The First Intifada, the Oslo Accords, and the Escalation of Terror: Causalities Revisited

The Story of the First Intifada from a Political-Economic Perspective

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The analysis of events of the First Intifada focused on the question of how well founded the decisions made at the time were to introduce radical changes in the terror-fighting strategy. Most sources treat the process at Oslo as an outgrowth of Israel’s inability to suppress the Arab riots. We will consider an alternative interpretation in addition to this widespread view. The alternative approach will be based on understanding Oslo as the outcome of developments dictated by certain interests within Israel.

The magnitude of the events of 1987–1990 does nothing to explain the leadership’s refusal to come up with a strategy for fighting terrorism in favor of choosing a strategy of pacification instead. Most of the steps taken by the Israeli leadership in the course of the conflict cannot be adequately explained without taking into account the struggle for power and the evolution of the leftist elite’s interests after their loss of the monopoly of power in 1977—along with their loss of motives for defending the country or the security of its citizens. Citizen security saw a drastic drop in the priority status it had formerly enjoyed as a state objective. This came in the wake of the disintegration of mechanisms of responsibility and the interest taken by the authorities in providing security.

The Oslo Accords were in no way dictated by the First Intifada; even so, the Intifada is used extensively as a means of Oslo legitimatization. In actuality, one and the same process and one and the same political choice led to both the Oslo Accords and the terror boom.

Keywords: First Intifada, security, terror incentives, weakness signals

JEL codes: D74, D78, H56
In reality, the populace will embrace the government only if it is less dangerous to do so than to support the insurgency. That is why successful population-centric policies aim to control the people with a 24/7 deployment of security forces, not to win their love and gratitude by handing out soccer balls, medical supplies and other goodies.

Max Boot (Boot, 2013)

"Showing any sign of weakness in the wild could get them killed..."

Piece of advice from dog training instructions

Introduction

Did the Intifada Lead to Oslo? The “Canonical” History of the First Intifada

The First Intifada has for decades been used as the principal explanation for the need to fundamentally reexamine Israel’s policies on terror. More precisely, the question concerns explaining and apologizing for the new policy of strategic concessions made by Israel to terrorists. Concessions, negotiations, and cooperation with terrorists have replaced the semi-legendary principles of Israel’s anti-terrorist strategy, which had once spelled out “No negotiating with terrorists,” the impossibility of concessions, and persecution and destruction of terrorists regardless of where they may be hiding.

The primary aim of the present study is to analyze the events of the First Intifada, focusing on the question of how well grounded the decisions made at the time were to introduce radical changes in the terror-fighting strategy. Most sources treat the process at Oslo as an outgrowth of Israel’s inability to suppress the Arab riots. We will consider an alternative interpretation in addition to this widespread view. The alternative approach will be based on understanding Oslo as the outcome of developments dictated by certain interests within Israel.
The “canonical” account of the events is the following. Privation of various kinds, suffering, and humiliation inflicted upon the “occupied” territories (check posts, Jewish construction) provoked due discontent (legitimate grievances) on the part of the Arabs. The discontent led to protests (see, for instance, Ensalaco, 2008) or accounted for the protests being channeled toward adopting increasingly violent forms (Levitt, 2006). According to a more neutral account, the protests arose spontaneously, as a “natural” development (White, 2012: p. 296). Notwithstanding the draconian repressive measures taken, putting the protests down proved impossible. It was these protests endorsed by world public opinion that made the Israeli leadership—which had previously never agreed to make concessions—reconsider its policies (Shindler, 2013; Ziv, 2007). The initiation of the peace process and the Oslo Accords (the Madrid Conference, according to some accounts) led to the end of the First Intifada (in 1993).

The account cited above is presented in official sources, Israeli ones foremost among them; in research literature (see above), including Israeli studies (Ziv, 2007); in educational materials; and in popular layman’s accounts.

The nearly universally accepted chronology of the events of the First Intifada (its beginning dated to December 1987, the conclusion in September 1993) is constructed in conformity with the position this spells out.

We propose two principal alternative hypotheses to explain the reaction of the Israeli leadership to the Intifada and the signing of the Oslo Accords:

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3 Kindle locations: 1623; 3716–3722.

4 “Hamas capitalizes on the suffering and frustrations triggered by Israeli settlement and occupation policies. Israeli settlements—especially those deep in the West Bank…” (Kindle location: 2278–2279).

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Israeli history timeline: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/IsraelAt50/Pages/Timeline%20of%20Events-%20Half%20a%20Century%20of%20Independence.aspx#1987

6 For example, materials disseminated by the US Institute for Curriculum Services, which offers materials on Jewish history for schools: http://www.icsresources.org/content/factsheets/ArabIsraeliTimeline.pdf

7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Intifada
1. The state proved unable to suppress the spontaneous—unless it was organized—protests of the Arabs living in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza; it was thus compelled to change its policies, shifting from a strategy of suppressing terrorism to one of pacifying terrorists.

2. The unrest was fed and fanned by signals received from Israeli politicians (typically from the leaders of the Israeli Left) about their readiness to shift to a strategy of pacification. These signals were—quite rationally—interpreted by the terror organizers as notification of greater chances of success for a rebellion.

A number of authors have also voiced the view that weaker "Palestine Liberation Organization" (PLO) influence in the areas where the rebellion sprang up provides a partial explanation for the zeal of its competing rivals (e.g., Levitt, 2006). Islamic extremists tried to fill the vacuum using the PLO’s weakness to win supporters and activists while also relying on resources provided by the oil monarchies.

But the question of the causes of the unrest seems less important than the one about the causes leading to Oslo. Was the First Intifada such a cause in reality?

An emotional ground for mobilization of the effort (important along with fear in the face of the uprising’s organizers) was hatred of the Jews. One of the factors leading to this hatred will be considered in greater detail below, as well as in an additional study (Rotenberg, 2014). The present study does not consider other factors (national or religious) in any detail.

In societies where government and the authority with which it is invested are based on violence, government and property are mutually inseparable. Wealth is almost always an attribute of power or else it is acquired with the permission of power; it can then also be confiscated at any moment. Rulers of such societies consider everything found in the areas they control in one way or another belonging to themselves (Pipes, 1999). Societies accustomed exclusively to this type of relationship between power and property cannot tolerate the economic success of a stranger (even if the stranger is stronger than them; see for instance the Philistines from Gerar). The...
last few centuries have seen numerous situations when the Arabs needed to accept the authority of strangers. In cases when the authority looked strong and stable, its representatives and those close to it (co-tribesmen and co-religionists of the ruler) encountered no challenge even when the Arabs’ own predicament worsened.

Through the Looking Glass of Statistics: The First Intifada

It would be difficult to come up with a confirmation of the accepted date of the First Intifada if we attempt to define its time period based on the number of victims alone. If losses among the Jews—or, beginning with the birth of the State of Israel, among Israelis (see Graphs 1 and 2 below)—are taken as the point of departure, the project of defining the initial and endpoints of the uprising becomes altogether impossible.

The Second Intifada period (2000–2003) is easily definable by a sharp rise in the number of victims. The same was true earlier of the Hebron Massacre (1929), the riots of 1936–1939, and the wave of terrorism preceding the War of Independence. The First Intifada is barely discernible using this standard of measurement. Israel’s losses due to terrorism were considerably lower than during the years 1949–1956, prior to the cleanup operation in Gaza and the Sinai during the 1956 war. It makes sense rather to group losses by type of population (that is, if we evaluate the likelihood of a Jew getting killed in the Land of Israel solely on the basis of him or her being Jewish). Using the indicator of losses grouped by population, the First Intifada becomes practically undetectable. The “Intifada” is hardly observable even with “high zoom”. Looking at monthly statistics and ignoring the commonly accepted version of the dating, two answers can be proposed: (1) spring 1989 to April 1991; the other, which is also the more natural, involving a great number of victims: March 1993 to November 1994.

According to all available timelines, the Intifada began in December 1987 and ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords on September 13, 1993. Common sense suggests that something really significant began in earnest following this development.

Note: according to Bituach Leumi, the number of Israeli terror victims during the period beginning in December 1987 and ending in September 1993 totals 154 people (Rot, 2007 mentions 157).
Figure 1. Terror victim dynamics: Data of the Israeli National Insurance Institute (Bituach Leumi), 1921–2012.\(^\text{10}\)

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\(^{10}\) Taken from Bituach Leumi; active reference for the database at: [http://laad.btl.gov.il/Web/He/Victims/Default.aspx](http://laad.btl.gov.il/Web/He/Victims/Default.aspx). Data through 1991 have been corrected: those who died as a result of Iraqi attacks during the Gulf War have not been taken into account (Authors’ note).
Figure. 2. Terror victim dynamics: Terror victim statistics by month (not counting those killed outside of Israel’s borders), 1986–1994.

Figure. 3. The number of Arabs killed in skirmishes with defense forces in 1987–2000 in the territories liberated by Israel in 1967. Taken from Betzelem: [http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables](http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables)
Figure. 4. Number of civilians—Arabs and Jews—killed during the same period in attacks against Jews in the Liberated Territories. Taken from Betzelem: http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables
The data represented by the graphs therefore raise questions concerning:

1. The magnitude of the problem of the Intifada for Israel (whether it has not been exaggerated in general, and whether it was worth implementing such unusual decisions as inviting a terrorist organization from Tunis into one’s own country?).

2. Dating the uprising.

We intentionally focus attention on victims among the Jews (Israelis) insofar as we are interested in the motivation behind the decision-making among Israel’s leaders. At the same time, another side is always clearly involved in a conflict. Let us therefore look at the dynamic of the activism and the losses among the Arabs.

The First Intifada is most clearly “traceable” in the statistics of Arabs killed in skirmishes with defense forces (Figure 3). But even these statistics do not fit very comfortably into the generally accepted scheme. The data that reflect Arab casualties (only those killed by Israelis) make it clear that the core issues had been left behind as early as 1990. The statistics for Arab attacks against Jews in the Liberated Territories and related losses (see Figure 4) “shifts” the peak of the problem to the moment when the Oslo Accords were signed (September 1993) or to an even later period.

It should be noted that the statistics provided by the NGO Betzelem, which were used in Figures 3 and 4, raise many questions. For instance, the number of Arabs killed by Arabs: 985 according to data introduced in Rot (2007). This figure is compatible with 1198, the number of Arabs killed in attacks against defense forces, or with 808 (see Rot, 2007: p. 43).

Suppose losses among Arabs hostile to Israel shocked the initiators of the negotiations and led them to invite the PLO into the country. Take some other appropriate examples for the sake of comparison. Some 51,000 Arabs in total have died in all the wars with Israel (not counting the War of Independence; i.e., in Arab-Israeli wars since 1950). According to other estimates, beginning in 1920, Arab losses totaled more than 91,000 people.11

Nearly 25,000 Arabs lost their lives in the 1971 war between the PLO and the Jordanian military alone. The losses incurred by two Muslim countries hostile to Israel—Iran and Iraq—in the War of 1980–1988 topped one million. Nearly 140,000 people died in the course of the Gulf War (Heinsohn and Pipes, 2007). According to official data, Israel’s own losses in all the wars taken together totaled 20,000 people.12 It remains unclear just how Arab losses in the course of the unrest associated with the First Intifada could have led those responsible for the decision-

11 [http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/casualtiestotal.html](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/casualtiestotal.html)
making concerning negotiations and the implementation of agreements to opt for such radical measures.

*We consciously leave “world public opinion” aside. This factor stayed well out of the limelight until certain groups within Israel started taking advantage of it to advance domestic political objectives of their own.*

*It is only prima facie that subsequent escalation of criticism looks surprising. The criticism descends upon Israel not before, but following the incredible concessions Israel agreed to make in 1992–1994. But prior to initiatives originating with Israel itself, the criticism lacked moral legitimacy. What is no less important is it looked a priori meaningless. Perennial announcements unaccompanied by any appreciable results tend to begin to bore readers, and so hold little interest for journalists. But the absence of visible “progress” is utterly unacceptable for the bureaucrat. It was only after it had become evident that Israel itself was ready to make considerable concessions that bureaucrats in democratic countries’ foreign political offices felt a strong urge to pressure Israel. This was due to the simple fact that action of this kind began to look promising.*

Given any reasonable interpretation of the statistics of the victims, the data prove impossible to use as an explanation for agreeing to negotiate with terrorists, and then for making strategic concessions to them at the negotiating table. Israel had her own experience of successfully fighting Arab guerillas (terrorist raids, etc.). So in this paper we deliberately ignore the possibility of Israeli leaders’ fear of Intifada transformation into “unbeatable” guerilla war (Boot, 2013; Henkin, 2006).

**Problems and Criticism of the “Canon”**

Far from all historians accept the understanding of the modern history of backward nations—and of the Near East in particular—as the encounter of the noble savage and the Western colonizing exploiter (Johnson, 1988).13

Zeev Jabotinsky (1923) warned leftist Zionists that as long as they remained subject to Jewish control, the Arabs would not be content with increased material well-being. He predicted Arab protest based on Arab national feeling.

Since considerations of well-being and rights can easily be disregarded by Arab leaders (see in “Additional Notes” below and the section on “The Intifada and the Well-Being of Arabs”), Jabotinsky defended the position in favor of zero concessions (known as the “Iron Wall”), which was capable of providing a solution to the problem. The basis of the solution consisted of a strong and clear signal enabling all the parties involved to plan for the long term by making choices from

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13 Johnson sees no need to mention the notion, which is obviously incompatible with the events related by the author of modern Jewish history in which the Jews become the target of Arab terror attacks unprovoked by any act on their own part; all this takes place long before the birth of the State.
among comprehensible alternatives. The substance of the proposed “positive” solution was in populating the Land of Israel with a firm hand, and at the same time refusing to engage in any discussion of this policy. Jabotinsky insisted on this as the most moral approach (based on the historical-religious right of the Jews to the land). He defended the “Iron Wall” policy as the most practical precisely on the basis of its being highly moral.

This point of view deserves special attention insofar as Jabotinsky, besides being a politician and journalist, was also an efficient man of action—a “manager of security issues.”

Another piece of evidence has to do with understanding the magnitude and the prolonged duration of the protests of 1987–1990 (1993) as an outcome of oppression. The evidence provided by the activist organizers of mass protests came from Polish authors of a guide to conducting an underground struggle (during the martial law period of 1981–88, the so-called “Polish-Jaruzelski War”). Representatives of Polish society and culture, which had provided a great many examples of outstanding self-sacrifice throughout the 1900s, explained the need to instruct their comrades in the underground in this way:

The memory of heroes alive in the heart of the people notwithstanding, the courageous are not numerous. It is essential to value the security of one’s workers, as well as one’s own. You should welcome any gesture of solidarity and act in such a way as to make the silent majority identify with us; however, do not count on attracting it to underground activism.

The people as a whole can resist only in patriotic books (Bielecki, Kelus, Sikorska, 1983).

This means that in dealing with the phenomenon of mass resistance, no idealistic or irrational factors can ever be taken into account as the primary—or the only—explanation. Considered in tandem with the abundant evidence of the extremely rational mentality of terror organizers in the Near East, this statement by the heroes of the underground struggle against communism in Poland casts into question many elements of the prevalent understanding of the history of the 1987 Intifada.

A principal objective of the present article is to attempt to interpret the First Intifada as an outcome of the rational steps taken by the players involved in the process. All players act in their own interest. Small groups, occasionally disadvantaged in resources, win accordingly in terms of coordination and concentration. That is, we mean to use the arsenal offered by the theory of public choice (theory of rational choice) both in identifying the significant factors and in interpreting them.

It is worth emphasizing that such an approach does not entail leaving religious motives out of the picture. On the contrary, we believe that religion continues to remain a powerful mechanism in coordinating steps that dramatically lower the coordination costs. In addition, the display of
religious motives—or their absence when it would be reasonable to expect them to manifest themselves—serves both as an indicator of the players’ intentions and as a basis for the evaluation (prediction) of the players’ behaviors. This is to say nothing of the fact that religious feeling, ritual, and other experiences dictated by religion are an important component of such valued goods as prestige and self-respect, as well as a source of positive emotion (hope) and a means of shock amortization.

**Prehistory of the First Intifada**

The explanation will need to begin at least as far back as 1967. Two symbolic—and therefore easily ignored—facts played an important part in what followed.

**The Significance of Symbols or “What We Need This Vatican For”**

From the point of view of the Arabs, Jews as the “lawful heirs” of the Hebrew Patriarchs and their traditions ceased to exist (or were replaced) with the appearance of Islam (see e.g., Spencer, 2009). At that time the Muslims became the Patriarchs’ sole rightful continuators. Such a reading goes far in explaining the attempts to Islamize the Temple Mount and the Tombs of the Patriarchs in Hebron.

The rebirth of the State of Israel and crushing military defeats dealt a heavy blow against this approach. Insofar as the claims laid by the Zionist movement to the Land of Israel are rooted in historical rights (which are in turn rooted in religious notions), it made sense to expect that first the Temple Mount, and then the Tombs of the Patriarchs would become the Zionists most desired prize (just in case the Zionists were to turn out to be really Jewish).

The Jewish leadership’s public rejection of both the Temple Mount (Navon cites Moshe Dayan’s words about the Temple Mount: 14 “What do we need this Vatican for?”) and the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron (Feiglin 2014; Navon 2007) provided the terrorists with an argument unprecedented in its capacity. Most important, an approach of this kind weakens Jewish moral claims to these areas. Moreover, the moral legitimization of the very existence of a Jewish state in the Near East becomes marginal, if not negligible. 15

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14 The mosques had long since become abandoned and unfrequented sites at the time when the Jews’ mass return began.

15 On the “symbolic” significance that wrestling Judea and Samaria from Israel’s hands holds for the terrorists, see the interview (dated May 7, 2009) on ANB TV (Lebanon, in Arabic with Hebrew subtitles) with Abbas Zaki, the Arab Autonomy’s “ambassador” in Lebanon at: Memritv.org / Palestinian Media Watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nok5xHJRoiI (uploaded Aug. 28, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ol8FC1-wq_o (English subtitles) uploaded Nov. 25, 2009. Once Israel gives up the Territories, it will collapse according to the veteran terrorist, who bases this forecast on the symbolic meaning the Territories hold for the Jews: “If they give up Jerusalem, what’ll become of all the talk of the Promised Land and the Chosen People?”
Interest Groups: The Diplomats and the Voter

Democratic countries’ ministries of foreign affairs occupy a place of honor among the strongholds supporting the terrorists and the regimes that sponsor their attacks against Israel. There are a number of explanations for this. The simplest in this case is the number of employees in the embassies in Arab countries (to say nothing of all Muslim countries), which is incomparably greater than in the embassy of any Western country in Israel.

What is a more considerable factor, in our opinion, is the struggle of these offices for influence, for grounding their own importance and for funding. Diplomacy based on a clearly enunciated set of policies and principles that remain unchanged through the ages, buttressed by the military-economic superiority of the West, drastically limits the role of the diplomats themselves. Everything has already been decided for them by politicians (most of whom have since departed for a better world), along with the natural advantages of a market economy and well-protected property. Playing “suicide checkers” and claiming some secret diplomatic knowledge, which presupposes measures impossible to check by any common sense (such as negotiations and concessions to regimes or terrorist leaders, all deserving of disgust) facilitate considerable improvements in the position of functionaries in foreign affairs offices.

Policies of this kind can be implemented only because voters who would have otherwise never supported them take little interest. Elected politicians are also often uninformed about the fine points of foreign policy, tending “to rely on the specialists’ opinion.” In the present case, the “specialists,” unlike the private lobbyists, have a strong personal interest, as well as the opportunity to take up lobbying in their working time, using state resources they have at their disposal, including work connections. This means that the mechanism described by Olson (1971) occasionally yields surprising results. Naturally enough, lobbying through a decision profitable only for the diplomats themselves vis-à-vis an ally—rather than vis-à-vis their own citizens—is even simpler.

It is hardly surprising that the State Department has made a notable contribution to weakening the position of Israel, a US ally, and to fortifying the terrorists. It was none other than the diplomats who initiated and encouraged—indeed, independent of the administration—a policy of supporting the KGB special operation aimed at presenting the PLO, a terrorist organization, as a “government in exile” (Pacepa, 2002, 2013). Supporting terrorist leaders as legitimate

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16 For instance, cooperating with the replacement of Hosni Mubarak’s rule, a regime friendly and dependent on the US, with the openly hostile Muslim Brothers’ regime, and the clear expressions of dissatisfaction when the latter was removed from power.
representatives of the people also required recognizing the “Palestinian People,” an entity never previously in existence.  

The first openly leftist US administration (that of President Jimmy Carter) pressured Israel at Camp David, demanding recognition for the principle of “peace in exchange for land” and the idea of a Palestinian autonomy. The same administration also initiated the process of diplomatic recognition of the PLO. However, even though the process did take off under the Carter administration, recognition as such was only achieved under Reagan, thus spelling out the high degree of autonomy and effectiveness of the State Department in attaining its office objectives, even at the expense of US national interests and the interests of US allies.

**Special Features of the System of Government in Israel after 1977**

In looking for an explanation why Israel opted to give up a successful strategy, replacing it with an untried and highly risky one instead, we must take into account the fundamentally new organization of power after Labor’s epoch-making defeat in the 1977 elections. Due to a number of reasons (ranging from direct threats of upheaval to the personal qualities of the new leadership), the new ruling coalition rejected large-scale reform. No constitution was adopted, and the executive authority apparatus remained unreformed (constructed originally under the semi-authoritarian “one-and-a-half-party” rule of Labor).

The territories referred to as the “West Bank and Gaza” were not annexed. The same party whose by-laws state that Jewish rule is to be extended to both banks of the Jordan River failed to annex even the territories to the West of Jordan once it stood at the helm of government. East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights formed the exception, a general consensus abiding in society concerning their annexation at the time.

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17 The very existence of significant Arab population in the pre-Zionist epoch is highly questionable; see for example the following discussion: [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1986/mar/27/mrs-peterss-palestine-an-exchange/](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1986/mar/27/mrs-peterss-palestine-an-exchange/). Self-identification of the local Arab population as “Palestinian” is even more questionable (see the famous Zuhair Muhsein interview when he told the Dutch daily Trouw in March 1977, “The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity.... Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people... to oppose Zionism” (first cited by Peters, 1984). See also the MEMRI TV interview with Gaza-Hamas “interior minister” Fathi Hammad and Egypt Al-Hekma TV on March 23, 2012 reminding viewers of “blood ties” with Arabs in Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia to substantiate his claim for assistance for the Hamas Jihad campaign: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwBSWN4s9IU](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwBSWN4s9IU).

18 “Leftist” meaning “committed to the principles” of unlimited government and general care; see in more detail …. An administration of this bent naturally found reliable partners in the State Department, not simply like-minded associates.


No large-scale liberalization of the economy was put through (this measure had been the subject of discussion with M. Friedman at the beginning of M. Begin’s first term in office). The state did not leave any of the principal spheres of the economy, from infrastructure to production and trade of foodstuffs. As a result, the Left retained control over the machinery of the state, the court system and the “public” media, with the schools and universities serving in part as propaganda channels (Yanovskiy et al., 2013). Such an unusual “division of power”—into the public authority, responsible to the voters, and the unelected (court system, prosecutors/attorneys/legal counsels of governmental bodies, public financed mass media, public financed Academia)—undermined the mechanisms and the motivation for responsible decision-making among both the Left and the Right (Yanosvkiy et al., 2014).

The attempt on the part of the Israeli leftist establishment to reject religious legitimization of the Right to the Land of Israel weakened the position of the Right (who associated themselves with religious values). Local progress made in this direction, apparently contributing to the extended rule of leftist parties in the Knesset and the government after 1967, began increasingly to create problems. In the eyes of the Arab world, giving up religious demands, control of the Temple Mount, the graves of the Patriarchs, and the rest fortified the claims of Arab nationalists and religious fundamentalists to Israel’s land. It also undermined the likelihood of the Arabs willingness to compromise (if the Arabs had ever experienced such a willingness to begin with).

The process seen by the voters as fulfillment of Biblical prophecies raises the likelihood of votes cast in favor of the Right. Correspondingly, a prophecy blocked by a standard type of political decision or political campaign strengthens the Left.

The canonical version of the story casts the growth of settlements exclusively as a development that is exasperating for the Arabs. But a different aspect of the same development should also be taken into account. As the ideologically and religiously motivated Jewish population of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza grew in numbers, its significance for the internal domestic confrontation within Israel grew as well.

If a large part of the core group of one of the great parties in the US were to live in lands being contested with Mexico or Canada, the other party would thereby have a strong reason to show flexibility in negotiating about the affiliation of the lands in question. In summary, following 1977, the interest that the leftist elite had taken in defense and security became blurry and indistinct. Returning to the standard position of “oil rather than cannon,” the Left evinced an interest in returning “to the borders of Auschwitz.” Objectively, they needed some “unsolvable
problem” like the Intifada in order to advance their agenda. The Right did not have enough willpower to take on the risks of a full-scale confrontation with the Left, or to face the uncertainties of transforming the first election’s victory into a revolution leading to a complete alteration in the system of government. To begin with, the revolution would have involved liberating the legal system from leftist control. Given such a system, the Right is incapable of assuming responsibility for defense.

**Symptoms of Weakening in the Israeli Government’s Resolve**

The 1977 elections brought no immediate change in the status quo. More than that, they signaled a more rigid position of Israeli society vis-à-vis terrorists and making concessions to regimes that support terror.

The first indication of a fundamental change in view came with the recognition of the demand for Arab autonomy in the “West Bank” of Jordan as legitimate at Camp David. Next came the treaty with Egypt (exchanging the Sinai Peninsula for “a piece of paper”), including the deportation of the residents of the Jewish settlements.

It seemed the attack against the Iraqi reactor was a new signal of resolve. But note that unlike at the time of the hostage crisis in Uganda in 1976, in this case opposition leader Sh. Peres objected to the anti-Iraqi attack. The objections are easy to explain with a view to the then approaching elections and additional points to be scored by the Likud in case the operation were to prove a success. But in 1976 the unqualified support for the Likud was achieved in a perfectly identical situation: a little more than a year before the latest possible date to be set for elections.

**The Left’s Anti-Military Campaign of 1982**

It is both senseless and dangerous to try to analyze the conflict—along with this particular episode—in light of the interests of two “collective” persons (coalitions) of the Jews and the Arabs, doing it without taking into account either internal Arab or internal Jewish controversies or conflicts of interests. Most studies dealing with the history of the conflict devote far too little

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21 Leftists not bound by responsibility for the entire country—those employed by the state mass media—began searching for such a problem long before 1977. Thus, the Israeli mass media’s view of Israel’s triumph over the Arabs, especially over Egypt in 1973, as almost a defeat of Israel was radically different from both the true state of affairs and the position assumed by the state Egyptian mass media, which are themselves also subject to rigid control. The Egyptian mass media represented Egypt’s military catastrophe as a victory.

22 Timid mentions (including discussions with the participation of today’s President R. Rivlin in an interview published in Haaretz; see the June 5, 2003 magazine supplement) that the Likud produced the first law bills barely a few years ago, even though the Likud leadership itself is blocking the same bills. We mean the bills put forth by Yariv Levin to deprive judges of the block package in the commission for appointing judges, to introduce parliamentary hearings at the time of appointment, bills introduced by other activists to restrict the ability of the Supreme Court to annul laws ratified by the Knesset, and so on.
attention to the struggle for power within Israel itself, ignoring the post-1977 history of the
evolution of the interests of the leftist elite.

Earlier we showed how this evolution led to a drastic change in the stance assumed by
Labor (the mainstream leftist party) in the course of the war in 1982: from supporting government
military effort to directly undermining it (Zatcovetsky et al., 2014).

The First Mass Release of Terrorists

Different types of folks get to go to the front. And in wartime people sometimes are taken
prisoner. The question of liberating prisoners used to be addressed in one of two traditional ways
as long as an unconditional national consensus is obtained that sets defense as a priority. The
first—and the more standard—way was to achieve victory, so that the defeated enemy—or else
the victorious army on its own—would set the prisoners free. The other way—an urgent one and
one resorted to in untypical situations—was to capture bargaining chips, taking prisoners
intentionally a priori for the purpose of exchange. In the well-known case of Operation “Argaz-
3” (Julian, 2014; Ronen, 2014), the emphasis was on the quality of the material. Generally, mass
capture of civilians is a possibility when civilians are relatives of the enemy. The outcomes of
such capture are not always easy to predict; even so, this was the tactic used by the British in the
1900–1902 war against the Boers.23

This is how things used to be done, or this is how they could be done—we stress again—
under conditions of unshakable unity of leadership (including the opposition). In the absence of
such unity, the threat of politicized revenge in case they lose power prevents politicians from
taking the decisive steps necessary (for the consequences of the collapse of the consensus, see
also Zatcovetsky et al., 2014). The absence of a consensus, along with growing pressure from the
opposition aimed at thwarting decisive action by the authorities, lead to decisions of an entirely
different kind. First among these became the mass release of terrorists in exchange for prisoners

It would be naïve to suppose that all these events could have remained unnoticed by the
Arab leaders in general—and by the terrorist leadership in particular. When the US entered
Afghanistan, and later Iraq, proclamations about the limited period of time the troops were going

24 http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2004/Pages/Background%20on%20Israeli%20POWs%20and%20MIAAs.aspx ;
to spend in the area proved to be a powerful motive for attacking the Americans. The plan in both cases was that once the Americans departed, the attackers would be able to ascribe victory to themselves, as well as mobilize forces for a civil war aimed at capturing power. There is a very simple game theory interpretation of behavior of this type: in a multi-move game like “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” one of the players informs the other of his or her readiness to “cooperate” beginning with a certain move, regardless of the moves made by the opponent.

Signals along these lines from the Israeli leadership could not fail to produce the same effect. There was evident unwillingness to annex the Territories, beginning with the Temple Mount and the Cave of Machpelah in 1967, as well as constant proclamations of readiness to exchange land for peace. The negotiations Peres conducted with the King of Jordan in London (spring 1987) were another confirmation of Israel’s readiness to give the Territories away.

In summary, we are now ready to present a proper timeline, which will include the most significant developments.

**Timeline: Prehistory Included**

1. **1967:** Arab control of the Temple Mount and Hebron is restored.
2. **1977–1982:** Alteration of the structure of power in Israel: disappearance of unified responsible leadership and radical change in motives of key political forces.
3. **1979:** Negotiations and accords at Camp David; essential agreement of the Israeli government to an Arab autonomy (although it was autonomy that was under discussion at the time, not a de facto independent state); and Operation “Litani” and cases of court prosecution of military personnel, including prison sentences issued for “unnecessary” killings of terrorists (Eitan, 1991).
4. **Dramatic weakening of the PLO following its sacking in 1982.** The subsequent flight of the organization’s leaders to Tunis, thus enabling the “entry into the market” of new Islamist groups with a view to getting familiar with the means being made available by the sponsors of terror.
5. **1983:** the first mass release of terrorists.
6. **1985:** the Jibril Deal; a new mass terrorist release.
7. **Political signals to the Arabs,** most important among them the previously mentioned refusal to annex the Territories, or the endless delay in doing this. In addition, negotiations between Peres and King Hussein during their “agreement” of April 11, 1987 in
London\textsuperscript{25} (Zittrain and Caplan, 2010: p. 73); other illegal contacts of high-ranking leftists with the PLO; and appointment of civilian mayors.

8. 1987: the Intifada proper. Events in the Balata camp (Balta / בַּלְתָּא) not far from Shechem on May 31, 1987 mark the genuine beginning of the Intifada. The May 31, 1987 refusal to use force (with two battalions ready) and marching the troops away was tantamount to making a present of uncontrolled territory to the leaders of the terrorists (see below on the meaning of control over territory). An instance of success, as stressed by Colonel Y. M. Rot, provoked a wave of imitations. Consider all this in light of the fact that before the incident, the entire region had been simply, smoothly, and uneventfully controlled by two units alone.

Colonel Rot blames failures by counter-intelligence and other special services to evaluate and prevent unrest. Some of the above mentioned authors stressed failure to appreciate the real extent of the Islamist threat on the eve of the events.

9. 1987-89: they are seen as a counterweight to the PLO and proceed legally (Higgins, 2009; Levitt, 2006).

10. By 1990, the disturbances see a downward turn (Beitler, 2004; see also Figures 2 and 3). The decline can be considered the conclusion of the story of the First Intifada. A new player—Hamas—has successfully “entered the market.” The surprise effect has been exhausted. Enthusiasm—as a result of more efficient repression both physical and economic—has breathed its last breath.

11. The events of 1991 and 1992 form two separate narrative sequences; this is due to more than the fact that the initial disturbances were now out of breath. The hopes that the Arabs living in the liberated Territories had entertained of an intervention by a victorious Iraqi army in late 1990–1991 had led to unrest, but not for long. This was a new, but external element, unconnected to the process in the “West Bank.” The disturbances of 1992 were provoked by thoroughly reliable information and the rational expectations that this had dictated. The organizers of the unrest knew about the renewal of contacts with the PLO. Expectations had grown with the victory of the Left in the June 1992 elections and the annulment of penalties for contacts with the PLO that followed immediately thereafter. A further signal came with Rabin’s promise to grant autonomy to the Arabs in the course of the following nine months (Shindler, 2013). This had a bearing on the rivalry between the PLO and Hamas, but both these narratives are clearly distinct and unconnected with the First Intifada—except for the attempt to make history fit the scheme of

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\textsuperscript{25} Although it was actually blocked by Prime Minister Y. Shamir, the very fact of the attempt to finalize a decision to give away land was a strong and clear indication that Israel’s leadership had no will to annex the Territories (see \url{http://israelsdocuments.blogspot.co.il/2012/07/shamir-and-peres-disagree-on-london.html}).
a victorious national uprising, which concluded with the capitulation of the Israeli government in September 1993.

Concerning the Chronology of Events: Key Comments

1. Even the figures of the losses and their comparison with each other alone (the simple fact is that 157 Israelis is a fact that reflects losses among Jewish civilians only; another 66 soldiers also lost their lives) suffice to indicate the extreme uncertainty and hedging of the military authorities; this was taken by the terrorist leaders as an invitation to escalate the violence. For comparison’s sake, consider losses in confrontations in Ukraine in 2014:

   26 According to different sources, the number of protesters killed by mid-April 2014 had reached 106 (official data of the Ministry of Public Health of Ukraine: http://www.moz.gov.ua/ua/portal/pre_20140414_b.html); in addition, 17 employees of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs lost their lives. Even though most of the protesters who died had been victims of shooting, it is obvious that only snipers did the shooting: most of those shot were self-defense activists: http://society.lb.ua/accidents/2014/03/15/256239_poyavilsya_predvaritelny_spisok.html; and nobody tried to gun down crowds of protesters.

   27 Studying the list of the Arabs who died during the last year shows that up to October 7, 2014, out of the 1017 cases examined and included in the verified list, 435 had been fighter members of terrorist groups, or “terrorist operatives,” as the study terminology labels them (Meir Amit Center, 2014).
be left out of the story. Thus, even back at the beginning of the First War in Lebanon, mainstream leftists—the Laborist (the Avodah Party)—were still supporting the government. The first step they had taken that indicated a change of course was participating in the extremist Shalom Achshav demonstration on occasion of the events in Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon (Zatcovetsky et al., 2014). Even during the pre-election campaign of 1992, the Left was deploying accusations that the Likud government was not putting sufficient effort into fighting terrorism. The leftist parties discussed no plans of territorial concessions or leading PLO units into the country in the pre-election campaign of 1992.

3. As borne out by the testimony of Colonel Y. M. Rot (August 24, 2014 interview), compared to the 1950–60s, the 1970s saw the legal status and protection of soldiers and officers deteriorate. This was particularly true for military workers serving in the Territories liberated in 1967 (for purposes of comparison, once again see Zatcovetsky et al., 2014). An interim point—1979 is recorded in R. Eitan’s memoirs—is marked by the case of Lieutenant Pinto et al.: a prison sentence for destroying a terrorist whose body was never recovered. The case was built up exclusively based on a denunciation by a colleague, who himself had been caught looting and marauding (see Eitan, 1991: pp. 202–205). Further considerable deterioration took place once the Intifada had begun. That is once again the risk of criminal prosecution for a soldier or officer fulfilling his assignment in the Territories became noticeably greater.

If in the late 1970s–early 1980s the new tendencies in military justice were still being contained thanks to the military leadership’s common sense, then during the 1987–1990 period this was no longer operative. While making resounding proclamations along the lines of “Break their [i.e., the insurgents’; authors’ note] arms and legs,” which were understood as an order, defense minister Rabin also refused to defend the military personnel executing “orders” of this kind. Finally, receiving no confirmation from Rabin himself, military prosecutor Amnon Strashnov concluded that the words ascribed to Rabin “had no sources in writing.” Rabin, for his part, dissociated himself from the orders he had given in a speech made in the Knesset on July 12, 1990 (Mann, 2001: p. 108). Soldiers and officers doing their duty and protected—as they had thought—by the orders issued by their superiors were in fact abandoned; they were left one-on-

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28 We mean here the massacre staged in PLO camps by the “phalangists,” including the “Damur” brigade, as retribution for destroying the Christian city of Damur in 1976 (Fine, 2008).
29 For instance, for this purpose, use was made of the episode involving the May 24, 1992 murder of Ellen Rapp, an attractive and photogenic young woman (http://laad.btl.gov.il/Web/He/Victims/111.aspx?ID=38206).
31 Clearly meant for the press and ultimately for the Jewish voter.
one with a force both new and openly hostile to the military. This force was the legal “Rule of Law” system (Rot, 2007). This circumstance makes it doubtful that any policy of repression against the Arabs as such could have been in existence.

4. A separate and independent issue: the near demonstrative contempt for the fate of the Arabs who had cooperated with Israel, which was meted out by the persons responsible for suppressing the unrest (Lockman and Benin, 1989). The signal was received and correctly deciphered by the organizers of the unrest; this is borne out by the high level of intra-Arab violence jointly with the demonstratively cruel treatment of the genuine or independently “appointed collaborationists.” Conduct of this kind could not fail to have an impact on the locals’ state of mind, encouraging them to support the terrorists (who were demonstrating the real extent of their control over the region and the ephemeral nature of Israel’s rule by thus making short shrift of anyone not to their liking). Yasser Arafat was well aware of the signal’s significance: this is why he tried to present the practice as a policy subject to his own personal manipulation. The claim was that he had demonstratively and publicly “delegated the authority” to the bandits to rule the regions by meting out retribution as they saw fit.\footnote{PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat defended the killing of Arabs deemed to be “collaborating with Israel.” He delegated the authority to carry out executions to the Intifada leadership. After the murders, the local PLO death squad sent the case file to the PLO. “We have studied the files of those who were executed, and found that only two of the 118 who were executed were innocent,” Arafat said. The innocent victims were declared “martyrs of the Palestinian revolution” by the PLO (Al-Mussawar, January 19, 1990); \url{https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/intifada.html}.}

Even in those cases when the victims are people who did not actually cooperate with Israel, permitting anything of this sort to go unpunished is extremely dangerous. Any making short shrift of culprits under the aegis of dealing with Israeli agents, if unaccompanied by obvious and frightening punishment, has the effect noted above. The terrorists look strong while the authorities look like slouches. Notably, the same stereotyped conduct has been recurring in ever expanding circles, engaged in by the Left ever since the beginning of the “Peace Process.” Compensation for the lucky “Mashtapim” in the guise of real estate in “Smaller Israel” and extra protection by the special services, including immunity from the police in cases of violation of the law does not improve, but further worsens the situation. Compensation of this kind encourages negative selection among the Arabs collaborating with Israel, extending the supporter base for a policy of treason among the Jews (“It would have been better if your own people had finished you off” becomes a typical response among neighbors taking advantage of former workers’ immunity).

5. The leftist leadership took advantage of the by then nearly-exhausted disturbances (Arafat’s loss of sponsorship after supporting Saddam Hussein in 1990–1991) to ground
clandestine, and according to the laws in effect at the time, illegal negotiations with the PLO. The fact confirms the view that active, rather than passive conduct was being engaged in by the Left. The fact of demonstrative illegal contacts and negotiations was on its own sufficient to provoke a new wave of unrest aimed at forcing the other side to agree to considerable concessions.

6. The waves of unrest referred to in the literature as the “First Intifada” are best studied as at least two distinct processes. The first of these was set in motion when the Islamists’ “offer of terror entered the market”; this was seconded by the wavering response of the Israel Defense Forces, programmed to sound an indecisive note. (The Left is not interested in reinforcing control over the Territories, although in the past this enhanced the core asset of the Right—the settlers; the latter were clearly a greater evil than the terrorists from the point of view of the Left as it absolved itself of the responsibility to provide for the country’s defense.) The second process was instigated by the negotiations and the wish (the opportunity) that the FATH had to “win it all back.” A possible motive for the Left in Israel may have been using forces from the outside to deliver a blow to the enemy within—the settlers—who had made up the core and the asset of the rightist electorate.

Gesturing at the impossibility of conduct of this kind on the part of the Left in Israel—based on the moral inadmissibility of such behavior—is refuted by the history of political competition both during the British Mandate years and after independence. Mutual hostility tended to reach an extreme pitch during this period. In most cases this was due to the initiative undertaken by the Left as it attempted to solidify its monopoly on representing the Jews, an arrangement artificially foisted upon the land by the British in the 1920s. The then leader of the Zionists—the “revisionists” (the non-socialists)—Jabotinsky was de facto expelled from the country, and his supporters chased into the underground.35

34 The articles by then-Member of Knesset Yosi Sarid August 17, 1990 and January 31, 1991 (“They Needn’t Look for Me”), both in Haaretz, cited by Mann (1998).
35 Let three simple examples suffice: the first, the case of Arlozorov, involved an attempt at instigating persecution of Jabotinsky’s supporters by accusing them of a murder they were actually innocent of (see e.g., Lebel, 2013). The second is operation “Seasons,” in the course of which the leaders of Mapai not only organized handing over underground Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) activists to the British, but themselves attacked and killed IZL fighters, all in the absence of any kind of retaliation (Lapidot, 1994; Lebel, 2013). The third was a provocation—an attempt to stage a civil war in the face of an approaching Arab attack that threatened to exterminate the Jewish community entirely. We mean the shelling and sinking of the Altalena, part of the episode known as the Altalena Affair. The Mapai broke off talks in which the IZL leader had asked to reserve for “his own” people a modest part of the weapons purchased by supporters of his organization in the US. Without any provocation whatsoever, the Left opened fire, with 19 Jews dying in the confrontation, including 16 IZL fighters. The instances cited by the Left—the 1983 murder of the Peace Now activist Emil Grinzweig and the 1995 murder of Prime Minister Rabin—also in fact reflect the degree of mutual hostility. At the same time, these incidents knowingly weren’t in any way connected with any steps or actions undertaken by the leaders of the Right. The attack mounted against the Right after Rabin’s murder, including an attempt to foist collective responsibility on the Right as a whole, shows that the hostility on the part of the Left in the 1990s was once again (after a certain “cooling off” in 1967–1988) comparable with the mood in the days of the “Seasons” and Altalena. The practice of hate speech initiated by the Left—silencing and demanding that the actual
In concluding this section of the article, a crucial element should be noted: if leaders whose authority subsists based on coercion receive signals of weakness, they will accept and understand these signals in only one way. A coercive leader will unleash violence against those who emit signals of this kind. The same is also true of the “self-restrictions” practiced by the Jews on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem—a situation that continues to incite the Arabs to ever increasing violence against the Jews.

The same is also true of the Caliphate. The leader of a miserable Caliphate defeated by the Americans in 2007 and liberated by Obama (Kazimi, 2008) has taken on the stature of a substantial regional challenge. But the world has received a simple and easy to comprehend signal from him; the signal can be misinterpreted only intentionally. A problem of this magnitude can be solved only by means of a total and humiliating destruction, which would drastically lower the appeal held by this kind of career for future abusive leaders.

Additional Notes: Motives and Outcomes of Choosing a Political Strategy

Control over Territory
Even a brilliant victory which leaves the enemy no illusions loses value if it is unaccompanied by control over territory. This can be illustrated by numerous examples taken from both Israel’s history and the history of opposition to Islamist violence beginning in the 18th century (the pirate states of North Africa). Thus, before Stephen Decatur, most European states preferred to pay tribute to pirates. Following Decatur’s expedition, influenced by the lasting impression that it made on them, they tended to choose to strike. But what put a decisive end to piracy was nothing less than the occupation of land, which came with the French conquest of part of North Africa (London, 2008).

Ostentatious Cruelty
Ostentatious cruelty is nothing new. This is not a story about psychic or mental distress (which is not contagious, and should not affect large groups of people at once).

There are some societies in which authority legitimates itself by achievement. Societies also exist in which the legitimacy of authority is determined by formal procedure (inheritance, elections, etc.). And there are some societies in which authority legitimates itself mainly or standard be made more severe—are all quite a part of the daily goings-on (Hasson Nir, 2013). Cases of inviting and taking advantage of enemies from the without against an internal opponent who is seen as an enemy, are not a rarity in world annals. Sadly enough, they can be found in Jewish history too, long before the beginning of the 20th century.
exclusively by means of successful violence (“Rule of Force”; this is the Arab case; see Rotenberg, 2011). In societies of this last kind, cruelty is about signaling resolve and forceful ability (Kazimi, 2008). Formally, the caliph has the right (if not the duty) to engage in unlimited military expansion. Hence the ostentatious cruelty of the “Caliphate”—ISIS—and the impressive and by now thoroughly universal support it enjoys from Muslims all over the world.

In Rule of Force societies, the populace has no access to objective information about the forces of the competing bandits. In the absence of such information, atrocity can well be associated with successful coercion. There is no way to foresee the future. Better a well-informed bandit leader, one who “can permit” himself extraordinary cruelty and thus, apparently, be certain of his armed force resources’ superiority over his rivals, than a common type or local leader.

**Conclusions**

If the available facts are taken into consideration, the hypothesis becomes significant that the 1987–1990 escalation of violence in the 1967 liberated Territories was in principle due to signals of weakness and lack of resolve emitted by the Israeli state leadership. The signals themselves were an outgrowth of both the crash in the interest taken by the elite (defense and security no longer forming a priority on the state agenda) and intra-political conflicts.

Among the signals: the refusal to annex the Territories, the authorities’ hostility toward attempts to settle Jews in the Territories, the drastic change in the authorities’ attitude to providing safeguards for the military in order to protect them from politicized persecution, and demonstrative indifference toward the fate of loyal Arabs. A strong signal also came in the form of gestures made by leftist politicians who conducted unofficial negotiations (at times violating official prohibitions). This list can be easily continued.

The idea that the escalation was fueled by rivalry among sharply weakened PLO factions or “leftist” nationalist terrorists and the Islamists gradually gaining power is a reasonable assumption; we endorse it, as do most other authors.

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36 Kazimi notes the unusual ferocity of the jihadists of the days of the first and “forgotten” edition of the “Caliphate” with Zarqawi at the head, and then, once this last had been disposed of, the “Caliphate” headed by al-Baghdadi. The Americans sacked that first Caliphate, its “caliph” doing time for a while in Guantanamo, from which he was freed by President Barack Obama (Daly, 2014).

The concept of the al-taifah al-mansurah (Victorious Faction) is an important one for the jihadists, and has been enthusiastically adopted by those waging jihad in Iraq. The notion that one belongs to a faction negates the Sunni doctrine of jamaa since it is dismissive of majorities and the process of consensus. It could explain the willingness shown by jihadists in Iraq to commit brutal atrocities since they are more interested in being right than in being popular.
Most of the challenges Israel faces in its struggle against terrorism seem to us to have little to do with failures of different kinds of special services. Fiascoes at various stages are most likely inevitable. The leading cause of the problem is rather the politicians’ recurrent failure to choose a strategy. Any transfer of territory to terrorists encourages and spurs them on to further activism. Returning land provides them with an obvious confirmation of success and victory, something no less important than a starting point for mounting future attacks in the effort to mobilize cash.

Taking indecisive or hedging measures against terrorism, especially when accompanied by proclaimed deadlines, yields returns that quickly melt away. Seen in a long-term perspective, these measures can rather stimulate terrorism than put an end to it, considering that they provide a marvelous opportunity to proclaim yet another victory after the conclusion of an anti-terrorism operation when the military on the anti-terrorist side restores terrorist control over the territories it has supposedly taken. In such a situation, sacking the terrorist organization may provoke a takeover by a crew even more radical both in rhetoric and in the steps it demonstratively takes (by committing atrocities).

Any leader whose authority is grounded in violence will interpret an indication of weakness as an invitation to escalate the violence. There comes a stage when a problem of this kind can be resolved only by means of total annihilation of both the leader and his active supporters. This was what happened to the Nazis. The same is obviously required at the present time as far as the Caliphate is concerned.

The magnitude of the events of 1987–1990 does nothing to explain the leadership’s refusal to come up with a strategy for fighting terrorism in favor of choosing a strategy of pacification instead. Most of the steps taken by the Israeli leadership in the course of the conflict cannot be adequately explained without taking into account the struggle for power and the evolution of the leftist elite’s interests after their loss of the monopoly of power in 1977—along with their loss of motives for defending the country or the security of its citizens. Citizen security saw a drastic drop in the priority status it had formerly enjoyed as a state objective. This came in the wake of the disintegration of mechanisms of responsibility and the interest taken by the authorities in providing security.

The Oslo Accords were in no way dictated by the First Intifada; even so, the Intifada is used extensively as a means of Oslo legitimatization. In actuality, one and the same process and one and the same political choice led to both the Oslo Accords and the terror boom.

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Appendix: Some Additional Causes of the Intifada and Extended Duration of the Unrest

The Principal Hypotheses under Consideration about the Causes of the Intifada

We have described a model of spontaneous or organized protest of the Arab population of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza against oppression; testing this explanation (about the hardship of occupation) forms the principal focus of the present appendix devoted to the dynamics of the well-being of the Arab populace. We should also add that the Intifada dramatically worsened the predicament of the Arabs in terms of their freedom of movement. Prior to the Intifada, Arabs from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza were entirely free to travel throughout the State of Israel, without any restrictions.

A distinction needs to be drawn between causes accounting for the behavior of the organizers of the disturbances and those causes of the Intifada that cannot be reduced to the terror organizers’ reactions to signals of the authorities’ weakness. This is the only way to appreciate the relative significance of factors that are naturally qualitatively different from each other. We will devote our attention primarily to the economic factor (the “oppression” component) and the factor of the mistakes made by the Israeli leadership, which proved unable to predict the disturbances or to respond to them in an appropriate manner.

Intifada and the Well-being of the Arabs

The return of the Jews led to an economic boom of sorts in Palestine. A mass Arab influx followed beginning in the late 19th century (Population – Mitchell). But this did not prevent the Arabs from ferociously attacking the Jews from time to time, foregoing their own well-being in favor of a bid for dominant community status.
The connection between a high Jewish population, the institutions supported by Jewish communities, and tradition on the one hand, and the guarantees of the life of property owners and private property on the other, were probably quite obvious to rational Arabs, and especially to their leaders. Yet the domination of alien institutions automatically implied giving up the opportunity to dictate one’s preferences and arbitrarily confiscate the property of the subordinate dhimmi community. This makes the pendulum swing from peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence to untrammeled aggression and pogroms thoroughly explainable in a rational way.

It bears stressing that in the absence of a tradition of self-government or any form of democracy among the Arabs, the motives dictating the actions of the leaders become much more significant than those of the rest of the population. Uprisings and pogroms caused levels of well-being among the Arabs under the British Mandate to drop (Arnon and Gottlieb, 1993). The same was true at later comparable moments of intensified conflict (the “Second Intifada,” the confrontation with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza, as well as with the Fath in Judea and Samaria from 2008 to the present time).

An exact totaling of losses is objectively problematic, insofar as every case of intensification of the conflict dramatically lowered the likelihood of collecting quality data (Arnon and Gottlieb, 1993). Basing our conclusions on the data provided by the World Bank, which shows a series of observations in fixed prices beginning in 1994, we have (see Figure 5):

![West Bank per Capita GDP](image)

**Figure 5.** Dynamics of the per capita gross product in the so-called “West Bank.” Taken from the World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2014.

The Second Intifada led to more than a one-third drop in per capita GDP in the “West Bank.” The chief component of the Arabs’ well-being consists of the well-being of the Jewish
community and the opportunity to integrate and take advantage of those institutions that protect property. By 2000, Israel’s GDP had grown by nearly 80% in comparison with 1987 ($114 billion in 1999–2000 versus $65 billion in 1987).

Yet the opportunity to enter Israel’s job market, as well as opportunities for Arabs to take advantage of Israel’s institutions to improve their own predicament, was incomparably higher prior to the First Intifada (Beitler, 2004: pp. 1–2; “Open Bridge Policy,” p. 55). The Arabs’ predicament drastically worsened with the forced rejection of the “Open Bridge,” which came with the frequent need to close off access for the Arab labor force beginning in 2000 (Valdiviseo et al., 2001). Up to 1988, there had been practically no restrictions on the freedom of movement throughout Israeli territory for Arabs living in Judea and Samaria. This means that the blow delivered against the Arabs’ well-being by the First Intifada was probably greater than the one they had been dealt in 2000–2002 (Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator, 2002).

Work opportunities and protection of personal and property rights were quite solid prior to the eruption of the disturbances, and tended to improve over the long term. The memory of the situation under Jordanian rule could not have been utterly obliterated in the course of 20 years, so the contrast must have been obvious.

In light of the information provided above, arguments about the privations and humiliations suffered by the Arabs as the cause of unrest do not appear convincing.

“Technical” Failures as an Explanation of the First Intifada

The bulk of the organizational responsibility for the failures rests with the extremely politicized military unambiguously affiliated with the Left: Amram Mitzna and Ephraim Sneh. The political responsibility is shared, along with Peres and Rabin (the leftist leaders), by the leaders of the Right, including Shamir. It should, however, be noted that surprising as the outbreak of the Intifada must have been for the leadership as a whole, it is a reasonable supposition that had the information about the brewing mass disturbances come into the hands of the then military leadership affiliated with leftist parties, they would have had no real incentive to act upon it or to treat it as something particularly deserving of attention.

The failure to appreciate the Islamist danger as such is obvious (the danger of political Islamism after the 1979 establishment of the Khomeini dictatorship in Iran and Sadat’s murder in 1981 could not be ignored). But the magnitude of the failure should also not be exaggerated. The USSR and its clients from among those terrorist organizations that had a “work record” incomparable with the Islamists by 1987 were naturally seen as a greater threat than Iran or the Egyptian branch of the “Muslim Brothers.” The way of annexation and mass construction along
with Jewish settlement was not closed off in either 1987 or 1989. Annexation and Jewish settlement would have proven the elements stimulating Arab emigration, beginning with the younger generation, and undermining the positions of any extremist groups among the Arabs, especially those assuming responsibility for the terror immediately preceding annexation. This in itself would have constituted a clear sign of the defeat of the Intifada.