

## ON REVISION OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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*In the new version of the Military Doctrine, the topical issues of the Russian Military Doctrine remained unchanged in general, however, such objectives as optimization of defense expenditures, efficient planning and allocation of financial and material resources were excluded from its text, which situation creates higher risks in planning of the state armament program in the 2016–2025 period. Due to the fact that it is impossible in present conditions to make macroeconomic forecasts for more than 1–2 years, a mechanism of the official annual revision of that program is to be introduced.*

On December 26, 2014, on the Kremlin's official Web-site the new version of the Military Doctrine (MD) of Russia updated by decision of July 5, 2013 of the Russian Security Council (SC) was published; the new version of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation<sup>1</sup> was developed by the interdepartmental working group under the Office the Security Council<sup>2</sup>. The new version was considered and approved at the SC briefing session led by the President of the Russian Federation on December 19. Though in the information message of the Security Council it was stated in connection with the above event that: "topical issues of the existing Military Doctrine remained unchanged in its new version"<sup>3</sup>, amendments introduced into that document are worth paying attention to.

Examination of those amendments by clause-by-clause comparison of the texts of the new version (hereinafter, MD-2014) and the previous one approved by D. Medvedev<sup>4</sup> on February 2010 (hereinafter, MD-2010) confirms their "genetic affinity" and also permits to get some idea about the motives of the editorial staff.

To begin with, as a result of revision of the MD the text of a number of clauses has been reduced (MD-2010: I.1, I.2 and other), thus making reading at some points easier, however, such an important objective of the military and economic support of the defense as "optimization of defense expenditures, efficient plan-

ning and allocation of financial and material resources" (MD-2010: IV.39b) was removed. A reference in the new version (MD-2014: IV.44a) to the need of "concentration of the country's financial and material and technical resources and upgrading of efficiency of utilization thereof" seems to be an inadequate substitution and an attempt by SC to get rid of any mention of the very fact of existence even on paper of budget limitations for the military institution.

In the new version (MD-2014: IV.49), the tautology – "mobilization and strategic deployment" (MD-2010: IV.43 (2)) – was corrected, however, "the risk of global extremism" (MD-2014: II.12κ) was included in the number of the main external military threats to the Russian Federation; it is to be noted that though that threat is a "growing" one it thus erodes the vague difference between *a military threat* (MD-2014: II.8b, II.8v) and *military risk* (MD-2014: II.8v).

In the new version, the number of external military risks rose from 11 to 14 due to adding in that list the unintended use of information and communication technologies (MD-2014: II.12m), dangerous "regimes" in neighboring countries (MD-2014: II.12n) and subversive activities of foreign secret services (MD-2014: II.12o). It is not surprising due to the fact that the SC assessment of the international situation changed from being fairly neutral (MD-2010: II.7) to a negative one (MD-2014: II.9) which is characterized – according to the SC – by "growing global competition, higher tensions in different areas of international and inter-regional cooperation, rivalry between value systems and development models and volatility of economic and political development processes on the global and regional levels in a situation of general worsening of international relations". Certainly, one may not agree with such an opinion, but one cannot but appreciate the genius of the editors to formulate the same thing in a different way.

The number of internal military threats rose from 3 to 4 with adding to that list the activities related to "information action against the population, prima-

1 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. URL: <http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf> (date of application: 26.12.2014).

2 The Security Council of the Russian Federation: by the end of 2014 Russia will update the military doctrine // RIA Novosti. September 2, 2014. URL: <http://ria.ru/interview/20140902/1022334103.html> (date of application: 02.09.2014).

3 On the results of the SC briefing meeting on the issue "On Updating the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation". December 20, 2014. URL: <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/838.html> (date of application: 21.01.2015).

4 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. URL: [http://news.kremlin.ru/ref\\_notes/461](http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461) (date of application: 29.12.2014).

rily, young people" aimed at "undermining historical, moral and patriotic traditions inherent to protection of the country" (MD-2014: II.13v). Fortunately, *military threats* to the Russian Federation (MD-2014: II.14a–II.14d) remained virtually unchanged as regards both their number (5) and the content which factor cannot but surprise in a situation of the above-mentioned changes in the international situation and multiplication of military risks. In addition to the above, the above-mentioned new military threats and risks have nothing to do with the main objectives of the armed forces, other troops and security agencies in peace and war time (MD-2014: II.32–34).

Along with traditional reference to growth in military threats to the Russian Federation "in a number of lines" (MD-2010: II.7, MD-2014: II.11), in the new version of the Military Doctrine a conclusion was made that there was a trend of "a shift of military threats and military risks to the information space and internal domain of the Russian Federation". Due to the fact that "information space" and "internal domain" are not mentioned among the main notions of the Military Doctrine (MD-2014: I.8a–I.8n), one can only speculate about the effect of the above shift on the country's defense.

In the above list of the main notions, the definition of the system of *nuclear deterrent* (MD-2014: I.8n) as a complex of "foreign policy, military and military-technical measures aimed at prevention of an aggression against the Russian Federation by non-nuclear means" was added as an innovation of the updated version; the above innovation was widely discussed in the mass media<sup>1</sup>. As the definition of nuclear deterrent was not listed among the main definitions either of the former text or the latest text of the Military Doctrine, it is difficult to judge to what extent that innovation specified anything, as well as to understand what the above "non-nuclear means" refer to: either to "an aggression" or "prevention".

The Military Doctrine still includes (MD-2010: III.22, MD-2014: III.26) a doubtful clause on the intent to use precision weapons "within the frameworks of strategic deterrent military measures", that is, the right to carry out *a preemptive strike* with use of precision weapons which situation blurs the difference between a conventional war and nuclear war.

It is worth mentioning the efforts of the authors of the new version of the Military Doctrine as regards changing of the place and role of mobilization in the Military Doctrine. Firstly, in the list of the main defi-

nitions "the mobilization readiness of the Russian Federation" (MD-2014: I.8m) was added. Secondly, "maintenance of mobilization readiness of the economy of the Russian Federation, state authorities, local government authorities and entities" emerged in the list of the main objectives of the Russian Federation as regards deterrent and prevention of military conflicts (MD-2014: III.21d). Thirdly, the Subsection: "Mobilization Preparation of the Economy, State Authorities, Local Government Authorities and Entities" moved from Section IV: "Military and Economic Support of the Defense" (MD-2010: IV.47–IV.48) to Section III: "The Military Policy of the Russian Federation" as the Subsection: "Mobilization Preparation and Mobilization Readiness of the Russian Federation" (MD-2014: III.40–III.41) instead of Subsection: "Military Planning" (MD-2010: III.35–III.37) which existed before. It is to be noted that the Military Doctrine concurrently got rid of not only military planning, but also the need to develop mobilization plans (MD-2010: IV.48g). Disappearance of the Section: "Military Planning" is probably related to a delay in development of the "new updated version" of the Clause on Military Planning<sup>2</sup> specified in the previous version of the Military Doctrine (MD-2010: III.37).

Other gains of the new version of the Military Doctrine, that is, the mention in it of the Arctic Region, BRIC countries, South Osetia and Abkhazia and even formation of territorial troops (MD-2014: III.39z) in addition to the territorial defense which was mentioned before can hardly make up for a loss of such an important line as "inadmissibility of the arms race" in the clause on the military policy (MD-2010: III.17, MD-2014: III.18).

The architects of the state armament program for the 2016–2025 period will have to fulfill the requirements of President V. Putin and take into account the provisions of the new version of the Military Doctrine<sup>3</sup>. However, in the present-day economic conditions the inviability of the existing format<sup>4</sup> of the state armament program is quite apparent; due to the fact that it is infeasible to make forecasts for more than 1–2 years a mechanism of official annual revision of that program (on the model of developed countries)<sup>5</sup> is to be

1 See, for example: O. Yelensky. The Hard Style of the "Exceptionally Defensive" Doctrine // Independent Military Review. January 23–29, 2015 (No. 2). P. 1, 8. [http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2015-01-23/1\\_doctrina.html](http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2015-01-23/1_doctrina.html) (date of application: 23.01.2015).

2 Meeting of the Security Council: Verbatim. Moscow, July 13, 2013. <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/18529> (date of application: 27.01.2015).

3 Meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission. Novo-Ogarevo, January 20, 2015. <http://state.kremlin.ru/commission/41/news/47493> (date of application: 23.01.2015).

4 10-year depth of planning with a five-year interval.

5 See, for example: The Defense Equipment Plan 2014 (the UK). [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/396102/20150112-EP\\_Plan\\_Document-Final\\_OS\\_to\\_PDF\\_version-2-1.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/396102/20150112-EP_Plan_Document-Final_OS_to_PDF_version-2-1.pdf) (date of application: 23.01.2015).

introduced. Otherwise, inflexible military plans may destroy the Russian economy altogether.

Certainly, in analyzing the Military Doctrine as a document it is to be remembered that it is only a visible portion of the “iceberg” which is demonstrated

on purpose. One should neither underestimate, nor overestimate its importance. Undoubtedly, publication of the new version of the Military Doctrine is a signal to the outside world, but real actions are a more important signal. ●