRICS, is not straightforward, even in terms of cooperation between countries. It is difficult to imagine that the US President Donald Trump's threats to impose 100% tariffs (in October 2024)¹ and then 10% tariffs on BRICS countries (on the eve of the summit)² had any impact on them, but the 2025 documents do not record any significant progress on the decisions of the Kazan summit. Discussions are continuing on the creation of a voluntary BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative, an independent cross-border settlement and depository infrastructure (BRICS Clear), an independent reinsurance mechanism, and a new investment platform based on the infrastructure of the New Development Bank (NDB). The proposal to create a multilateral guarantee mechanism (based on the experience

1. Trump threatens 100% tariff on the BRIC bloc of nations if they act to undermine U.S. dollar. URL: <https://www.cnbc.com/2024/11/30/trump-threatens-100percent-tariff-on-the-bric-bloc-of-nations-if-they-act-to-undermine-us-dollar.html>

2. BRICS tariff to be applied only if they adopt policies deemed 'anti-American', source says. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/brics-tariff-be-applied-only-if-they-adopt-policies-deemed-anti-american-source-2025-07-07/>

of the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) based on the NDB to stimulate private investment in sustainable infrastructure has been accepted and is to be implemented on a pilot basis by the end of 2025¹ and may contribute to the creation of an investment platform. The full and IMF-independent functioning of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement has been postponed again due to the revision of the existing rules and the Arrangement Agreement with a view to including new BRICS countries and expanding the use of national currencies.² Despite the difficult course of institutional transformations, it is important for Russia that the process is still ongoing and that the share of national currencies in settlements between BRICS countries is de facto growing. Thus, in 2024, the share of the ruble and currencies of friendly countries in Russia's settlements with other BRICS countries amounted to 90%.³

On trade issues, the BRICS countries emphasize their unchanged common position on the incompatibility of "indiscriminate tariff increases and non-tariff measures or protectionism under the guise of environmental goals" with WTO norms and the needs of sustainable development and support for an open, transparent, non-discriminatory and consensus-based multilateral trading system with the WTO as its foundation, providing for special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing country members.⁴ The statement on SDT is particularly important in the context of China's announcement that it will not seek new special and differential treatment in the current WTO negotiations.⁵

Amid attempts by developed countries to impose measures of forced decarbonisation and a complete abandonment of hydrocarbons on all states, the following are important for Russia a balanced approach by BRICS to the policy of transition to a low-carbon economy, based on the fundamental principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; objective understanding of the essential role of fossil fuels in the global energy balance, especially for developing countries and emerging market economies; the priority of achieving all Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in a balanced manner, including improving energy access and security (SDG 7), ensuring economic growth and quality employment (SDG 8), building sustainable infrastructure and industry (SDG 9), reducing inequality (SDG 10), etc. Cooperation within the framework of their own instruments and research plat-

1. Guidelines on the BRICS Multilateral Guarantees (BMG). URL: https://brics.br/en/documents/economy-finance-trade-and-infrastructure/2506_guidelines_bmg.pdf/@download/file

2. 2025 BRICS Summit: Takeaways and Projections. URL: <https://www.stimson.org/2025/2025-brics-summit-takeaways-and-projections/>

3. Speech at the main plenary session of the 17th BRICS Summit. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77373>

4. Rio de Janeiro Declaration. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/gvTArkWauqwuryk-9xzLt3Huul7EBmqrC.pdf>

5. Address by Chinese Premier Li Qiang at the High-Level Meeting on the Global Development Initiative. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyjh/202509/t20250924_11715922.html

forms (BRICS Laboratories on Trade, Climate and Sustainable Development (2025) and BRICS Climate Research Platform (2024)) and reliance on common documents such as the Memorandum of Understanding on the BRICS Partnership on Carbon Markets (2024) and the BRICS Principles for Fair, Inclusive and Transparent Carbon Reporting on Products and Equipment (2025).

An unconditional achievement in 2025 was the agreement on a common approach and four guiding principles for building global governance in the field of AI, including: (1) multilateralism, legal regulation, and digital sovereignty; (2) fair competition and fair and transparent market regulation in accordance with national legal norms and applicable international agreements; (3) fairness and sustainable development; (4) ethical, reliable, and responsible AI. For each of these principles, areas for collective action have been identified with a view to building fair and inclusive AI governance that should contribute to reducing the risks of inequality associated with the concentration of AI in the hands of a limited number of individuals and the creation of new forms of technological dependence, and accelerating economic growth and addressing priority socio-economic challenges, especially in emerging market economies and developing countries.¹

Following the second year of work by the expanded BRICS, it can be said that skeptical predictions about the loss of integrity, influence, and ability of BRICS to agree on specific decisions have not come true. BRICS decisions reflect solidarity on key issues while recognizing the diversity of the association's members' priorities and make a significant contribution to the implementation of Russia's foreign policy and socio-economic development goals.

5.2.2. G20

South Africa's presidency of the G20 in 2025 completed a full cycle of G20 work and four years of presidencies by developing countries—Indonesia (2022), India (2023), and Brazil (2024). Emphasizing its mission as a representative of Africa and the Global South, South Africa announced ambitious cooperation priorities that reflect the challenges facing the continent and developing countries as a whole. As a fundamental task, the South African leadership proposed a paradigm shift in economic policy to address inequality and achieve the SDGs. Russia supported the setting of tasks to overcome inequality at the center of economic policy. Moreover, in 2013, Russia initiated this approach in the G20. During Russia's presidency of the G20, a decision was agreed for the first time to strive not only for strong, sustainable, and balanced growth, but also to establish a model of growth that prioritizes the well-being of individuals and the reduction of inequality within and between countries.

1. Statement by BRICS leaders on global governance in the field of artificial intelligence. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/n1eGkN9xVCOWXIAGekbAlJOLApDGIXEq.pdf>

The other three priorities put forward by South Africa are also designed to help solve fundamental development problems, including reducing the debt burden of low-income countries, ensuring sustainable financing for a just energy transition, and using critical minerals for inclusive growth and sustainable development. With the G20's full cycle of work coming to an end, South Africa has initiated a review of the G20's activities, an assessment of the implementation of decisions, and an evaluation of the G20's ability to coordinate policy in the future.

Almost at the very beginning of South Africa's chairmanship, the US President Donald Trump announced a boycott of South Africa's program by the US under the pretext of the discriminatory policies of South Africa's white minority population. US representatives did not participate in the preparation of documents or events. At various stages of the US delegation's non-participation, various claims were made against South Africa, including on the subject matter and content of the proposed documents and the approval procedures. The US boycott and, in particular, the de facto paralysis of the "troika" (a mechanism for continuity within the Group of 20, based on close coordination between the three presidencies) did not prevent South Africa from organizing more than 130 events and agreeing on the final text of the declaration. Given the US's intention, announced on the eve of the summit, to participate at the level of a diplomatic mission representative and its demand to reject the declaration due to the lack of US approval, the decision by South African President C. Ramaphosa to hold the summit without the US and adopt the declaration on the basis of consensus among those present was evidence of the growing independence of South Africa and the countries of the African continent, confirming the shift in the balance of power in the global economy and the viability of the G20 (despite the decline in the group's level of participation and transformational potential).¹

It is important for Russia to further reduce the level of geopolitical rhetoric and return economic issues to the focus of the G20's. The declaration reflects both the common position of member countries that peace is a prerequisite for sustainable development and their intention to work "guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety ... for the sake of a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the occupied Palestinian territory, Ukraine, as well as the resolution of other conflicts and wars on the planet".²

No progress is expected on IMFS reform and debt sustainability. The G20 has once again confirmed its support for quota redistribution and IMF governance reform, increasing the resources and effectiveness of multilateral development banks

1. For various reasons, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, and Argentine President Javier Milei did not attend the summit.

2. Declaration of the Leaders of the G20 South Africa Summit. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/Gl3ZrtkLkslPIKY2w2CDsPdJmSCPyzs.doc>

(MDBs) based on the MDB Capital Adequacy Assessment Framework, and implementing the G20 Common Principles for debt resolution after the completion of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative for low-income countries (although it took five years for Chad, Zambia, Ghana, and Ethiopia to be granted debt resolution terms under the Common Principles). No new decisions on eliminating or alleviating debt vulnerability have been formulated, although the risks of high capital costs and systemic debt crises to sustainable development and economic growth are emphasized at all levels and tracks of the G20.

The G20 devoted considerable attention to issues such as unilateral trade measures, improving the effectiveness of the WTO, and constructive cooperation to modernize trade rules in agriculture, development, and the relationship between climate and trade. On forest-related issues, the G20 adopted a specific decision to “refrain from discriminatory ‘green’ economic policies in accordance with WTO rules and multilateral environmental agreements,” which is in Russia’s interests, given the role of forests in its low greenhouse gas emissions socio-economic development strategy.

Given the priority of ensuring fairness in the transition to low-carbon energy, industry, and the economy as a whole, approaches reflecting Russia’s interests were established. In particular, the principles according to which “energy security remains the foundation of national sovereignty, economic development, stability, and global prosperity”,¹ all transitions must be technologically neutral, taking into account national circumstances and goals for ensuring socio-economic development. The flexibility of the wording was an obvious compromise between developed countries, which are still not ready to commit to increasing climate finance to \$1.3 trillion by 2035, while actively using measures to support the decarbonization of their economies and protectionist measures to combat climate change, and developing countries insisting on technological and financial support for the implementation of nationally determined contributions by developing countries² and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. In terms of assessing the policies of developed countries, the declaration’s stated intention to work to minimize the negative consequences of sustainable industrial policy in accordance with international rights and obligations, including WTO rules, is significant.³

The results of South Africa’s initiatives have been rather modest. They have mainly been reflected in voluntary framework documents and reports confirming the significance of the issues and the need for coordinated action.

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1. Declaration of the Leaders of the G20 South Africa Summit. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/Gl3ZrtkLkslPIKY2w2CDsPdjRmSCPyzs.doc>
 2. Estimated at \$5.8–5.9 trillion in the period up to 2030. See: URL: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP30%20Action%20Agenda_Final%20Report.docx.pdf
 3. Declaration of the Leaders of the South African G20 Summit. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/Gl3ZrtkLkslPIKY2w2CDsPdjRmSCPyzs.doc>

The G20 High-Level Principles on Sustainable Industrial Policy for Inclusive Economic Growth, Industrialization, Employment, and Equality postulate the importance of sustainable industrial policy for economic diversification and support for sustainable growth that provides economic benefits for all countries, the need for fair competition and coordinated policies that link industrialization, decent job creation, social protection, and respect for workers' rights. This is a thesis that Russia formulated as a priority in the G20 back in 2013.

The G20 Framework on Critical Minerals aims to attract investment in geological exploration, promote mineral processing at the point of extraction, and improve governance to ensure the sustainability of mining activities while respecting the sovereignty of countries. The Framework's principles on sustainable management are essentially similar to the Principles for Responsible Supply Chains of Critical Minerals¹ adopted by the members of the Partnership for Mineral Security established by the G7. Russia fully supports the noble goals of the Framework: expanding exploration for critical minerals; promoting diversification of mineral sources, routes, markets, processing locations, and supply chains; increasing the level of localized value added and processing in developing countries rich in minerals; and introducing reliable, non-discriminatory and applicable standards related to economic, social and environmental aspects, in accordance with national approaches. The document can serve as a basis for further concrete initiatives.

The Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Global Inequality, chaired by Nobel Prize-winning economist Professor Joseph Stiglitz, contains an analysis of the causes and extent of inequality and recommendations for policies to reduce inequality, including through the development and adoption of new international rules limiting the influence of corporations; new models of trade cooperation and strategies for sustainable industrial development; macroeconomic policies aimed at ensuring equality; measures to radically transform the governance and policies of international financial institutions (IFIs), and to restructure the architecture of lending and liquidity support.² The report "Debt and Development: Opportunities for a New Partnership for Africa"³ includes a proposal to launch a new G20 initiative on refinancing for low-income countries, revising international rules and agreements, including rules on international trade, taxation, competition, and IFI governance.³ However, the recommendations set out in the report were not reflected in the text of the declaration on overcoming inequality and a new phase of partnership between the G20 and Africa (2025–2030).

1. Minerals Security Partnership Principles for Responsible Critical Mineral Supply Chains. URL: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/MSP-Principles-for-Responsible-Critical-Mineral-Supply-Chains-Accessible.pdf>

2. Report by G20 Extraordinary Committee of Independent Experts on Global Inequality. URL: https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202511/g20-global-inequality-report-full-and-summary.pdf

3. Growth, Debt and Development: Opportunities for a New African Partnership. URL: https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2025/FINAL-AEP_Report_Individual_Pages_v251115.pdf

Nevertheless, South Africa's presidency marked another step toward strengthening the influence of the world's majority countries in the Group of 20¹ and moving toward a new balance. As a result of the summit, 163 specific commitments were agreed upon, although no breakthrough decisions or landmark initiatives were adopted. The decisions of the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro have been implemented at an unprecedentedly high level — 88% — compared to an average of 77% over all years of observation. The absence of the US did not spell the end of the G20 or multilateralism.² The next two years of US (2026) and UK (2027) presidencies will test the G20's ability to act “on the basis of consensus and with the equal participation of all members ... in accordance with international commitments.” There is an increased risk of the troika failing, the G20 losing its potential as a forum for cooperation between the world's leading economies, and its fragmentation into groups (BRICS, G7, IBSA (India—Brazil—South Africa)). Given the specifics of its presidency in 2026, Russia will continue to advocate for the depoliticization of the G20 and its focus on economic growth, sustainable development, energy security and accessibility, reform of global economic governance, and the development of rules for the digital economy.

5.2.3. United Nations Organization (UN)

Sustainable development goals (SDG)

In 2025, the UN continued its work to coordinate efforts in the field of sustainable development. The annual meeting of the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) was devoted to promoting sustainable, inclusive, science-based solutions for the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals.³ Participants heard reports from the UN Secretary-General on the progress of the SDG,⁴ on promoting scientific methods and innovation for the implementation of the SDG,⁵ and on the long-term consequences of achieving the SDG.⁶

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1. Johannesburg G20 summit: advancing amidst anxiety. URL: <https://www.gatewayhouse.in/johannesburg-g20-summit-advancing-amidst-anxiety/>
 2. Canada PM Carney says world can move on without US, stresses new ties. URL: <https://www.straitstimes.com/world/canada-pm-carney-says-world-can-move-on-without-us-stresses-new-ties>
 3. High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF). 2025. URL: <https://globalcompact.ru/events/announcements/politicheskoy-forum-vysokogo-urovnya-po-ustoychivomu-razvitiyu-pfvu-2025-/>
 4. Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. Report of the Secretary-General. URL: https://docs.un.org/ru/a/80/81&i=A/80/81_1748035261784
 5. Promoting sustainable, inclusive, science-based and evidence-based solutions for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the achievement of its Sustainable Development Goals. URL: <https://docs.un.org/ru/e/2025/69>
 6. Long-term implications for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Report of the Secretary-General. URL: <https://docs.un.org/ru/E/2024/55>

To support developing economies, UN members pledged to “provide developing countries with more accessible, predictable, sustainable, and adequate financing.” Support was expressed for the provisions of the Doha Program of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2022–2031, the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for Small Island Developing States, and the Program of Action for Landlocked Developing Countries for the Decade 2024–2034. The need to strengthen measures to implement the African Union Agenda 2063, its second ten-year implementation plan, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development program was also emphasized.

The funding gap needed to implement the SDG continues to grow (\$4 trillion per year in 2025). The HLPF declarations include both a commitment to close this gap and a call for increased international aid and expanded access to concessional financing. In July 2025, the Fourth Conference on Financing for Development agreed on the Sevilla Commitment, which contained plans to reform the global financial system, reform taxation, ease the debt burden, increase official development assistance (ODA), increase funding, and restructure financial institutions.¹

Following the HLPF, a Ministerial Declaration was adopted with a recommendation to “refrain from enacting and applying any unilateral economic, financial, and trade measures that are inconsistent with international law and the UN Charter.”² This recommendation is in line with the position of Russia and many other developing countries, in particular the Group of 77, on the inadmissibility of politically motivated unilateral measures.

As part of the Ministerial Declaration, specific steps were proposed during the forum to harness the potential of digital technologies. In particular, the “transformative potential of digital health technologies” was noted and the “need to take measures to ensure fairness and increase literacy in digital health issues” was recognized. The ministers drew attention to the importance of developing the digital skills of the population and creating tools and opportunities for their use in economic activity, including in the context of ensuring equality and overcoming the digital divide. However, the participants of the HLPF did not propose ways to systematically integrate new tasks and indicators into the current or future structure of the SDG. In the absence of specifics on tasks and accountability mechanisms, the ministers’ statements will not be reflected in national sustainable development strategies, financing plans (including against the backdrop of the expected further reduction in ODA in 2026)³ and, as a result, will not be implemented.

1. Sevilla Commitment Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development. URL: https://financing.desa.un.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/FFD4%20Outcome%20Booklet%20v5_EN_Digital%205.5x8.5.pdf

2. Ministerial Declaration at the high-level segment of the 2025 session of the Economic and Social Council 2025. URL: <https://docs.un.org/ru/E/HLPF/2025/L.1>

3. Cuts in official development assistance. URL: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/cuts-in-official-development-assistance_8c530629-en/full-report.html

In 2025, there were no signs of serious work beginning on the formation of a forward-looking agenda for the period after 2030. To ensure that the new SDG cover all relevant topics, take into account current and future challenges and risks, and create incentives for integration into national planning, it is necessary to assess the reasons for the lag, identify cooperation issues, conceptualize and structure future goals, and agree on tasks and principles of cooperation. There are less than five years left to implement these measures.

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

The 30th Conference of the Parties (COP30) to the UNFCCC in Belém in 2025, which the Brazilian presidency called the “Conference of the Parties on Implementation”,¹ was supposed to focus not so much on finding new solutions as on ways to implement those already adopted. Twenty-nine decisions were agreed on topics such as just transition, adaptation finance, trade, technology, and renewing the collective commitment to accelerate action to achieve the Paris Agreement goal.² However, deep divisions on financing, trade measures, ways to reduce emissions, and other aspects slowed progress in adopting these decisions.

Russia’s objectives in participating in the UNFCCC process are to ensure a balance between adaptation and emission reduction efforts, and to achieve a just transition to a low-carbon economy, in which decarbonization cannot be achieved at the expense of socio-economic development and growth. Russia advocates the principle of technology neutrality, whereby resources should be directed towards the entire spectrum of solutions: from renewable sources to nuclear energy and carbon capture technologies. Russia, like its BRICS partners, considers it unacceptable to introduce unilateral measures that hinder the achievement of climate goals and to revise agreements that have already been reached.³

By the end of COP30, 119 countries, accounting for 74% of global emissions, had submitted new commitments under the “nationally determined contributions” (NDC).⁴ The adopted targets demonstrated some progress in reducing emissions and mobilizing sectoral action, but collectively they provide less than 15% of the emissions reductions needed by 2035 to keep global temperature rise to 1.5°C.⁵ UN analy-

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1. COP30 approves Belém Package. URL: <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/cop30-approves-belem-package1>
 2. Outcomes of the Belém Climate Change Conference. URL: <https://unfccc.int/cop30/auvs>
 3. Kondratiev N. Russia has confirmed its commitment to the Paris Agreement. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/esg/climate/characters/2025/12/09/1161564-nikita-kondratiev-rossiya-podtverdila-priverzhennost-parizhskomu-soglasheniyu?from=copy_text
 4. NDC Tracker. URL: <https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ndc-tracker?ap3c=IGj4zqh1xiHVaGgFAGj4zqhc5E0mgnXRbKfeAM9kCZGO3cIURg>
 5. Despite Some Progress, Countries’ New Climate Plans Largely Fall Short. URL: <https://www.wri.org/insights/assessing-2025-ndcs>

sis shows that even with the updated NDCs, the world is still on track for a 2.3–2.8°C warming, which is well above the temperature targets of the Paris Agreement.¹

Significant progress has been made in the area of climate change adaptation. The Mutirão Decision (Global Mutirão Decision) called for a threefold increase in adaptation funding by 2035.² This goal helps maintain pressure on developed countries to increase their support. However, it does not mention a specific baseline and does not correspond to the desired level that developing countries insisted on in Belém, nor does it ensure the adoption of urgent measures to protect communities, economies, and ecosystems from climate change. Also, following COP30, a set of 59 indicators was adopted to assess progress on adaptation in seven sectors, such as water supply, agriculture, and health, as well as the adaptation policy planning process, including financing, capacity building, and technology transfer.³ At the same time, this set includes some indicators that are impossible to measure and are thematically incomplete, which creates technical problems for real monitoring and data collection.

An agreement was reached on developing a just transition mechanism aimed at strengthening international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity building, and knowledge sharing.⁴ Decision COP 30 confirmed that a just transition should be based on an approach that encompasses the whole of society and the entire economy, including emissions reduction, adaptation, the consequences of natural disasters, and financing. There is a clear focus on domestic aspects of fairness, while cross-border aspects (the impact of unilateral trade measures and industrial policy) are not given due attention, which is likely the result of pressure from developed countries.

In the context of the WTO crisis, the UNFCCC is gradually becoming the central forum for discussing the impact of climate-related trade measures. At the beginning of COP30, some developing countries insisted on including such trade policy measures in the official agenda for discussion. Although the adopted agenda did not reflect this request, the Mutirão decision, which was a central element of the COP30 outcome, mentioned trade and climate dialogues. The outcome document reaffirmed that countries should cooperate to create a favorable and open international economic trading system that complements efforts to combat climate change. Over the next three years, dialogues will be held during the intersessional meetings of the UNFCCC. These dialogues will involve the WTO and other international economic organizations, which will examine issues at the intersection of trade and climate, and a report will be prepared in 2028 based on the results.

1. Emissions Gap Report 2025. URL: <https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2025>

2. Global Mutirão. URL: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L24_adv.pdf

3. Beyond the Headlines: COP30's Outcomes and Disappointments. URL: <https://www.wri.org/insights/cop30-outcomes-next-steps>

4. COP30 approves Belém Package. URL: <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/cop30-approves-belem-package1>

The failure to adopt a resolution on phasing out hydrocarbons was a significant setback for Russia. Eighty-eight countries supported the development of a roadmap for phasing out fossil fuels, insisting that this goal be enshrined in the Mutirão resolution so that discussions could continue over the next year.¹ However, the final text did not reflect these calls and did not contain any wording on phasing out fossil fuels.

Thus, COP30, chaired by Brazil, can be considered generally successful for Russia, as decisions were made on fundamental issues (just transition, adaptation, inadmissibility of unilateral trade measures). At the same time, however, no decisions were made that demonize hydrocarbons and establish a complete rejection of them as a common goal and commitment. The Conference of the Parties once again highlights the growing contradictions between developed and developing countries, especially on issues of financing, including adaptation efforts, technology transfer, and unilateral trade measures.

Global Dialogue on AI Governance

One of the key trends of 2025 was increased competition for influence over the emerging rules and mechanisms for AI governance. In 2025, the UN launched the process of establishing global AI governance through the Global Digital Treaty (GDT) adopted in 2024. The first stage involved determining the modality and agreeing on the scope of authority of collective bodies (the Global Dialogue (GD) on AI Governance and the Independent International Scientific Panel (IISP) on AI) by the time they began their work at the 80th session of the UN General Assembly.

It was initially suggested that the DG and IISP on AI would prepare a consolidated draft resolution on AI governance by 2027 for adoption at the 82nd session of the UN General Assembly in 2027. The draft document should include agreed approaches to key AI governance issues, including: the social, economic, ethical, cultural, and linguistic implications of AI use; interoperability and comparability of approaches to AI governance; transparency, accountability, and reliability of human oversight of AI systems in accordance with international law; the development of open source software, open data, and open AI models.

The nature, scope of tasks, powers of the co-chairs' mandate, and expected outcome of the Global Dialogue have become subjects of disagreement. This is due to the fact that Western countries, including Western NGOs and technology corporations, play a leading role in negotiations on AI governance at the UN. The opportunities for participation and influence of representatives of developing countries are significantly lower than those of developed countries and their technology companies. Despite the commitments made in the GDT to govern AI in accordance

1. COP 30 Outcome: What it means and what's next. URL: <https://www.iisd.org/articles/insight/cop-30-outcome-what-it-means-and-whats-next>

with the public interest for the benefit of countries and communities,¹ the processes of establishing AI governance carry the risk that the emerging ecosystem of international AI governance will cement the overwhelming influence of Western-centric structures (OECD, Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI), G7, Council of Europe, national and regional initiatives). Following consultations, the mandate of the Global Dialogue has been significantly reduced. General Assembly Resolution 79/325 stipulated that “the co-chairs of the Dialogue shall conduct intergovernmental consultations to develop a common understanding of priority issues of AI governance in an international format.” This is a significant change from the drafts that provided for intergovernmental negotiations and the preparation of a GA resolution approving a declaration “reflecting a common understanding of priority areas for international AI regulation.” At the 80th session of the UN General Assembly on September 25, 2025, the first meeting of the General Debate was held with an approved mandate for consultations. Nevertheless, the risks of dominant influence by Western countries and corporations remain high.

The fact that Russia distanced itself from the consensus on the GDT does not prevent it from participating in the intergovernmental process, including consultations between the GD and the IISP on AI. It is important to ensure that an influential Russian representative is appointed to the first 40-member NMN, elected for a three-year term, as this period will be the most significant in the process of developing draft proposals on AI governance. Continuous substantive work is needed in the IISP and in the process of preparing Global Dialogue meetings and documents. It is advisable to ensure coordination on substantive issues with partners in BRICS, SCO, and ASEAN. It would be useful to assess the prospects and advantages of implementing China’s proposal to establish a World AI Cooperation Organization.²

International Information Security (IIS)

In July 2025, the second mandate of the Open-ended Working Group (OWG) on Security in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and ICT Themselves, established in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution of January 4, 2021, came to an end.³ According to the final report,⁴ one of the key decisions was to agree on the mandate of the Global Mechanism on ISA. The new body will begin work in 2026 and will address the same issues as the OWG, focusing on developing practical solutions. The mechanism will have two thematic working

1. Task 5 of the GCD.

2. Statement by Chinese Premier Li Qiang at the General Debate of the 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. URL: https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/80/cn_en.pdf

3. Achievements in the field of informatization and telecommunications in the context of international security. URL: <https://docs.un.org/ru/A/RES/75/240>

4. Draft Final Report. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies_-__\(2021\)/Letter_from_OEWG_Chair_10_July_2025.pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies_-__(2021)/Letter_from_OEWG_Chair_10_July_2025.pdf)

groups: a general cross-sectoral group and a group on capacity building for developing countries in the regulation of the ICT environment. Plenary meetings are planned to be held twice a year. Organizations with consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) may be accredited to participate in the work of the Global Mechanism. Other organizations may also be accredited, provided there are no objections from participating states. This is in line with Russia's policy of seeking to maintain the leading position of states in negotiations.

In July 2025, the second mandate of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and ICT Themselves, established in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution of January 4, 2021, came to an end. According to the final report, one of the key decisions was the agreement on the mandate of the Global Mechanism on ISA. The new body will begin work in 2026 and will address the same issues as the OEWG, focusing on the development of practical solutions. The mechanism will have two thematic working groups: a general cross-sectoral group and a group on capacity building for developing countries in the regulation of the ICT environment. Plenary meetings are planned to be held twice a year. Organizations with consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) may be accredited to participate in the work of the Global Mechanism. Other organizations may also be accredited, provided there are no objections from participating states. This is in line with Russia's policy of seeking to maintain the leading position of states in the negotiations.

During the negotiations, Russia's BRICS partners demonstrated a fairly high level of commonality in their stated positions, but there were also some differences. The BRICS countries showed the greatest solidarity in discussing the problems of developing the potential of developing countries and measures to build trust. All BRICS countries supported Russia's proposal to create a register of contact points to facilitate international information exchange. Differences emerged in positions on the applicability of international law in the ICT environment. For example, Brazil, Indonesia, and the African countries that are members of BRICS spoke in favor of the full and comprehensive application of IL in the ICT environment, which correlates with the position of Western countries, while Russia, India, and Iran called for preliminary resolution of the issue of qualifying the use of ICT as a means of attack. China took a compromise position on this issue and pointed to the priority of protecting state sovereignty, without denying the possibility of regulating the digital environment based on existing international law norms. As a result, the issue of the applicability of international law in the ICT environment remained on the agenda for future negotiations. On the format of the negotiations on the IIS, the BRICS countries differed in their views on the possibility and modalities of including non-state actors in the negotiation process. Countries such as Egypt and Indonesia actively advocated for the permanent involvement of a wide range of stakeholders in the development and adoption of decisions, while Russia, Chi-

na, and Iran, which sought to preserve the principle of priority for intergovernmental cooperation and consensus-based decision-making, which could be hindered by expanding the membership of the negotiations.

Amid ongoing international confrontation, the adoption of the final report by the OEWG and the decision to launch a permanent negotiation mechanism are significant achievements. However, the complexity of the institutional structure of the negotiating platform creates risks of excessive bureaucratization of the process and duplication of the agenda between tracks. In addition, contradictions in the positions of key participants in the negotiations are likely to persist in the foreseeable future, resulting in a low estimated probability of agreeing on the practical solutions expected from the format.

5.2.4. International Monetary Fund (IMF)

In 2025, Russia continued to fulfill its financial obligations and contribute to the formation of IMF credit resources, although restrictions remained on our country's interaction with the Fund in terms of the use of its resources, consultations, and expertise. Nevertheless, the Russian authorities still consider it necessary to maintain dialogue in a multilateral format and support the IMF's priorities, which are in line with the interests of the majority of countries in the world.¹

Russia's position implies the need for the IMF to take action in two main areas. The first involves improving the effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral surveillance and further refining lending instruments. In the area of surveillance and economic policy recommendations, the Fund should focus on maintaining financial and fiscal stability, including through the mobilization of countries' domestic resources. Russian representatives pay particular attention to the development of a more coordinated and accessible Global Financial Safety Net, since more than half of the world's countries have access to only one element of this network—the IMF. The fragmentation of the network, including inequality in access to loans and swap lines, undermines the legitimacy of the IMF.

The second area relates to the need to ensure the stability of the international financial system amid the rapid development of digital technologies. Given that the scale of digital transformation goes beyond national jurisdictions, Russian financial authorities believe that the IMF should take on a coordinating role in managing the changes taking place,² confirming the position that the existing global

1. Written statement by Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov at the 52nd Plenary Meeting of the IMF. URL: https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=39980-pismennoe_zayavlenie_ministra_finansov_rossiiskoi_federatsii_upravlyayushchego_ot_rossiiskoi_federatsii_v_mvfa.g._siluanova_na_52-m_plenarnom_zasedanii_mvfk_16-17_oktyabrya_2025_g._vashington

2. Ibid.

economic governance system needs to be transformed without radical changes, supplementing rather than replacing traditional institutions.

However, progress in these areas in 2025 was insignificant. A key unresolved issue remains the extremely slow implementation of IMF capital and governance reforms, including increasing the quota and voting shares of underrepresented members and revising the quota calculation formula. The proposal adopted in 2023 as part of the 16th General Review of Quotas to increase them by 50% in proportion to current values (i. e., without redistribution from developed countries to countries most in need of financing) has not yet entered into force.¹ The decision to redistribute quota shares among countries, which was postponed to the 17th Quota Review and has more significant consequences, continues to be discussed, with the deadline for formulating the relevant principles once again postponed from June 2025² to spring 2026.³

Despite the IMF's claims of "success in addressing debt problems",⁴ there were no significant changes in its policy in this area in 2025. There are also no concrete results from the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable (GSDR), a multilateral forum for discussing debt burden issues.⁵

The implementation of reforms of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), aimed at ensuring its self-sustaining lending capacity, is being delayed. As part of the reforms, IMF member countries have committed to providing guarantees amounting to approximately \$8.5 bn, but as of October 2025, less than half of the agreed amount had been allocated.⁶

The IMF's financing terms for the poorest countries are not becoming more favorable. Thus, on May 1, 2025, a new interest rate mechanism for new loans under the PRGT came into effect. Outstanding loans approved before that date, as well as new payments under existing agreements, still have a zero interest rate. However, when concluding new loan agreements, zero interest rates are set only for the poorest countries that are PRGT borrowers (approximately half of all states), while the rest will receive financing at preferential, but still non-zero rates.⁷

Thus, in the interaction between Russia and the IMF, long-term problems of bilateral interaction and lack of progress in implementing reforms that are in the interests of partner countries remain. Western countries continue to attempt to poli-

1. Resilience in a World of Uncertainty. URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2025/10/17/sp101725-resilience-in-a-world-of-uncertainty>

2. Chair's Statement: Forty-Eighth Meeting of the IMFC. URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/10/14/pr23353-chairs-statement-forty-eighth-meeting-of-the-imfc>

3. Chair's Statement Fifty-Second Meeting of the IMFC. URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2025/10/17/pr25348-imfc-chairs-statement-fifty-second-meeting-of-the-imfc>

4. Ibid.

5. Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable. URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/about/faq/gsd-roundtable>

6. Resilience in a World of Uncertainty. URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2025/10/17/sp101725-resilience-in-a-world-of-uncertainty>

7. IMF Lending. URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/about/factsheets/imf-lending>

timize the Fund's activities, including in the context of financial support for Ukraine. In November 2025, IMF staff and the Ukrainian authorities reached an agreement on macroeconomic and structural measures that could be supported under a new 48-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) agreement worth \$8.1 bn.¹

5.2.5. Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)

The nature of Russia's interaction with the MDB in 2025 did not change fundamentally. Since 2022, the activities of the World Bank Group (WBG) institutions in Russia have been frozen, and since 2014, there has been a moratorium on their new projects in Russia. The World Bank's expert and analytical work in Russia, including within the framework of the Financial Sector Assessment Program and the publication of reports on the Russian economy, has been completely suspended.

There has been no progress in implementing the reforms of the WBG's share capital, voting rights, and governance promoted by Russia in the interests of the world's majority of states. A review of the share capital structure of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), conducted once every five years, was planned for 2025. but as of December 2025, no specific decisions have been made within its framework, and further consultations are expected at the IMF and GBR meetings in the spring of 2026.² There are doubts that the review will ultimately lead to a significant redistribution of share capital and votes, since previous reviews have not resulted in any significant changes, even for significantly underrepresented countries.³

Other multilateral banks in which Russia is a shareholder have also continued to effectively suspend their activities in the country. These include, in particular, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). At the same time, the EBRD's management is inclined to take a politicized view of the geopolitical situation in the world, and support for Ukraine is declared as one of its priorities. Over the past four years, more than \$8 billion has been allocated for these purposes.⁴

The issue of resuming cooperation with formally friendly multilateral development banks remains unresolved. Against the backdrop of sanctions risks, the Asi-

1. IMF and Ukrainian authorities reach Staff-Level Agreement on a new US\$8.1 billion 48-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement. URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2025/11/26/pr-25399-ukraine-agreement-on-new-us-8-point-1-bil-48mo-eff-arrangement>

2. 2025 Shareholding Review. Progress Report to Governors for the 2025 Annual Meetings. URL: https://www.devcommittee.org/content/dam/sites/devcommittee/doc/documents/2025/Final_DC2025-0005.pdf

3. 2020 Shareholding Review: Concluding Report to Governors at the Annual Meetings 2021. URL: <https://www.devcommittee.org/content/dam/sites/devcommittee/doc/documents/mgr/DC2021-0008%20Final%20Shareholding%20paper.pdf>

4. The EBRD in Ukraine. URL: <https://www.ebrd.com/home/what-we-do/where-we-invest/ukraine.html>

an Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) canceled one of the approved Russian project and suspended another.¹ The same situation arose with the New Development Bank (NDB) projects. Nevertheless, cooperation with the NDB and AIIB continues actively outside the scope of investment cooperation. In June 2025, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, met with the NDB President Dilma Rousseff. They emphasized common priorities, including “expanding the possibility of settlements in national currencies and efforts to create a digital platform for settlements and investments.”² Russia is interested in the rapid integration of new members into the NDB’s activities and the accession of new states, viewing the bank as the main international development institution for the countries of the Global South and the basis for the formation of a New Investment Platform for global growth. Work in these areas is continuing. In 2025, Algeria became a full member of the NDB, and the Board of Governors approved the accession of Ethiopia, Colombia, and Uzbekistan. Of the projects approved over 10 years, worth \$42 billion, more than a quarter are financed in national currencies, and this share is gradually increasing.³ Bonds in national currencies are actively used to attract financing. Thus, the total volume of the NDB panda bonds (debt securities denominated in Chinese currency) issued as of December 2025 amounted to 78.5 billion yuan (about \$11 bn).⁴ Russian Finance Minister, Anton Siluanov, has been elected chairman of the bank’s Board of Governors for the next year, and Russia will host the 11th annual NDB meeting in 2026.⁵

After Russia’s share in the paid-up capital decreased in 2023, the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) continued its activities in our country, although the share of Russian projects in its portfolio is constantly decreasing amid a lack of data on new investments. The latest available annual report of the EDB notes that “taking into account compliance with international standards and the Bank’s obligations to investors and counterparties, the share of Russian projects in the EDB’s balance sheet portfolio decreased from 41% at the end of 2021 to 11% at the end of 2024.” The reduction in activity was linked to the task of “preserving the EDB’s own financial and operational activities in the medium term,” i.e., in essence, minimizing

1. Our Projects. URL: https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/list/year/All/member/Russian%20Federation/sector/All/financing_type/All/status/All
2. Meeting with Dilma Rousseff, President of the New Development Bank. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77205>
3. Keynote Address by Vice President Roman Serov at the 22nd China International Finance Forum. URL: <https://www.ndb.int/news/keynote-address-by-vice-president-roman-serov-at-the-22nd-china-international-finance-forum/>
4. New Development Bank successfully issued RMB 3 billion 3-year Panda Bond. URL: <https://www.ndb.int/news/new-development-bank-successfully-issued-rmb-3-billion-3-year-panda-bond/>
5. New Development Bank’s Board of Governors Convened its 10th Annual Meeting in Rio de Janeiro. URL: <https://www.ndb.int/news/new-development-banks-board-of-governors-convened-its-10th-annual-meeting-in-rio-de-janeiro/>

the risks of sanctions.¹ As of early 2025, the EDB's current portfolio in Russia had shrunk to \$722 million (13 projects)² compared to \$1.48 billion (22 projects) a year earlier.³

Thus, the geopolitical situation has greatly complicated the implementation of joint initiatives between Russia and the major MDBs, although Russia continues to faithfully fulfill its obligations to international financial institutions. Beyond investment projects, cooperation continues with those IBRs where Russia and friendly states play a key role. It includes expert and analytical work, promoting initiatives to expand the use of national currencies, better accounting for the needs of borrowers, and other areas of reform of the international monetary and financial system to address common challenges.

5.2.6. World Health Organization (WHO)

The main event of 2025 on the international health agenda was the 78th session of the WHO, held on May 19–27 in Geneva. The most important outcome of the session was the agreement on the Pandemic Preparedness and Response Agreement after three years of negotiations. The agreement will be available for signature and ratification by UN members after the development and agreement of the System for Access to Pathogens and Benefit-Sharing (DPSV) and its approval as an annex to the Agreement by the Assembly in 2026.⁴

The Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) was tasked with initiating preparations for the establishment of a Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Financing Coordination Mechanism and a Global Supply and Logistics Network with the aim of “expanding, simplifying, and ensuring equitable, timely, rapid access to safe and affordable medical countermeasures against pandemics.”

Russia was among the 11 countries that abstained from voting on the draft resolution. Russia's position is based on concerns about restrictions on the sovereignty of signatory countries in the process of implementing WHO powers and the lack of specific mechanisms for implementing the Agreement.⁵ In its statement explaining its vote, Russia emphasized that “the Russian Federation is organizing its work

1. Annual Report of the Management Board of the Eurasian Development Bank – 2024. URL: <https://eabr.org/upload/iblock/f86/GO2024-publicnaya-versiya.pdf>

2. Ibid.

3. Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the Eurasian Development Bank – 2023. URL: https://eabr.org/upload/iblock/a8b/EDB_Annual_Report_2023_RU_web_2024_06_18.cleaned.pdf

4. World Health Assembly adopts historic Pandemic Agreement. URL: <https://www.who.int/ru/news/item/20-05-2025-world-health-assembly-adopts-historic-pandemic-agreement-to-make-the-world-more-equitable-and-safer-from-future-pandemics>

5. Pandemic agreement: more questions than answers. URL: <https://dfnc.ru/c106-technika/pandemicheskoe-soglashenie-voprosov-bolshe-chem-otvetov/>

in the field of responding to health emergencies based on the interests of the Russian people, priorities in the field of public health protection, and national rules, norms, and standards.”¹

The second important outcome of the 78th session of the WHO was the adoption of the Organization’s Program Budget for 2026–2027, which provides for a 20% increase in mandatory contributions. This increase will provide an additional \$90 million in annual funding for WHO activities.² Back in 2022, an agreement was reached to gradually increase the share of mandatory contributions from 16% to 50% of the WHO budget. This step is important in terms of increasing the predictability of the Organization’s funding and reducing its dependence on targeted voluntary contributions, especially in the context of the withdrawal of the United States from the WHO, which provided 12–15% of its funding in 2022–2023.³

5.2.7. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The 2025 anniversary of the SCO was marked by landmark decisions (including the decision to establish the SCO Development Bank), new initiatives (including the creation of the SCO Single Transport Space, the Regional Center for Critical Materials, the E-Commerce Cooperation Program, and the establishment of the SCO Export Credit and Investment Mechanism) and the personal participation of the heads of the 10 SCO member states in the 25th summit chaired by Chinese President Xi Jinping. In the context of many multilateral meetings of leaders being held in incomplete composition or online, the personal participation of all the leaders of the 10 member states in the Tianjin summit⁴ and the 10 partner states⁵ in the “SCO Plus” meeting testifies to the importance they attach to the organization. It is no coincidence that it was at the SCO summit that Xi Jinping put forward China’s new initiative on global governance.⁶

1. Comment by the Permanent Mission of Russia to the UN Office in Geneva on the adoption of the WHO Pandemic Agreement. URL: https://geneva.mid.ru/ru/vystupleniya_i_zayavleniya/o_prinyatii_soglasheniya_voz_po_borbe_s_pandemiyami/
2. WHO Director-General: At the historic session of the World Health Organization, Member States reaffirmed their support for the Organization and global health. URL: <https://www.who.int/ru/news/item/30-05-2025-who-director-general--member-states-reaffirm-commitment-to-who-and-global-health-at-historic-world-health-assembly>
3. United States of America, WHO, 2024. URL: <https://www.who.int/about/funding/contributors/usa>
4. Belarus, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.
5. At the meeting, it was decided to combine the statuses of “observer” and “dialogue partner” into a single status of “SCO partner.” The SCO Plus meeting was attended by partner countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Mongolia, Nepal, Turkey, Egypt, and representatives of guest countries: Turkmenistan, Indonesia, Laos (which received partner status), Malaysia, and Vietnam, as well as heads of executive bodies of the UN, SCO, CIS, ASEAN, CSTO, ECO, CSTO, EEC, and AIIB.
6. Concept Paper on the Global Governance Initiative. URL: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202509/t20250901_11699912.html

As chair of the SCO Council of Heads of Government in 2025, Russia coordinated work on the government track, focusing on practical measures to deepen trade, economic, investment, and financial cooperation, including expanding transport corridor infrastructure; creating an independent financial infrastructure; developing innovative agriculture; strengthening technological sovereignty; and deepening industrial cooperation.

The key decisions of the heads of state are reflected in the Tianjin Declaration and a number of statements on issues of priority for the SCO Plus countries and the region as a whole, including statements on strengthening cooperation in the digital economy; strengthening scientific, technological, and innovative cooperation; deepening international cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence; cooperation in the field of green industry; supporting the multilateral trading system; and sustainable energy development. The summit approved the “SCO Development Strategy until 2035” and the “Roadmap for the Implementation of the Strategy for Energy Cooperation among SCO Member States for the Period until 2030.”

The SCO agenda has consistently focused on decisions to ensure security and counter traditional and new threats, terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The leaders of the participating countries adopted the Program of Cooperation in Countering Extremist Ideology in the SCO Space for 2026–2030, signed the Agreement on the Universal Center for Countering Challenges and Threats to the Security of SCO Member States and the Agreement on the SCO Anti-Drug Center. The centres are planned to be established in Tashkent and Dushanbe, respectively. Thus, the institutionalisation of security cooperation continued.

On issues of economic cooperation, SCO members emphasized their readiness to contribute to improving the architecture of global economic governance, including reform of the IMF and WTO; the inadmissibility of unilateral coercive economic measures that contravene the UN Charter and WTO rules, undermine international security, undermine fair competition, and hinder the achievement of the SDGs.

All member states reaffirmed their support for Russia’s initiative to create a Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) and expressed their readiness to develop dialogue between the SCO, the EAEU, ASEAN, and other interested states and multilateral associations. Despite a slight warming of relations between China and India (Indian Prime Minister N.Modi met with Xi Jinping in person for the first time in a long time), all members except India expressed their support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its alignment with the development of the EAEU.

After more than 15 years of discussions, a decision was made to establish a SCO Development Bank and to intensify consultations on its functioning. The key objective of the new institution is to help reduce the SCO members’ dependence on Western financial infrastructure and develop trade between countries. Experts believe that, as in BRICS, one of the Bank’s immediate tasks will be to synchronize exi-

sting national payment systems with each other. On Russia's initiative, the Council of Heads of Government has established an Expert Group on Improving Financial Infrastructure, which is tasked with developing a set of measures to increase the share of national currencies in mutual settlements, including, obviously, the parameters of the SCO Development Bank's activities.

Following the conclusion of the summit of heads of state, the chairmanship of the SCO passed to the Kyrgyz Republic. It will be held under the slogan "25 years of the SCO: together towards sustainable peace, development, and prosperity." The President of the Kyrgyz Republic, S. Zhaparov, identified ensuring long-term stability and security and realizing the potential for economic cooperation, including accelerating the establishment of the SCO Development Bank and decisions on the creation of a SCO emergency assistance fund/mechanism, as the most important issues. A significant step in building a unified digital space and strengthening technological potential could be the implementation of the Kyrgyz Republic's proposal to develop data centers and create regional high-performance computing capabilities. The implementation of the SCO's intention to form in the region "an economic space of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation, ensuring the effective functioning of markets, supply chains, settlement and payment operations, transport corridors, logistics routes, flows of investments, goods, services, and technologies"¹ will be an important step towards building the BEP.

5.2.8. Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)

In 2025, the EAEU continued its cooperation in key areas of integration. One of the long-awaited decisions was the signing on December 22 of a roadmap for implementing the Eurasian Economic Path declaration. It provides for the development of a separate plan for cooperation in the field of AI for 2026–2030, including issues of legal protection of intellectual property. There are plans to eliminate bottlenecks in the infrastructure on key routes (East-West and North-South) and to switch completely to electronic transport documents. The emphasis is on industrial cooperation, innovative collaboration, and ensuring food and energy security.²

An important event was the adoption of the decision "On the Strategic Program for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Eurasian Econo-

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1. Joint communiqué following the 24th meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <http://government.ru/news/56977/>
 2. A five-year roadmap for the development of economic processes within the EAEU has been approved. URL: <https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/utverzhdjena-dorozhnaya-karta-po-razvitiyu-ekonomicheskikh-protsessov-v-ramkakh-eaes-na-pyat-let/>

mic Union for the Long Term Framework”.¹ The program focuses on digital transformation, biotechnology, space research, new materials, AI, and the creation of common platforms and centers of competence. It is expected to intensify joint research, support cooperation between scientific organizations and businesses, establish common standards, develop venture financing, and create common infrastructures.

In 2025, new measures were implemented in the EAEU to form a common financial market, an independent payment infrastructure, and ensure stable settlements between enterprises. Work was also carried out to develop commodity exchange trading and create price indicators for key mutual trade commodities in national currencies. Recommendations were approved on harmonizing the legislation of the Union countries in the field of securities and insurance markets.² A multi-level (differentiated) approach to harmonizing legislation in the financial sector was agreed upon. Harmonized regulatory requirements will apply only to those financial market participants that provide services throughout the EAEU. For participants operating only within the territory of one state, the requirements established by national legislation will remain in force.³

In 2025, one of the priorities of the EAEU was the development of integration in the agro-industrial complex. A decision was made to establish a supranational mechanism to support cooperation in the agro-industrial complex. A list of joint research and development projects in the agro-industrial complex for 2026–2030 was approved.⁴ These are important steps towards developing the bioeconomy and ensuring food security. The members of the Union have taken decisions to develop integration in industry. The implementation of the Regulation on EAEU intergovernmental programs in industry creates conditions for the development and launch of innovative high-tech intergovernmental programs in the Union, bringing together enterprises and scientific teams from three or more member states.⁵

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1. Long-term program for scientific and technical development of the EAEU approved. URL: <https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/utverzhdena-dolgosrochnaya-programma-nauchno-tekhnicheskogo-razvitiya-eaes/>
 2. EAEU countries have approved recommendations on harmonizing legislation in the securities and insurance markets. URL: https://economy.gov.ru/material/news/strany_eaes_utverdili_rekomendacii_po_garmonizacii_zakonodatelstva_v_sfere_rynka_cennyh_bumag_i_strahovaniya.html
 3. The formation of a common financial market within the EAEU was discussed in Moscow. URL: <https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/v-moskve-obsudili-formirovanie-obshchego-finansovogo-rynka-v-ramkakh-eaes/>
 4. The EAEU has defined areas for joint research in the field of agriculture and forestry until 2030. URL: <https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/v-eaes-opredeleny-napravleniya-sovmestnykh-issledovaniy-v-sfere-apk-do-2030-goda/>
 5. The heads of government of the EAEU countries supported the development of mechanisms for financing cooperation. URL: https://economy.gov.ru/material/news/glavy_pravitelstv_stran_eaes_podderzhalirazvitiemehanizmovfinansirovaniyakooperacii.html

Cooperation in the field of climate continued. As part of the implementation of the five-year plan for the development of the climate agenda, it is proposed to develop interstate standards in the field of carbon regulation, as well as agreed requirements for the accreditation of relevant validation and verification bodies. It is also important to take measures to prevent barriers caused by the climate regulation of member states, as well as to interact with third countries on climate issues in the field of trade.¹

The EAEU seeks to develop economic ties with key international partners. Among the main areas of the Union's international activities for 2026 are minimizing the negative impact of global challenges on the economies of member states; developing dialogue on climate issues; and positioning the Union internationally as a pole of economic attraction.² The EAEU will continue to coordinate efforts to jointly develop the transport, logistics, and digital infrastructure of international transport corridors, including in the East-West and North-South directions.³

In 2025, cooperation within the EAEU made progress on some areas of the agenda. However, it has not yet been possible to resolve the contradictions in order to complete the formation of single energy markets and sign an agreement on electronic commerce. The issue of a single data space and the regulation of data transfer within the Union has fallen off the agenda. Overcoming barriers in these areas should be a priority for cooperation in the coming years.

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In 2025, Russia, in partnership with the leading countries of the global majority, reinforced the trend toward greater multilateralism in the system of international relations. However, the transformation of international institutions is proving difficult. The shift in the balance of power in the global economy is a significant but insufficient factor for the G7 members to abandon their hegemony in global economic governance. Russia, together with other new centers of influence, should focus its efforts not on reform, but on the formation of a new (if necessary, alternative) system of institutions and norms for managing the regional and global economy. Success in this process will be key to uniting the efforts of the Global South countries and creating a multilateral world order for the 21st century.

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1. The EEC will consider a five-year plan for the development of the climate agenda within the EAEU. URL: <https://ru.sputnik.kz/20250726/eek-rassmotrit-pyatiletний-plan-po-razvitiyu-klimaticheskoy-povestki-v-ramkakh-eaes-55968144.html?ysclid=mj8cb36lnm192850598>
 2. On the draft decision of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council "On the Main Directions of International Activities of the Eurasian Economic Union for 2026." URL: <https://www.alta.ru/tamdoc/25r00142/>
 3. Ibid.