

FORTHCOMING NATIONAL ARMS PROGRAM: NEW PRIORITIES AND OLD ISSUES

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The priorities of a new National Arms Program for 2016–2025 have been published. However, the well-known issues are unlikely to see a successful resolution, because this area is extremely sensitive to information disclosure. The Russian President's demand to create a transparent defense economy and establish order in the management of the Military-Industrial Complex is still facing serious difficulties.

While the National Arms Program (NAP) for 2011–2020 approved by the confidential Edict of the President of the Russian Federation issued on December 31, 2010, No. 1565¹ was still in force in 2013, the draft of a new NAP for 2016–2025 have been under development over more than a year based on the Resolution of October 24, 2012 issued by the Military-Industrial Commission (MIC) under the Government of Russia.

The MIC resolved a year ago that a new NAP “will be based upon the national security threat forecast for 30 years and the military-technical data for the decade to come”². Additionally, the leaders of the MIC made a decision at that time to update the development and implementation rules for the NAP. This is why the Russian Government Regulation of August 30, 2007, No. 549 “On the Approval of the Rules for the Development and Implementation of National Arms Programs” approved by the Edict of the President of the Russian Federation of July 2, 2013 No. 599 “On the Development and Implementation of the National Arms Program” was replaced by new unpublished Rules for the Development and Implementation of the National Arms Program³ which are similar to the previous rules. The MIC intention to rest upon the au-

thority of the President of Russia within the Russian vertical power structure can easily be explained by the absence of any legislative regulation in this field and a well-known negative attitude of the Ministry of Defense of Russia towards the draft law “On the National Arms Program”⁴.

The draft NAP for 2016–2025 is being developed by a work group headed by MIC's First Deputy Chairman Kharchenko I. who makes no secret of the fact that the respective works have been organized resembling closely the Soviet top-secret provision on the MIC of 1987⁵. The draft of the new NAP is to be submitted to the President of Russia in July 2015, pursuant to the approved schedule. Furthermore, the document will traditionally consist of 10 specific programs of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, one program for the rest of the national security, defense and law enforcement agencies and another program on fundamental, exploring, applied and technological research and development projects⁶.

1 Бюллетень Счетной палаты. 2013. № 10. С. 88. URL: http://www.ach.gov.ru/userfiles/bulletins/2013-10-06-buletен_doc_files-fl-2454.pdf (дата обращения: 28.10.2013). [The Bulletin of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation (date of access: 28.10.2013).]

2 Дмитрий Rogozin провел заседание Военно-промышленной комиссии при Правительстве России. 30 января 2013. URL: http://government.ru/vice_news/264 (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [Dmitry Rogozin held a meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government of Russia on January 30, 2013 (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

3 Упоминание см. в: Постановление Правительства Российской Федерации от 26 декабря 2013 г. № 1255 «О Правилах разработки государственного оборонного заказа и его основных показателей». URL: <http://government.ru/media/files/41d4b14a9f6650a43347.pdf> (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [The reference can be found in the Russian Government Regulation of December 26, 2013 No. 1255 “On the Rules for the Development of the State Defense Order and its Core Indicators” (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

4 Законодательное обеспечение государственной политики в области развития оборонно-промышленного комплекса в соответствии с целями и задачами реформирования Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации (по материалам парламентских слушаний, состоявшихся в Государственной Думе Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации 3 июня 2010 г.) // Аналитический вестник. Серия: Оборона и безопасность. 2010. Вып. 17. URL: <http://iam.duma.gov.ru/node/8/4589/16018> (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [Legal support to the national policy towards the development of the military-industrial complex for the purposes of reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (based on the materials of the parliament hearings held on June 3, 2010 in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation) // Anlitchesky vestnik. Series: Oborona (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

5 Деятельность Военно-промышленной комиссии и гособоронзаказ // Эхо Москвы. 2013. 12 августа. URL: <http://echo.msk.ru/programs/arsenal/1132844-echo/> (дата обращения: 28.10.2013). [The activity of the Military-Industrial Commission and State Defense Order // Echo of Moscow. August 12, 2013 (date of access: 28.10.2013).]

6 Программу вооружения до 2025 г. представят президенту РФ через два года // РИА Новости. 2013. 25 июня. URL: http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130625/945662520.html (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [An arms program will be presented to the Russia's President in two years // Rianovosty. June 25, 2013 (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

Despite the foregoing, the initial public statements about the new NAP made by top managers of the MIC and the Ministry of Defense of Russia made it clear that the new NAP will differ fundamentally from the one being in effect.

For instance, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Yuriy Borisov attended a meeting on naval construction which was held at the Krylov State Research Center (St. Petersburg) early in September 2013. He pointed out at the meeting that “in developing the next defense program we would like to focus on the quality, because this program will receive less financing than the program in effect”¹ and future terms of reference will be intended to achieve maximum unification, optimization of characteristics and extend the calendar term of military service². MIC Chairman, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin pointed out in Nizhny Tagil at the end of the same month that “the forthcoming program is designed to create different air, ground, subwater and other types of robotechniques. Second, designing weapons which are based on new physical principles”³.

“The Ministry of Defense intends beginning with 2015 to introduce qualitative changes to the national military technical policy in this field and design the forthcoming NAP in the way to enhance the quality of weapons rather than the quantity of supplied modern equipment”⁴ Mr. Borisov added in November 2013 to what was previously said. Furthermore, the list of purchased weapons and military equipment (WME) will be shortened 25%⁵ for the Land Forces by 2025. For the time being, most detailed priorities of the NAP for 2016–2025 were set by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin at the State Duma on December 11, 2013, namely:

1. “Arms forces automated control system, battlefield automated control system, battlefield visualization, robotechniques”.
2. “Reducing the types of weaponry, military and special equipment”.
3. “Modularity”.
4. “inter-branch unification and creation of inter-field apparatuses”.
5. “Electronic component base”.
6. Transition to full life-cycle contracts⁶.

Such a detailed comprehension of the specifics of the new NAP by the MIC’s top managers would seem to allow them to feel confident about the future, but it is not the case. The proposed list of priorities contains no indisputable solutions while at least five of them have long been well known, because they used to be listed among the objectives of the Soviet arms programs. It is uncontrolled growth in the WME list and the lack of their unification that became a key driver towards the transition to the long-term planning of the arms development which was introduced in the USSR by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers’ Regulation of June 10, 1969 No. 433-157-69 “On the Further Enhancement of the Planning of the Development of Weapons and Military Equipment”⁷ as early as 45 years ago.

It appears that the military-political leaders of this country and the MIC’s top managers believe that Rb 20 trillion allocated to the NAP in force will help not only achieve its primary objective of upgrading 70–100% of the WME by 2020, but also resolve the internal issues of the NAP itself. At the aforementioned meeting on naval construction at St. Petersburg on September 5, 2013 Deputy Minister of Defense Mr. Borisov listed the following reasons for the failure to implement the previous NAPs, namely incorrect estimation of forward-looking appropriation, high level of inflation, poor advancing of funds, underestimated prices adopted during the development of the NAP, and higher-than-anticipated growth in the costs of products, which “rendered unserviceable a national program in the year that followed a year of its adoption”⁸.

1 Морской бой по новым правилам игры // Коммерсантъ. 2013. 6 сентября. URL: <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2272302/> (дата обращения: 28.10.2013). [Battleship under new game rules // Kommersant. September 6, 2013 (date of access: 28.10.2013).]

2 Ibid.

3 Новая госпрограмма вооружений будет основана на робототехнике // Интерфакс. 2013. 25 сентября. URL: <http://www.interfax.ru/russia/news/330960> (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [A new national arms program will be based on the robotechniques // Interfax. September 25, 2013 (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

4 МО хочет сделать упор на качестве продукции в рамках ГПВ 2016–2025 гг. // РИА Новости. 2013. 20 ноября. URL: http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20131120/978408039.html (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [The Ministry of Defense wants to focus on the quality of products as part of the National Arms Program // RIA Novosti. November 20, 2013 (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

5 Минобороны РФ сокращает номенклатуру вооружений и военной техники Сухопутных войск // Независимая газета. 2013. 21 ноября. URL: <http://www.ng.ru/news/450077.html> (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [The Ministry of Defense of Russia shortens the list of weapons and military equipment at the Land Forces (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

6 Стенограмма заседания Государственной Думы 11 декабря 2013. URL: <http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/node/3973/> (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [The shorthand report of the sitting of the State Duma on December 11, 2013 (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

7 Патрушев Н. На сильных не нападают // Военно-промышленный курьер. 2013. 27 марта (№ 12). URL: <http://vprk-news.ru/articles/15103> (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [Patrushev N. The strong ones are not supposed to be attacked // Voenno-promyshlenny kurier. March 27, 2013 (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

8 Морской бой по новым правилам игры // Коммерсантъ. 2013. 6 сентября. URL: <http://www.kommersant.ru/>

The developers of all Russian NAPs in the Ministry of Defense of Russia classify as NAP's issues of concern such issues as "making volumes of planned supplies of weaponry, military and special equipment (MSE) in the arms forces be adequate to the objectives of standing up to threats to military security of the state and consistent with its economic potential; ensuring completeness of MSE deliveries; as well as guidelines for the development of technological advance in the context of future weapons"¹.

Furthermore, even a simple, as it may seem, issue of identifying the NAP's principal performance target – the contribution of modern WME – has been found to encounter difficulties. It has appeared that after the NAP in force was adopted, its developers were facing serious difficulties when they estimated the specified contribution, insisting on classifying as "outdated" the samples supplied by manufacturers during the previous periods of the program². The uncertainty in this issue wasn't coped with until March 12, 2012 when the First Deputy Minister of Defense approved guidance papers which established the procedure for estimating the equipment coefficient, the up-to-dateness coefficient, and the serviceability coefficient – the vital metrics of section 4 in the passport of the NAP for 2011–2020³.

The NAP developers' recognition of serious simulation problems⁴ or, rather, the lack of required models nowadays, challenges the accuracy of forecasting

the demand from the Ministry of Defense of Russia. No less challenging is forecasting the supply from the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) both in terms of the physical volume and the cost of products. It is well-known that the "input-output" base tables for 2011 won't be officially published until Q4 2015⁵ and can hardly have an impact on the quality of planning of a new NAP for 2016–2025.

Understandably, there is no hope that the NAP in force will show inarguable accuracy, let alone optimality. The Russian top-rank leaders' unconcealed concern about the use of the MIC's production capacities "beyond the horizon of the implementation of the National Arms Program, when our principal manufacturing facilities have accomplished their tasks in this field by 2020"⁶ becomes a kind of indirect recognition of its serious shortcomings. However, the MIC will inevitably face a recession after 2020⁷, because its enterprises will inevitably find themselves out of demand owing to the peculiarities of the decisions made in 2010. The Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation (Minpromtorg) has insufficient capabilities for redressing the current situation⁸ without having to make adjustments to the NAP in force and the federal target program on "The Development of the Military-Industrial Complex in the Russian Federation until 2020", provided that the budget maneuver"⁹

doc/2272302/ (дата обращения: 28.10.2013). [Battleship under new game rules // Kommersant. September 6, 2013 (date of access: 28.10.2013).]

1 Буренок В.М. Направления совершенствования методической базы обоснования проекта новой Государственной программы вооружения // Вооружения и экономика. 2013. № 1(22). С. 3. URL: http://www.viek.ru/vie_13_1.pdf (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [Burenok V. M. The guidelines (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

2 Буравлев А.И., Монин С.А. Методика оценки технического уровня парка вооружения и военной техники в ходе реализации программных мероприятий по ее закупке и ремонту // Вооружения и экономика. 2013. № 1(22). С. 8. URL: http://www.viek.ru/vie_13_1.pdf (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [Buravlev A. I., Monin S. A. The technique (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

3 Буравлев А.И., Гладышевский В.Л., Пьянков А.А. Методика формирования агрегированного показателя эффективности реализации государственной программы вооружения // Вооружения и экономика. 2013. № 3(24). С. 6. URL: http://www.viek.ru/vie_13_3.pdf (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [Buravlev A. I., Gladyshevsky V. L., Pyankov A. A. The (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

4 Буренок В.М., Цырендоржиев С.Р. Создание системы моделирования – необходимое условие развития Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации // Вооружения и экономика. 2013. № 4(25). С. 4–11. URL: http://www.viek.ru/vie_13_4.pdf (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [Burenok V. M., Tsyrendozhiev S. P. Creating a simulation system is the necessary condition for the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

5 Михеева Н. Таблицы «затраты—выпуск»: новые возможности экономического анализа // Вопросы экономики. 2011. № 7. С. 144. [Mikheeva N. Input-Output Tables: New opportunities for economic analysis // Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2011. No. 7, p. 144.]

6 Путин В. Вступительное слово на совещании о деятельности Фонда перспективных исследований. Стенограмма. Тула, 20 января 2014. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/news/20087> (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). См. также: Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию. М., 12 декабря 2014. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/19825> (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [Putin V. An introductory speech at a meeting dedicated to the performance of the Advanced Research Foundation. Short-hand notes. Tula, January 20, 2014 (date of access: 21.01.2014). See also the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. M. December 12, 2014 (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

7 Чечкин Е. Все равно получается автомат Калашникова // Эксперт Урал. 2014. № 3–4. URL: <http://expert.ru/ural/2014/04/vse-ravno-poluchaetsya-avtomat-kalashnikova/> (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [Chechkin E. A Kalashnikov gun is unavoidable result // Expert Ural. 2014. No. 3-4 (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

8 Минпромторг к июню решит вопрос загрузки заводов после выполнения ГОЗ // РИА Новости. 2014. 9 июня. URL: http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20140109/988351488.html (дата обращения: 21.01.2014). [Minpromtorg is to decide by June on how to load plants after the state defense order is completed // Rianovosti, June 9, 2014 (date of access: 21.01.2014).]

9 Долгосрочной стратегии не хватает времени // Коммерсантъ. 2014. 28 января. URL: <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2393696> (дата обращения: 28.01.2014). [A long-term strategy runs out of time // Kommersant. January 28, 2014 (date of access: 28.01.2014).]

nearly delayed in August 2013 is implemented. In this case, potential reductions may cover 30–35% in the former case and up to 67% in the latter case, if one recalls the yet unexplained bouncing in the amount of financing of these programs by the moment of their approval against those which were mentioned during their development.

Meanwhile, the key risks to which the forthcoming NAP for 2016–2025 is exposed are associated with the effects of confidentiality of the July decree on its development, thereby showing that the Russian public administration system is incapable to learn from its own mistakes. And it remains to be seen how they will develop...