Post-Privatization Corporate Governance in Russia: Singular Path or Typical Transition Trajectory?

Publication date
Saturday, 11.12.1999

A. Radygin

Eastern Transition Trajectories. Measurement, typologies, differentiation, interpretations. International Conference GTD - Grenoble. December 10-11, 1999

In the present day economic literature the well–defined property rights (clarity, stability and predictability of the property rights) are regarded as one of the major factors of the economic growth and are closely linked to the successful economic development (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967; North, 1981). Nevertheless, the role of the clearly defined property rights may vary depending upon the size of entities, whether they are public or private, the access to information etc. (Arrow, 1974; Stiglitz, 1994; World bank, 1998).


1. Introduction. Preliminary methodological notes
2. Tendency toward ownership concentration and myth of “an efficient owner”
2.1. Privatization models
2.2. Ownership structure in transition economies: main trends
2.3. Interrelationship between ownership concentration and effective corporate governance
3. Major mechanisms of the corporate governance and their specific features in Russia
3.1. Internal mechanisms
3.2.The general legislative situation.
3.3. The corporate securities market
3.4. Bankruptcy procedures
3.5. Market of corporate control (takeovers)
4. Conclusions


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