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Democracy: a Conflict Extinguisher or a Fuel for Terror?

Today's exaggerated, deferent focus on democracy (the ability of voters by means of elections to change the government, to cause power rotation) has led to some overvaluations of the institutions associated with this type of government and their ability to cure society of all ills.
Thus, some people recommend resolving acute violent conflicts (civil wars) by holding free elections. The present article studies two instances when attempts were made to entrench free elections in the absence of institutions formed in advance to protect persons and property. We have shown that in situations of violent conflict free elections may improve the position of the violence perpetrators – the roving bandits – at the cost of worsening the predicament of the population whom the bandits control. The instances considered lead to the question of the possibility in principle of constructing an effective democratic mechanism in the absence of minimal guarantees provided in advance to protect the lives and property of the voters.

A Universal Medicine?

Democracy is an excellent piece of machinery, which should be constructed and put to use in countries where traditions of the appropriate kind are at present still lacking. Yet, sadly enough, democracy is no panacea for all ills. Besides, in a number of acute social disorders, applying democratic procedure without grounding for the authority of the law and legal order can lead to an intensification of the illness. This is the main thrust of the argument which we will try to defend in the article we put forth for your consideration below.

This thought should have seemed obvious, if it were not for the opposite kind of thinking which had swept over the countries setting the tone in the economic and social disciplines; first and foremost, the US. Thus, upon reading *In Defense of Democracy*, the book by the politician and human rights activist Natan Scharansky, the "conservative" President George Bush referred to it in grounding support for democratic experimenting in Afghanistan and in Iraq. His leftist opponents attacked him fiercely for resorting to violent methods at the experiments' outset. Even so, American leftist "liberals" do not just completely endorse the goals enunciated by the President; they also suspected the Republican administration of insincerity and resourceful iffy-ness in its "pro-democratic" plan. A general consensus emerged, which remains inviolate even for those authors who can clearly see the threats and risks involved in forced democratization (*The Economist*, Sept. 2004).

Something thoroughly typical in this setting – a setting not quite conducive to serene academic discussion – is the recommendation put forth by Francis Castles on the cover of the well-known book by A. Przevorrski et al., *Democracy and Development*. The Australian professor congratulates the book's readers with the publication of our generation's best apology for democracy. In his view, the authors have convincingly shown that democracy outplays authoritarianism both in humanitarian and in economic terms. The problem is that the authors themselves find no proof of this kind in the data they have collected. Castles' mistake is in vividly replicating what is by now not simply intellectual fashion, but public mindset concerning an issue on the verge of turning into prejudice.

But Przevorski et al. actually reach the same conclusion as most of the other economists who have studied this problem (cf. W. Wu and O. Davis 1999). According to Wu and Davis, democracy is a factor neutral vis-à-vis economic growth, or even a luxury of sorts and a bonus good (Cooter 2000 on the freedom of speech) which a wealthy nation can afford. The distinctive element in Przevorski is in that he notes somewhat higher growth rates in the authoritarian countries during some time periods, with lower levels of stability of these rates than in the democratic states.

Some researchers (Barro 1999) acknowledge, with various reservations, that democratic institutions have a positive impact on state economic growth. Yet overall, Barro bases his analysis on the view of the origins of democracy in Lipset (1994), who hypothesized that Democracy is caused and supported by sustainable economic development and political and cultural maturity.

Few are the authors (Olson 2000) who are certain that given specific conditions, democratic institutions become a sine qua non for making the transition to long term economic growth. True enough, the Nobel Prize winner A. Sen (2000) took a clear stance on the issue, yet his understanding of rights and freedoms is in some instances not fully compatible with either the classical interpretations of John Locke and Adam Smith,[2] or the possibility of giving an economic interpretation in light of the influence of the institutions he describes on market agents' motivation.

Cases by country are also to be found in the literature, with in-depth analysis of problems connected with making the transition from civil war to relatively peaceful existence.

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[2] These can be reduced to freedom (as a combination of the right to life, immunity of the individual person with corresponding guarantees of independent courts and the like, including immunity of the individual person of the dissenter and the heretic, in accord with notions of freedom of speech and press) and private property. Contemporary leftist intellectuals unambiguously propose replacing this compact set with an open list of contradictory demands regularly specified anew; these reduce to the call for multiplying the privileges for those groups which had previously been denied them. A. Sen's position is closer to the new interpretation given by the leftists, while M. Olson's is more reminiscent of the classical stance.

Thus, Autesserre (2009) mainly addresses issues of local violence and local agenda to explain instances of appeasement failure.

Problems of civil war are considered in the study done by a group of World Bank experts (WB 2003); the study is devoted to analyzing factors which increase civil war probability.[3] Poverty is first and foremost among the items prominent on the list; it is followed by a number of geographic features which make it enticing to bid for the secession of a particular province if it is rich in resources. But the authors do not devote any detailed attention to the issue of the fundamental reasons for poverty as such; they see no direct connection between violence and the likelihood of civil war, even though violence constitutes the principal means of legitimating authority in poor countries.

Others also indicate poverty among the reasons for civil war (Besley and Persson 2009), along with the opportunity to subject a province rich in natural resources to one's control (Ross 2004; WB 2003). At the same time, Besley and Persson (2009) also stress the function of a parliamentary democratic regime. In their view, it negatively correlates with the likelihood of civil war and repression. But the study provides no description of the "parliamentary democracy" variable. There is thus no way to know whether the authors used any means of measuring the stability of democratic regimes (duration, or specific minimum number of instances of peaceful power rotation as a result of elections) or not. Without such a measure, the result obtained seems of little use in grounding a causal connection between democracy and peace in the land. The study leaves the question unresolved as to whether democracy ensures peace or peace raises the likelihood of democratic stability, or whether both factors are perhaps the consequence due to some third element or elements.

Scully (1997) suggested that the rational dictator could resort to mass murder to ensure staying in power and to prevent challenges to his authority, provided that human life is sufficiently cheap. Clearly, the problem of the cheapness of human life (low cost of murdering people by bandits or dictators) is not solved by holding elections (see the examples below).

Politicians take an interest in the approach which explains civil wars by poverty. The interest which these politicians – especially the supporters of "the Greater State," which provides for ever expanding circles of persons from cradle to grave – take in interpreting terrorism and civil wars as a consequence of poverty is quite understandable. This is a good reason to insist on generous economic aid programs for backward countries. Programs of this kind ensure growth of the number of personnel and of officials' capacities (Niskanen 1971). Moreover, unlike internal

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[3] World Bank 2003.

spending in democratic countries, these programs remain perfectly nontransparent.[4] Programs of this kind lead to unsound motivating factors and fail to provide effective aid for those in need, making harmful institutions permanent (Coyne 2013).

It is all the more important to note the absence of a reliable statistical connection between poverty and the likelihood of a country's sliding into civil war. More precisely, such a connection is in fact extant, but it needs to be explained – like the wars themselves – by something else. The point is demonstrated in the study by Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2010). When historical variables such as European settler mortality rates and population density c. 1500 are included in civil war regressions, poverty loses the effect on civil wars which has been ascribed to it.

Understandably, these variables make it possible to distinguish European political cultures from others, and European (i.e., mostly of countries with colonial empires) institutions from non-European ones (with all due consideration given to the differences between the British and the Spanish institutions; see North).

In other words, these variables distinguish the countries whose institutions make human life "dear" from the general mass of countries where human life – and all the more so property – have "a low price."[5] Overall, we agree with the authors who conclude by saying: "We suggest that historical variables, which determine both the path to economic prosperity and to peace, are the reason."

The connecting bridge between protection for the life of the property owner and the level of economic development is shown in the study by Shulgin and Yanovskiy (2013). The study demonstrates the significant impact of institutions which ensure basic rights[6] on economic growth rates in the long term (180 years).

The present study attempts to focus on the universal-type reasons for recurrent violence. We hope to deepen our understanding of the connection between the stability of a democratic regime and opportunities for economic growth.

The study is an attempt to illustrate and to explain some connections between poverty, institutions, and political instability.

In Defense of Democracy

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[4] Also partly understandable is the (moral) interest of benefactors who are more concerned about "atoning for the sin of success" before the "liberal" establishment than about aid programs' results (Kluger 2014); see http://time.com/1381/bill-gates-talks-to-time-about-the-three-myths-of-global-aid/ .

[5] See also Yanovskiy and Zhavoronkov 2013.

[6] These are taken to refer to life, liberty (including protection from arbitrary arrest), and property.

Well-known instances of effectiveness of the democratic mechanism are based on the mutual complementarity of basic rights and democratic institutions. It is clear that no political competition (something without which democracy quickly degenerates into an effigy) can be sustained in the absence of freedom of speech and the mass media. The stability of the freedom of speech needs a foundation consisting of a media market with free competition and reliable safeguards for private property. The independence of the courts protects both private property and freedom of speech and voters' and candidates' rights. At the same time, political competition is a powerful restraint on state arbitrariness and the opportunities a state has for exerting pressure – for instance, pressure on independent courts. The wish of the opposition leaders to become leaders of the government camp raises their vigilance, providing newspapermen with a nonstop source of information, and occasionally protection. Even the apparent archaism of the American freedom to bear arms is in reality nothing but the last line of defense of the personal immunity of the individual and of private property.[7] Mass repression is thus incompatible with this "noxious" right.

Citizens raised in such a system, with all their due criticism of it, also understand the enormous opportunities it opens before them. They can decide not to take part in elections (for instance, because they assume that their votes will not have any impact). But, should they make the decision to go to the voting booths, they will know why they came there and will usually conduct themselves accordingly. They know or else they remember that "universal suffrage" democracy is an outgrowth of the democracy of the taxpayer. Taxes and the question of how best to collect and to spend them, as well as how to define and delimit rights, are the issues and the general "public concern" (res publica), which they resolve during elections.

In backward countries, voters cannot remember the democracy of the taxpayer; it was never in existence in their land. These countries' voters have no positive democratic experience either of their own or of their forebears. But as we will demonstrate below, this is far from being the greatest problem.

So we entertain no doubt as to the effectiveness of the democracy of the armed taxpayer. However, we cannot ignore the fact that in most cases the attempt to transfer – but without at the same time confirming basic individual rights – institutions of elections, president, or parliament from Europe and North America to Africa, Asia, and – for a long time – even Latin America, has led to failure. This is not to say that there are no more or less happy instances (such as India), but the sheer number of the failures provides food for thought.

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[7] So long as a free person freely holds a weapon in hand, trying to arrest him or her, depriving him or her of liberty or property without due process of law, is a risky business. A. I. Solzhenitsyn wrote in his *Archipelago* that civil mass resistance would inevitably slow down the work of the machinery of repression. This is to say nothing of armed resistance.

The case of India differs from most countries with weak economies and unstable democracies in the following respect. After the Sepoy Mutiny (1857-58[8]) was put down, Great Britain made fundamental changes in the system of the country's government. Prior to the uprising, the British relied on traditional institutions with a modest superimposed mechanism: фт imported governor and his apparatus, the East India Company. The outsourcing system was effective in its way. It minimized the metropolitan expenses. After the uprising, India formally became a crown colony. More or less systematically, the British began to transfer their political institutions to India, from the free press to the independent courts.

Democratic institutions (elections) as such began to be introduced later on. The free press and independent (albeit corrupt) courts were apparently what created the conditions conducive to defending basic individual rights, on the one hand, and sustaining stable political competition with repeated peaceful transfers of power as based on election results, on the other.

The issue of political (primarily inter-confessional) violence remains quite acute. Even so, progress as compared with pre-colonial times would be evident, even if we were to leave aside the ability of voters to change the government by means of elections.

The process is in full swing: principles of the democracy of the taxpayer sinking into oblivion to the accompaniment of the borrowing of institutions – but not of those which made the West free and wealthy, but of modern ones, which have not yet demonstrated their efficacy (Friedman 1992). It is precisely the wisdom of this process, which in backward countries is already taking on the vivid, ugly features of "non-liberal democracy" (F. Zakaria 1997) that makes us doubtful.

In this respect we are in perfect agreement with N. Scharansky, who is certain that democracy must not be either hurried, nor delayed[9] and that society's forces founded on authority (the Rule of Force; see Yanovskiy et al. 2005) must be the object of both aid and pressure. They should not be given their carrots (see Thatcher 2003 on aid to the "Third World," as opposed to Brandt 1980) without due use of the stick.

On the Methodology of the Research

The methodology of the study is based on data collected for projects dealing with the political economics of terrorism (statistics of victims, conflicts, voting statistics, qualitative descriptions of cases).

Insofar as the view being argued against claims that "Democracy is, in essence, an effective means of peaceful conflict resolution, which lowers the level of violence," strictly

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[8] http://www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armycampaigns/indiancampaigns/mutiny/mutiny.htm
[9] Democratic experience will never begin to accumulate if this is not adhered to.

speaking, finding a single counter example will suffice to refute it. The present article therefore emphasizes describing two particular situations. In addition, it introduces a game model of a situation showing the players' motivating factors when the attempt is made to resolve an armed conflict by means of elections but without previously establishing law and order with guarantees for basic rights.

Arabian Autonomy ("Palestinean")

In 1994, Israel's leftist government bestowed on Fatah (Yasser Arafat's organization) the territories on the West Bank of Jordan and in the Gaza Strip along with the population living in them, as well as arms. Fatah had a "ready" army, imported from Tunis, and enjoyed the support of the international community, including the US and the EU. Fatah and Yasser Arafat personally received international aid (including deposits made to Arafat's personal bank account; Scharansky and Dermer 2006). Aid from the oil monarchies was restored, after being interrupted due to the PLO's support of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. "Refugee" camps and the Gaza Strip with its economically least well adapted population emerged as Fatah strongholds ("Fatahland"; at the same time, the Arab population of Judea and Samaria disliked the new authorities as "aliens from Gaza"[10]).

Elections to the "Parliament" have taken place only twice, in 1996 and 2006. The Hamas boycotted the elections in 1996, and Fatah got 70.45% of the vote, or formally 62 of the 88 seats (with the so called "independents" in many cases also being connected with Fatah). Arafat's "presidential elections" took place at the same time.

Appreciating the portent of the situation, the Hamas and other groups began to seek sponsors (such as Iran or Saudi Arabia) for terrorism; for a long time they continued to lead in this "champions' race" (see Ill. 1). Leading in this race allows the Hamas to shorten the gap of lagging behind in various vital respects. The conviction – up to 2000 – entertained by Fatah and by Arafat himself that their position is unshakable allowed them to ignore the competition and to spend the monies obtained from foreign donors for their own enrichment.

As Ill. 1 shows, the HAMAS was well ahead of the others in "supplying terrorist attacks" up to 2004. At this time, two key leaders – Ahmed Yassin and Abdul Aziz Rantizi – and many field commanders were done away with by the Israel Defense Forces. But these substantial losses did not prevent the HAMAS leadership from going on with internal terrorism, allowing them to solidify their reputation as the "tough guys." The best known move made by the

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[10] As far back as 2002, the Hamas was the dominating authority in the Gaza Strip. There were documented instances of those suspected of maintaining ties with Israel being turned over to the "people's court" – immediate punishment – when demanded by the "opposition."

HAMAS against Fatah came with the September 7, 2005, murder of Musa Arafat, Yasser Arafat's relative and "President" Abbas' counselor. The Fatah found itself unable to meet the challenge, and lost the respect with which it had previously been regarded by a large part of the population.

Ill. 1. Terrorists' Race: Israeli Citizens as Victims (Civilians Only)

Municipal elections took place a number of times between 1996 and 2006, but this is of no avail in making exact comparisons, even though the numbers do bring out the increasing ability of the HAMAS. Thus, the HAMAS won in the elections to 7 of the 24 local councils on Dec. 24, 2004, and to 28 of the 84 councils on May 7, 2005. But a noteworthy report is available concerning the December 2004 elections: according to information provided by the "Palestinian" electoral commission, 70% of the votes were cast for Fatah candidates (*Haaretz* Dec. 24, 2004). In January 2005, Fatah managed to "show" a half-million-strong support for Mahmud Abbas in the "presidential elections" (100,000 votes more than half-a-year later). That is, up until this time, Fatah support remained practically unchanged. ***The drop in Fatah popularity in 2005 thus coincided with the significant drop in violence against opponents (see Ill. 2).*** Thus, as per the survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion,[11] 45.6% intended to vote for Fatah in the parliamentary elections on December 26, 2004, and 13.0% for the HAMAS. Two days before this date, the HAMAS crushed Fatah in local elections. This makes the gap between

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[11] See http://imra.org.il/story.php3?id=23391

preferences and voter conduct obvious. At the same time, it is most rational to cast one's vote not in accord with one's convictions, but for the strongest bandit.

In villages, the residents are enclosed within a protective structure, the "Hamullah," and can be less apprehensive of the bandits' revenge. Even so, heads of families prefer to avoid getting into squabbles with the authorities (that is, prior to January 25, 2006, Fatah). In voting in 104 villages in September 2005, local heads of families won in 40 villages and Fatah in 51, with the HAMAS winning in only 13.

Urban inhabitants are much more dependent on the bandits. This is why practically everybody votes for the HAMAS in the towns (the Christian population of Ramallah forms an exception; the city's residents simply do not so much as hope to be spared by the HAMAS).

Acts of Violence Perpetrated against Each Other by Hamas and Fatah (articles in *Haaretz*, mentions of %)

Ill. 2. The Dynamics of Internal Violence

Following elections, Fatah-HAMAS relations entered the phase of open armed conflict, interspersed with negotiations and "reconciliations." The mutual opposition in mid-2007 led to Fatah's completely losing control over the Gaza Strip; Fatah fighters and functionary officials were partly annihilated and partly deported to Judea and Samaria.

2009 saw the end of the term of Mahmud Abbas' authorized capacity. Abbas nonetheless did not risk holding new "presidential elections," but simply continued to remain in the position he had previously occupied. The 2009 parliamentary elections were also cancelled.

Commotion and general unrest sweeping over the Arab world beginning in December 2010 (the "Arab Spring") made themselves felt in the Palestinian Authority, as well. Trying to lessen their intensity, in March 2011 Abbas reported that "municipal elections would be organized as soon as possible." The elections really did take place – in October 2012. They were held only in Judea and Samaria, with the HAMAS taking no part. But in three large cities – Nablus, Ramallah, and Jenin – the winners were politicians who had demonstratively left Fatah and run as independent candidates against their former organization's henchmen. Fatah had proved incapable of eliminating its rivals either prior to or following the elections.

At the present time the Fatah retains its influential status in those regions where the Israel Defense Forces takes active measures in the struggle against terrorism (Judea and Samaria); it has lost it entirely in the Gaza Strip, which had originally been seen as Fatah's "patrimonial fief" (see above).

Chechnya

Table 1. "Election" Results, 1991-2005

	October 1991	December 1995	January 1997	October 2003	August 2004	November 2005
Votes registered in support of the federalists, %	0	95	0	100	100	100
Federalist control over the territory, dummy	0	1	0	1	1	1
Votes for the separatists, %	100	0	100	0	0	0
Separatist control over territory, dummy	1	0	1	0	0	0
Turnout	72	68	72	87	85	70
"Official" candidate's results, %	90,1	95	59,3	80	73,7	60

On September 6, 1991, Dzhohar Dudaev's supporters stormed the building of the Supreme Soviet in Grozny. On October 27, 1991, the new authorities held elections for President and Parliament in the self-proclaimed state of Ichkeria. Dudaev was elected President of the Chechen Republic, with 90.1% of the vote.[12] 72% of the voters took part in

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[12] Dzhohar Dudaev was killed by federal troops on April 22, 1996.

the elections. Dzhohar Dudaev's contending rivals were Ramazan Gaytemirov, assistant professor at the Grozny University, and Mamaka Sulaev, head agronomist of the "Assinovskiy" state farm. There had been practically no election campaign conducted, and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR proclaimed the elections illegal.

Ichkeria's Constitution was copied, practically in toto, from the Russian; it proclaimed Ichkeria a secular democratic state with separation of powers, a Parliament, and a Constitutional Court. Yet the foundations for the future government were laid not by this document, but by appointments of criminals to leading positions in Dudaev's cabinet (Kh. Gelaev, Kh. Nukhaev, M. Udugov, S. Raduev, R. Labazanov[13]), men who had previously been sentenced for severe crimes (robbery, rape, murder); this was accompanied by the setting free of prison inmates and the beginning of repressions against the non-Chechen populace.

On June 6, 1993, acting against the Constitution, Dzhohar Dudaev dissolved the Parliament and the Constitutional Court. No new elections were announced. That is, Dudaev had usurped power even prior to the outbreak of war in December 1994. In 1995, some "soviet of the elders of Ichkeria" proclaimed the post of President hereditary. Dudaev's in-law Raduev later grounded his claim to power on this proclamation.

Fall 1995 saw the pro-Russian Chechen administration conduct the election of **Doku Zavgaev** as Head of the Chechen government. 87.6% of the voters took part in the elections. According to different sources, Doku Zabraev got between 60 and 95% of the vote. His rival contenders were M. Aduev, editor of the World Democratic Union newspaper, and L. Saligov, chairman of the committee for issues of press, publishing, and the printing industry in Chechnya. In August 1996, after the takeover of Grozny by separatist forces, Zavgaev left Chechnya.

Also in June 1996, the pro-Russian Chechen administration held "elections" for the two-house people's assembly, which then, however, discontinued its functions in August 1996. This came after Grozny had been seized and the federal troops in it routed, with government of the Republic virtually returning into the separatists' hands, while most of the elected delegates left Chechnya.

In January-February 1997, presidential and parliamentary elections were once again held in Ichkeria. Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of General Staff of Ichkeria, was elected President of Chechnya on January 27, 1997. 72.2% of the voters took part in the elections. A. Maskhadov amassed 59.3% of the vote. His leading rivals Shamil Basaev and Acting

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[13] "Minister of Defense," "Vice-Prime Minister," "Minister of the Press," mayor of Gudermes, and head of Dudaev's guard, respectively.

President of Ichkeria, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, garnered 23.5% and 10.1% of the vote, respectively; the other ten candidates (Movladi Udugov and Akhmed Zakaev among them) received less than 1%.[14] The low results amassed by Dudaev's formal successor had to do with that the former children's writer had no armed forces subject to his control. The Kremlin saw Maskhadov as the party to negotiate with – it was with him that the Khasavyurt Accords were signed concerning the departure of troops from Chechnya, as well as the subsequent economic agreements concerning payment of pensions on Chechen territory and payment for the transfer of petroleum from Baku. (Basaev had enjoyed no lesser a degree of military influence, but could not guarantee the arrival of the Russian monies.) Even so, half-a-year after the elections, Maskhadov had no alternative but to appoint Basaev "Prime Minister."

Approximately 50 members made up the Parliament. Only two of them could be said to have been known as influential field commanders: Speaker Ruslan Alikhadzhiev and Aslambek Abdulkhadzhiev.

Despite the efforts made by A. Maskhadov's government, real authority locally was still in the hands of the field commanders, most of whom had no intention of disarming or submitting to government orders. In practically every region of the Republic, fighters' units had maintained their setup: staff headquarters, military bases, security services, prisons, and "jaammats." They did not see the war as being over, and were at any moment ready to take up combat operations and terrorist attacks. The strongest field commander at this time was Raduev, who openly refused to acknowledge the authority of the President. The greatest of the bandits and slave traders became officials: V. Arsanov became "Vice-President," B. Bakuev was "Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs," and so on.

Maskhadov had to maneuver between the interests of the various groups, maintaining a mere semblance of Chechen unity. But any substantial state building or reconstruction of the economy in the Republic was something beyond his organizing capability. Economically, Chechnya's existence was provided for exclusively by the virtually open borders with Russia and Russian electricity and energy supplies.

Large-scale armed conflicts erupted in Grozny and in Gudermes in the summer of 1998; an attempt was made on Maskhadov's life. By fall 1998, the anti-Maskhadov group consisted of the retired Sh. Basaev, S. Raduev, Arbi Baraev Akhmadov, and other influential bandits.

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[14] After the beginning of the counter-terrorist operation in August 1999, Aslan Maskhadov, with whom the federal center had broken off relations, went underground and united with the terrorists (Sh. Basaev et al.); he was killed by federal troops in 2005.

In an attempt to take over the initiative, in February 1999, Maskhadov himself proclaimed the introduction of "Sharia" law. By March 1999, a number of "shuras"[15] had emerged in Chechnya, organized about themselves by A. Maskhadov, Sh. Basaev, and V. Arsanov; yet another "shura" was formed by the parliament. Each one naturally considered itself the leader; all of them – with the exception of the shura clustered about Maskhadov – denied Maskhadov's authority.

In late July 1999, Chechen leaders made a number of pronouncements to Russia, expecting the Sharia court to sentence two hundred Russian politicians to death by firing squad; they also anticipated beginning to deliver preventive strikes against Russian targets. In early August, threats to use military force were put in effect with the invasion of Dagestan; following this, the Russian government no longer saw itself as required to pursue peaceful reconciliation by negotiating with parties involved in armed invasion and organization of terrorist attacks. The invasion was repulsed, and Russia in turn led its troops into Chechnya, proclaiming the deposition of Maskhadov and dissolution of all the "shuras." As they carried on their resistance, the terrorists, for their part, continued to use their 1997 titles, associated themselves with some hierarchy of "amirs," or else combined these two lines into a sort of "State Committee on Defense – the Madjlisulshura," depending on the situation.

Some of the separatist leaders, headed by the Chechen Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov (Ruslan Yamadaev, Sultan Satuev, Musa Doshukaev, Ibrahim Khultygov, et al.) switched to the Russian authorities' side. In the fall of 2000, Kadyrov was by order of Vladimir Putin appointed "Head of the Chechen Republic's Administration." By 2003 he had acquired the right to sign financial documents and make personnel appointments throughout Chechen territory. An authoritarian regime emerged, based on Russian troops, on the one hand, and on native armed units, on the other.

Presidential elections were scheduled for 2003 in Chechnya, with Akhmat Kadyrov due to become the leading candidate for the highest position. Shortly before the elections for Chechen President in 2003, came an announcement to the effect that a quorum had assembled, made up of surviving members of the last Parliament of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, who allegedly accepted the decision concerning Maskhadov's impeachment. Isa Temirov was the leader of the assembled Members of Parliament. In reality, confirmation was received from fewer than 10 Members of the "Ichkerian Parliament."

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[15] According to the Chechen terrorists' own "theological" research and findings, a "shura" is an agency of management of the highest order (and sometimes the highest court agency) in a fundamentalist Islamic state; it is composed by no clearly identifiable party as based on a non-transparent foundation consisting of theologians and "authoritative persons."

As later became evident, Kadyrov was not inspired by the likelihood of having to engage in honest competition with a substantial rival of his patrons. The greatest danger was associated with the possible candidacy of the member of the State Duma, Colonel-General of the Police, A. Aslakhanov, who made no attempt to conceal his disapproval of Kadyrov's harshly repressive regime. A federalist, Aslakhanov nonetheless considered peace negotiations with the separatist President Maskhadov possible.

In case these candidates were not available, part of the population could also vote for others – for instance, for the Moscow Chechen businessmen Khussein Djabrailov and Malik Saidulaev.

On September 2, 2003, Djabrailov made a statement to proclaim that he was removing his name from the candidate lists. A few days before the beginning of the election campaign, he was invited to the Kremlin, where he was informed that "in the upcoming elections, Moscow will support the incumbent Head of the Republic, Akhmat Kadyrov." Kh. Djabrailov enjoyed the support of the Chechen Minister of the Press and field commander, B. Gantamirov. On September 3, Gantamirov was dismissed from government; the night of September 4-5 saw Kadyrov's security service take Grozny's television and the offices of all the eight newspapers published in Grozny under armed control.

On September 11, 2003, the Chechen Supreme Court eliminated the registration of M. Saidulaev as a contender for the position of Chechen President. The reason cited was the inauthenticity of some of the signatures in favor of nominating Saidulaev, based on which he had originally been registered. Saidulaev reminded the Court that together with the signatures he had also submitted a pledge; he now demanded to be registered on the basis of the pledge alone. He was, however, refused, and given the mock explanation that: "If the signature lists and the pledge are submitted on the same day, then in accord with the law, the elections committee has the right to choose the type of registration that it will acknowledge on its own."

Aslakhanov, the most dangerous of the alternative contenders, removed his candidacy from the lists after his conversation with Vladimir Putin; he accepted the offer to become Assistant to the President of the RF instead. In January 2004, the Djabrailov family was also given a "backspacing," most likely, along pre-conceived lines: Khussein Djabrailov's brother Umar was deputized as Chechen senator.

Following this "mopping up operation," voter turnout was subject to doubt. However, in the absence of independent observers, the turnout problem was solved (no international observers were admitted).

On October 5, 2003, Kadyrov was "elected" (allegedly more than 80% with reportedly 86.8% turnout), only to die on May 9 of the following year in a bomb explosion engineered by the separatists at the "Dinamo" Stadium in Grozny.

The next President and former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic, Alu Alkhanov,[16] was elected in late August 2004. The reserve candidate (in case the same fate should befall Alkhanov which had already become Kadyrov's lot) was Movsur Khamidov, head of the management department of the Federal Security Service in Chechnya. Thereafter events followed the same course as at the time of Kadyrov's "election."

On July 22, 2004, Malik Saidulaev was refused registration for running in the presidential elections in Chechnya, which were scheduled for August 29.[17]

These elections were for all intents and purposes ignored by the voters. The official results were: 73.67% of the votes cast for the requisite candidate, with more than 85% voter turnout.

In 2007, Kadyrov's younger son Ramzan, having concentrated sufficient authority under his control (in 2004 he had been unable to take part in the elections because he was then under 30, a legal requirement), achieved Alkhanov's long-term retirement and held new "elections" (this time around, elections for governor were cancelled; the President was elected by Chechen delegates based on the lists provided by the Russian President). He was "elected" unanimously.

Elections to the Chechen Parliament were held in November 2005. Composing the Parliament posed a problem because according to Russian law, at least half the seats were supposed to go to political party candidates elected according to the proportional system. The list of the party in power, "Yedinaya Rossiya," was headed by Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, Minister of Agriculture in the Republic and Ramazan Kadyrov's friend. Tellingly, he was later unanimously elected Chairman of the People's Assembly of the Chechen Republic (!).

Documented sources reflect victory in the elections in favor of "Yedinaya Rossiya" (more than 60%). The party would remain the most strongly represented in the Chechen "Parliament": 33 seats out of 58. Second place was taken by the CPRF (12% and 6 seats), while the SPS got 11% of the vote and 4 seats. The remaining five parties out of eight did not

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[16] Served as head of the local police department in Grozny prior to 1996; fled with the Russian troops; until 2002, occupied modest posts within the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RF; appointed Minister of Internal Affairs in 2002.

[17] Reason: passport not valid due to that place of birth was indicated in it incorrectly. The line in the passport read, "Alkhan-Yurt, Republic of Chechnya," while it should have read, "Alkhan-Yurt, Checheno-Ingush ASSR," insofar as on October 5, 1964, when Saidulaev was born, Chechnya was part of Checheno-Ingushetiya. As journalists have been able to ascertain, Alu Alkhanov, the candidate supported by the party in power, had the same kind of "mistake" made in his passport, which had been issued to him on June 7, 2004: his place of birth was indicated as "Kirovskiy Village of the Kirovskiy Region in the Taldy-Kurgan Oblast, Kazakhstan." But on June 29, 2004 (a mere three weeks later), Alkhanov was issued a new passport, with "Kazakhstan" changed to the correct "Kazakh SSR."

manage to make it over the 5-percent entry barrier established by elections law. 69.59% voter turnout was recorded.

SPS and CPRF lists contain the names of the 2000-2004 "Ichkerian Minister of Defense," M. Khambiev (surrendered to Kadyrov supporters after dozens of his relatives had been taken hostage) and Said-Khamzat Arsanov, also a former field commander.

Some relatively loyal candidates were not able to run in the elections, either. Thus, Chairman of the Chechen State Soviet Taus Djabrailov had been a close associate of the late Akhmat Kadyrov, but was not on terms of mutual understanding with his son. Three days before the elections, he removed his name from the lists.[18] The brother of Malik Saidulaev and the brother of Khassan Ortzuev, wrestling champion of the world, Europe, and the Soviet Union, were kidnapped (this last is the only one to have made it to elections, but his observers were removed from the districts; he "lost" despite extensive philanthropic activities in which he had been involved in the Republic). In this way, Chechen "parliamentary elections" also demonstrated a kind of unanimity which is rare in a civilized country.

- Pre-term "elections" to the Chechen Parliament were held in October 2008. The reason turned out to be a banality: the need to deprive just one (!) Member of Parliament of his seat. The truth of the matter was that an acute conflict had developed in 2008 between the head of Chechnya, R. Kadyrov, and the family of the brothers Ramadaev, also "Ichkerian" field commanders who had switched to the Russian side. They played an important role in the conflict and were for a long time considered to be Kadyrov's close allies. Sulim Yamadaev became commander of the Ministry of Defense "Vostok" battalion; Ruslan Yamadaev was a State Duma Member as per the lists of "Yedinaya Rossiya" in 2003-'07; one of the younger brothers, Badrudi, having been sentenced to imprisonment for attempted murder, had incomprehensibly remained at large, something that came to light after he was involved in an automobile accident. This also testifies to the special attitude harbored toward the family by the authorities. Another brother, Isa, was elected Member of the "Chechen Parliament" in 2005, also from the "Yedinaya Rossiya" party lists. It is hard to say just what the cause of the conflict was – whether it was rumors that the Yamadaevs wanted the post of Head of Chechnya for themselves, which had intensified after the formal transfer of the post of Russian President to D. Medvedev (albeit a formality which could not be guaranteed in advance by anybody in 2008); or whether it was commercial controversies; or perhaps something else. In any case, Kadyrov went so far as to accuse the Yamadaev family of murdering their own father, even though he had earlier claimed that the murderers had been

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[18] Not the worst of all possible scenarios, considering that shortly after the elections, Akhmat Kadyrov's second closest associate, Security Council Secretary Rudnik Dudaev, "died in a fire" in a tiny train car on the premises of a specially guarded building complex of the Chechen Government in Grozny.

found and killed. In 2008 and 2009, the elder brothers, Ruslan and Sulim, were killed; Ramzan Kadyrov's associates were arrested in connection with the plot, but failed to provide any evidence as to the identity of the party ordering the murder. Even so, Isa remained a member of the Chechen Parliament. It was precisely so as to deprive him of his seat that pre-term dissolution of Parliament was proclaimed, leading to new "elections." "Yedinaya Rossiya" allegedly garnered 88.4% of the vote, with "Spravedlivaya Rossiya" coming in as the second party with 9.2%; the CPRF, which had made it in just a mere three years previously, had less than 1%. In 2011, this same assembly would equally unanimously reelect Ramzan Kadyrov as it had first elected him in 2007.

- At present, two schemes are possible for governor elections in Russia (as specified by local law): just as previously, governors can be elected by delegates based on the Russian President's recommendations, or by direct elections; the latter option involves a "municipal filter" which is extremely difficult to pass for the opposition: to register, a candidate must obtain 10% of the municipal delegates' notarized signatures. A further stipulation is that a single delegate may sign for no more than one candidate, and the signatures must be collected in no fewer than three quarters of the municipal assemblies. Given these conditions, Ramzan Kadyrov speaks out in favor of holding direct elections, a point which understandably does a great deal to raise his status in the eyes of the Kremlin.

- The atmosphere during elections was described by Bislan Gantamirov back in 2003:

The key question in the controversies surfacing today between me and the Chechen Republic's government concerns less the parliamentary elections approaching this fall, and more, whether my family will have to pay… Ramzan Kadyrov. My answer to them all is NO! My family will not pay! … The situation in the Republic is such that anything not belonging to Kadyrov's family or not representing this family's interests has no right to exist. Kadyrov's "security service" is an unconstitutional setup, an illegal armed band no different from Basaev's fighters… It is stupid to react with surprise when Chechens are disliked, considering that Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Kadyrov engages in banditry throughout the Northern Caucasus, while the government covers up for him, and thus lends him support.

The case of Chechnya-Ichkeria shows that in the absence of law and order and minimal security guarantees independent of the identity of the party holding the elections or how they are held, the elections' outcome has no bearing on the real distribution of forces in the government.

Sadly enough, the situation in the examples considered above is far from rare. The general sequence of events is thoroughly typical of African elections. Thus Ch. Taylor (Liberia), a violence perpetrator outstanding even by local standards, conveyed to his

population the idea of the ***vital*** need for his victory in the elections. The notion was conveyed via posters displayed by his janissary soldiers: "He has killed my mother, and he has killed my father. I am voting for him." He received 77% of the vote, but later was fortunately deposed in an armed struggle.

Game: Two Bandits

The players are two bandits and the population living on the territory subject to the bandits' control. The object of the game consists in the bandits' preparing for elections and then holding them.

Possible stratagems for the population: to cooperate with one of the two bandits, counting on the protection of "one's own roof" from his rival, or else to cooperate with both (twice as expensive, but considerably safer). ***Once elections are introduced, this latter alternative is ruled out due to the transparency of the results.***

The bandits ($i = 1, 2$) have resources at their disposal and distribute them for their own use; for the struggle against the other bandit (in our game we can let ourselves suppose that these means are devoted to seizing land); and for intimidating the local population. Distribution of these means takes place prior to elections. Let us suppose that M_i stands for the resources available to the ith bandit. The share of the monies spent by each of the bandits on intimidating the local populace will be α_i, and the share spent on the struggle against the other bandit will be β_i (accordingly, for his own use the ith bandit will have $1\text{-}\alpha_i\text{-}\beta_i$). Granting all this, α_i and β_i have the natural restrictions: $0 \leq \alpha_i+\beta_i \leq 1,\ 0 \leq \alpha_i,\ 0 \leq \beta_i,\ i=1,2$.

With monies $\beta_i M_i$ invested in the struggle by the ith bandit, let us suppose that land will be divided in a manner proportionate to the monies invested, so that the first will receive the share of the land indicated by $\dfrac{\beta_1 M_1}{\beta_1 M_1 + \beta_2 M_2}$, while the second will get the share equal to

$\dfrac{\beta_2 M_2}{\beta_1 M_1 + \beta_2 M_2}$ (assuming that $\beta_1+\beta_2>0$). Means invested in intimidating the populace can be supposed to be divided by the bandits in the following manner: 9/10 of these monies are spent on the area subject to the bandits' control, and 1/10 on raids on residents of other areas. We also assume that the bandits pose no threat to "docile" residents.

We will consider clan representatives (Mukhtars, elders, and so on) as representatives of players from the side of the populace; these are the people who decide, in essence, how their relatives will vote. Similarly, in order to justify representing a whole clan by one person, suppose that each such group (or clan) has the same number of voters. All residents can see how cruel each of the bandits is (say, judging by the cruelty of the way he makes short shrift of those

around him and by the number of dead bodies); they know whose territory they live on. Besides, we will assume that the populace settles the area under consideration with equal density throughout, so that an area subject to the ith bandit's control, is inhabited by the share of the population equal to $\dfrac{\beta_i M_i}{\beta_1 M_1 + \beta_2 M_2}$ of the total population. During elections, each resident has two choices: to vote for the first bandit or for the second. Victory in the elections is determined by the majority of the votes (we are assuming that ties do not occur). The victorious bandit gets "humanitarian aid" in the amount of Q. The gains of the bandit who wins the elections *(i)* will thus comprise $Q+(1-\alpha_i-\beta_i)M_i$, while those of the loser will amount to *(j)* – $(1-\alpha_j-\beta_j)M_j$), or only those means which had been allocated for his personal use.

Residents' preferences are of a lexicographic nature: first and foremost, they attempt to preserve their own lives and those of their dear ones, and only then begin to take all other goods into account. In this way, during elections residents will vote for the bandit who poses the least threat to their lives.

It bears noting that the threat for the residents may stem not only from the bandit against whom the residents have voted; it is also independent of the outcome of the elections (the decision about means to be allocated for intimidating the populace is something the bandits reach prior to elections and then leave unchanged, never touching the "loyal" residents).

For residents living in the first bandit's territory, the losses expressive of the ratio of probabilities of dying at the bandits' hands (provided that $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 > 0$) amount to

- $\dfrac{1}{10} \dfrac{\alpha_2 M_2}{\alpha_1 M_1 + \alpha_2 M_2}$ in case the resident has voted for the first ("one's own") bandit

($\alpha_2 M_2$ indicates the monetary resources invested by the second bandit, 1/10 is the share of these resources spent on another's territory);

- $\dfrac{9}{10} \dfrac{\alpha_1 M_1}{\alpha_1 M_1 + \alpha_2 M_2}$ in case the resident has voted for the second (the "other guy's")

bandit ($\alpha_1 M_1$ indicates the monetary resources invested by the first bandit, 9/10 is the share of these resources spent on home territory).

{Should the ith bandit not invest money in intimidating the populace, then violence surmounting some threshold significance will be required in order to enable the jth bandit to win over residents from the territory indicated to his side. Should neither of the two bandits invest in violence, then the most profitable course for the residents to pursue will be to vote for "their own man." }

Let $k = \dfrac{\alpha_2 M_2}{\alpha_1 M_1}$ signify the ratio of the resources invested in violence. We remind the reader that residents aim to minimize their losses, so that given $k>9$, they will vote for the second bandit, and in a situation when $k<9$, they will vote for the first. That is, from the second bandit's point of view, in order for the residents of another's land area to vote for him (he being the second bandit), he must invest 9 times as much money in intimidating the populace as the first bandit.

For residents living on the territory of the second bandit, the losses amount to

- $\dfrac{9}{10} \dfrac{\alpha_2 M_2}{\alpha_1 M_1 + \alpha_2 M_2}$ in case the residents have voted for the first (the "other guy's")

bandit;

- $\dfrac{1}{10} \dfrac{\alpha_1 M_1}{\alpha_1 M_1 + \alpha_2 M_2}$ in case the residents have voted for the second bandit ("their

own").

Given $k = \dfrac{\alpha_2 M_2}{\alpha_1 M_1} > 1/9$, the residents will vote for the second bandit, while if $k<1/9$, they will vote for the first. That is, from the first bandit's point of view, in order to make the residents of another's territory vote for him, he must invest 9 times the amount of money in intimidating the populace that the second bandit has invested.

Thus, if

- $k>9$, the entire population of both regions will, according to our model, vote for the second bandit independently of how the land is distributed, and the second bandit will win;

- $k<1/9$, the entire population of both regions will, according to our model, vote for the second bandit, and the first bandit will win;

- $1/9<k<9$, all the residents of each area will vote for their own bandit; i.e., for the one on whose territory they live. Victory in the elections is determined by the ratio of the number of residents in the territories of the first and the second bandits, which is the same as the ratio of the means invested by each in his competition against the other.

Let us consider two resource ratios possible at the outset:

1) $M_1 = M_2$. That is, the bandits start out with identical resources. Neither of them can afford (has the requisite means for) investing in violence against the populace sums of money which will exceed the parallel investment made by his opponent by a factor of 9 (more precisely, the other always has the opportunity to eliminate this imbalance). Victory in the elections will thus be determined by the way the land is divided between them. Let us also note that it is not profitable for anybody to set resources aside for personal use when

they could be invested in taking possession of land, and so increasing the likelihood of victory. There is either no Nash equilibrium of pure strategies in such a layout of the game (given the restriction that a tie is impossible), or else the bandits have a motive for agreeing to imposing restrictions on violence. An example can be taken from the informal agreements of the mid-'90s among Russian entrepreneurs, which brought down the level of ordered murders (O. Kiselev[19])).

2) $M_1 >> M_2$. That is, one bandit's resources outdistance the other's by a great deal (without restrictions on commonality, we will take it that this is the first bandit), if gains from the elections yield resources great enough (for instance, so as to be comparable with the resources of the second bandit). In this situation, there is no equilibrium in which the second bandit wins the elections and gets a "bonus," since the first can outdo the second in both resources invested in terrorism and in those invested in competition against the rival; he can then also go on to redeem everything by winning the elections. That is, the equilibrium will consist in victory with minimal investment of resources, impossible to outdo by the other (and with zero investment by the second in terrorism and in competition with the rival). This equilibrium may not be achieved if

- The leader's resources draw the majority of the "field commanders" to him; however, having a strong preference for personal use or simply spending the resources in an ineffective way, he begins to lose in "investments" in mutual struggle and intimidation;

- The preference profile of an outsider bandit is not described by money received, but includes (with the utmost priority) other goods, such as, for instance, authority and power.

The case fits many of the situations described above from either Chechnya or the Arab [Palestinian National] Authority.

Conclusions

A Pareto-efficient equilibrium is impossible to achieve under conditions of "non-liberal democracy." That is, in the absence of reliable guarantees of basic rights, beginning with the right to life, physical security (immunity of the individual person), freedom of speech, conscience, and private property, democratic procedure makes cooperating with the most dangerous bandit the most sound course of action.

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[19] See *Liberal'naya missiya [Liberal Mission]* 2003, p. 51.

At the same time, the transparency of such "democratic elections" does not let the populace bribe all of the strongest gangs. Usefulness deteriorates considerably. The stability of the equilibrium achieved is in no way connected with progress in economic development (there will simply be no progress), but only depends on those factors which determine the ratio of forces among the bandits. Except for the relatively rare long-term equilibrium of these forces, what remains stable in all cases is the fact of arbitrariness and violence, which block motivation for hard work and investment.

Introducing the institutions of free elections and political competition must thus be based on a sound and previously established foundation consisting of personal security, immunity, and property. India's experience deserves special attention in this connection.

In order for the accumulation of democratic experience to combine with preserving the rigid frameworks of law and order, it is helpful in certain cases to use the experience of the democracy of the taxpayer which includes voting qualification requirements.

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Appendix 1.
Election Results in the Arab [Palestinian National] Authority in Israel, 2005.

District	Fatah	HAMAS	Others
Single district (elections by lists): 66 seats	27 (403458 votes)	30 (434817 votes)	9 (120517 votes)
Bethlehem	2 (Christians)	2	0
Jenin	2	2	0
Jericho	1	0	0
Jerusalem	2 (Christians)	4	0
Hebron – Ramada	0	9	0
Deir el-Balah	1	2	0
Ramallah and El-Bireh	1 (Christians)	4	0
Rafah	3	0	0
Northern Gaza	0	5	0
Tubas	0	1	0
Tulkarm	0	2	1
Gaza	0	5	3
Kalkilya	2	0	0
Shechem (Nablus)	1	5	0
Total (132 seats)	43	76	13

To sum up, distribution by district:
HAMAS – 45
Independents – 4
FATAH – 16, including small cities and village towns (without Gaza) – 7, Christian districts – 5, and "refugee" camps – 2.

English by Elen Rochlin